No U.N. Resolution against Israel is enforceable. (biased)

No U.N. Resolution against Israel is enforceable. (biased)

No U.N. Resolution against Israel is enforceable.

History and Archeology is the best proof Greater Israel belongs to the Jewish People and non-other.
The Arabs have no claims whatsoever to Israel.
Prominent PLO Arab says there are no 'Palestinians' and no "Palestine"

PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein admitted in a March 31, 1977 interview with a Dutch newspaper Trouw.

"The Palestinian people do not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct 'Palestinian people' to oppose Zionism. "

The Qur'an 17:104 - states the land belongs to the Jewish people

If the historic documents, comments written by eyewitnesses and declarations by the most authoritative Arab scholars are still not enough, let us quote the most important source for Muslim Arabs:
"And thereafter we [Allah] said to the Children of Israel: 'Dwell securely in the Promised Land. And when the last warning will come to pass, we will gather you together in a mingled crowd'.".

The Myth of 'Occupied' Territories

The Myth of 'Occupied' Territories
[Boris Shusteff]
Summary ... To truely determine the legal status of the area known as Yesha (Judea, Samaria and Gaza), it is important to understand the different types of UN resolutions. Once this is understood, it becomes clear there is no such thing as the Israeli-occupied territories. (If anything, they are actually Arab-occupied territories.)

One of the most misused, misapplied and misunderstood definitions in the dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the term "occupied territories". The vast majority of people simply do not know the facts or misinterpret them, thus completely distorting the real picture of the land distribution between the Arabs and the Jews. The truth of the matter is that, according to international law, the Jews have the complete and unquestionable right to settle the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza (collectively known as Yesha). Not a single enforceable international document exists that forbids them from settling the lands of Yesha.

On the contrary, the only existing enforceable document actually encourages Jewish settlement. This document was created on April 24, 1920 at the San Remo Conference when the Principal Allied Powers agreed to assign the Mandate for the territory of Palestine to Great Britain. By doing so the League of Nations "recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" and established "grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." Article 6 of the Mandate "encouraged ... close settlement by Jews on the land," including the lands of Judea, Samaria and Gaza (Yesha).

There is nothing whatsoever in the Mandate that separates Yesha from the rest of the mandated territory. That means that the right of the Jews to settle the land spreads to the whole of Palestine. As a side note it is worth mentioning that the 76% of the territory of Mandated Palestine known today as Jordan, were [sic] not permanently exempt from settlement by the Jews either. Article 25 only allowed to "postpone or withhold application of [this] provision."

With the disbanding of the League of Nations, the rights of the Jews to settle the territories of Palestine, including Yesha, were not hurt. When in 1946 the United Nations was created in place of the League of Nations, its Charter included Article 80 specifically to allow the continuation of existing Mandates (including the British Mandate). Article 80 stated that "nothing ... shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever ... of any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."

Then in November 1947 came time for Resolution 181, which recommended the Partition of Palestine. Like all UN Resolutions pertaining to the Jewish-Arab conflict it was not enforceable. It was simply a recommendation, and the Arab countries rejected it. As the Syrian representative in the General Assembly stated:

"In the first place the recommendations of the General Asembly are not imperative on those to whom they are addressed.... The General Assembly only gives advice and the parties to whom advice is addressed accept it when it is rightful and just and when it does not impair their fundamental rights"(1).

If the resolution had been implemented maybe it would be possible to argue that it replaced the San Remo Conference resolution, which had legitimized the rights of the Jews to settle in any place in Palestine. However, it was not only rejected by the Arabs, but in violation of the UN Charter they launched a military aggression against the newly reborn Jewish state thus invalidating the resolution. By the time of the ceasefire at the end of the War of Independence there was still no other enforceable document pertaining to the rights of the Jews to settle Eretz Yisrael - they remained intact.

Now we approach the most misunderstood aspect of the scope and application of international documents. In order to resolve the puzzle of the "occupied" territories, one must clearly distinguish between the different types of resolutions passed by the United Nations. Misconceptions about the issue led to the question of a double standard that was constantly raised by the Arabs after the Persian Gulf War. The Arabs were unable to understand why from Iraq the UN demanded compliance with the decisions of the international body while Israel was not forced to comply with UN resolutions.

On April 3, 1998 Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen, well known for championing the Arabs' position, in an interview with the London al-Quds al-'Arabi, gave an explanation of this "paradox." She was asked, "What about the double standards that the United States and Europe adopt when it comes to Arab issues?" She answered,

"I understand this view, which is common in many Arab countries. Nevertheless, the UN resolutions passed on Iraq are different, because they are binding for all nations according to Article 7 of the UN Charter. Meanwhile, the resolutions passed against Israel are not subject to Article 7 of the Charter."

To better understand the way UN resolutions work, it is worth reading an open letter by Uri Lubrani, coordinator of Israeli activities in Lebanon, addressed to Lebanon's Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz and published on February 27, 1998 in the Paris newspaper al Watan al-'Arabi. Although the letter was written regarding Resolution 425, it talks about all resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Uri Lubrani wrote the following,

"... There are two types of resolutions in the Security Council. The first type are resolutions passed on the basis of Chapter Six of the UN charter that relates to the settlement of disputes through peaceful means. Such resolutions are considered recommendations. They are not binding, and they do not require immediate implementation.... The second type of resolutions are based on Chapter Seven of the UN charter.... This chapter grants the UN Security Council resolutions an implementative authority and commits the international community to use force if necessary to implement these resolutions.... None of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict, including Resolution 425, were passed on the basis of Chapter Seven. They were passed on the basis of Chapter Six of the UN charter, which is the basis also of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338."

Since no mandatory UN Resolution exists pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are left with the San Remo Conference decision that governs land ownership in Palestine. That means that not a single enforceable internationally valid document exists that prevents or prohibits the Jews from settling anywhere in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and all the rest of Eretz Yisrael. Or, to put it differently, from the standpoint of international law for the Jews it is not an occupied land.

This conclusion was confirmed not long ago by an unexpected (for Israel) source. It is hard to argue with the fact that James Baker, former US Secretary of State, was not the best friend of the Jewish state. However, he categorically rejected the mislabeling of the lands of Yesha. This happened at the Middle East Insight Symposium in Washington on May 4, 1998. Hoda Tawfik, from the newspaper Al Ahram asked him, "What do you think is right? That these are occupied Arab territories and not disputed territories?" Baker replied, "They're clearly disputed territories. That's what Resolutions 242 and 338 are all about. They are clearly disputed territories."

All of this means that when the Jews build settlements in Yesha, they are not building them on "occupied" territories. If one wants, one may call them "disputed" territories, as Baker did. However, this will still not change the fact that from the standpoint of international law it is the very land where the Jews were encouraged to settle.

And as a final note, it should not be surprising that the San Remo Conference plays such an important role in this particular case. The majority of the other players in the conflict: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, etc. gained sovereignty over their territories based on the decisions of exactly the same conference. The Jews finally deserve to settle freely on their territories as well. It is time to stop labeling them "occupied".

1. Abba Eban. Voice of Israel. Horizon Press, New York, 1957.

[ Published: May 28, 2009 | Original: May 16, 2001 ]

Israel and the Palestinians: Irreconcilable Differences

Israel and the Palestinians: Irreconcilable Differences

by Jerrold L. Sobel



American Thinker

9 January, 2011





There are still many things out there that mankind just can’t get a grip on. For instance; When exactly did the universe begin? When will it end? What’s the last digit in Pi? Why can’t there be peace between Israel and the Palestinians? All mysteries, all irreconcilable questions, the last one seemingly as difficult as the first three.


What separates the degree of difficulty between the Middle East conflict and the three other questions posed is that the option of acquiescence to the demands of the Palestinian/Islamists always remains available to Israel. Bowing to the pressures of the of the Islamic world, the international community, and leftist persuasions both within Israel and the United States always remains an option. In actuality, to some, the relinquishment of the Jewish character of Israel and the sovereignty attained after two thousand years is the answer. To those of this inducement, throwing in the towel and living at the largess of the Palestinians in what in effect would be a Palestinian state is the correct resolution of the crisis. The Road Map, The Arab Initiative, The Saudi Peace Plan; all recipes containing the same ingredients; Israel should give up territory and receive two hypotheticals; peace and recognition; maybe.


For others wishing to fulfill the dream of an independent and sovereign Jewish State there is a more realistic understanding. This age old conflict is irreconcilable due to the fact of its religious, non-secular nature. Islam, by foundational decree can not surrender land it considers, dar al-Islam, land belonging to its uncompromising, politico/religious movement. That’s the rub. There cannot be a long term peace with people which practice the Islamic deception known as taquia, an Islamic provision which allows for lying to advance Allah’s cause by deceiving their enemies. This practice of compromise by convenience has been employed by Islamic regimes since the betrayal of the Banu Quraysh tribe in 629 and the abrogation of the Hudabiya treaty. Yasser Arafat, mentor and co-founder of the PLO with Mahmoud Abbas admitted as much in 1994 subsequent to his signing of the “Declaration of Principles,” at the conclusion of Oslo II. In a 1994 speech rendered in a Johannesburg mosque he proclaimed, “the agreement was nothing to worry about.” More directly, he uttered this in 1998 to a Fatah youth group: “The Peace of Oslo is the Peace of Hudabiya.” Echoing the thoughts of the deceased terrorist, Abed Rabbo, an early Arafat disciple recently stated that “we can’t remain committed to the agreements that were signed with Israel forever.” With this in mind, it’s not difficult understanding the capricious ways in which the Palestinians renege upon their agreements. The main proviso of the Oslo II treaty states; “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the Permanent Status negotiations.” (Jewish Press, December 24, 2010, Joseph Farah, “Continuing in Arafat’s Footsteps”) Yet today the Palestinians threaten to seek U.N. recognition thus unilaterally abrogating the Oslo Accords.


For those still not convinced of the duplicitous manner in which the Palestinians have conducted and still conduct so called peace negotiations, let’s take a trip down memory lane back to 1947 and seek more proof.


Although the religious roots of this conflict can be traced back for centuries, up to and including the Arab pogroms of the 20’s and 30’s, for the sake of brevity, let us begin with the post Mandate period, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, passed on Nov. 29, 1947; the Partition Plan for Palestine.


The plan called for an end of the British Mandate and a recognition of the nationalistic aspirations of both the Jews and the Arabs by dividing Palestine into two states, with the Jerusalem and the Bethlehem area to be administered by a special international regime to safeguard access to the holy sites of the three great religions. With reservations, particularly concerning Jerusalem, David Ben Gurion on behalf of the Jewish Agency, none the less accepted the plan. The Arabs, represented by the Palestine Arab Higher Committee would have received 43% of Mandatory Palestine but rejected the plan out of hand and chose war instead.


On May 14, 1948, based upon the Partition Plan Israel declared independence. Soon after marginalizing the Palestinians in a brief civil war, five armies from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria attacked the nascent Jewish State. Hostilities ended the following year with the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But keep in mind, the war did not end, only the hostilities. The boundaries created subsequent to the fighting were not internationally recognized borders. They merely represented a demarcation line indicating where opposing armies stood when the guns went silent, an area which became known as the “green line;” a pseudo border of contention which has lasted over two additional wars to this very day.


By agreeing to a ceasefire and allowing the Jordanians control of Judea/Samaria; hence referred to as the West Bank, Israel, for 19 years was left with ostensibly indefensible borders; borders which today she is once again being pressured to return to. East Jerusalem, with its rich past of Jewish habitation and culture fell under Jordanian ascendancy and was ethnically cleansed of its Jewish population and access to its most holy sites. In retrospect, the ceasefire did not lead to peace, it merely set the stage for the Six Day War two decades later. http://wejew.com/media/8760/FFT_Fact_7/


But today Jews, forty four years following the recapture of this precious land, still cannot safely visit the ancient cities of their homeland such as Nablus, Jenin, or Hebron, the cradle of Judaism where their Matriarchs and Patriarchs have been interred for millennia. What’s the connection between then and now? King Hussein of Jordan tried as best he could to eradicate every vestige of Jewish heritage in East Jerusalem following the Armistice which left Jordan in control of Judea and Samaria. In addition to ethnic cleansing, he violated the 1949 Agreement by illegally annexing the West Bank and denying Israelis access to the Western Wall; desecrating the ancient Mount Olives cemetery and using the headstones to build latrines; ravaged no less than 58 ancient synagogues and built slum dwellings adjacent to the Western Wall; fast forward sixty two years:


Mahmoud Abbas, with the support of the Arab world and a great deal of the international community is attempting to carry this effort much further by not only extirpating Israel from Judaea and Samaria but even from the land which is currently recognized by the U.N.


Talk about unmitigated chutzpah, last February Israel’s partner for peace warned of a holy war over Rachel’s tomb in Bethlehem. He claims it to be a 1000 year old mosque, irrespective of the fact that Islam itself has only been in existence for 1300 years and the Palestinians just began making these bogus claims 44 years ago. Why these threats of holy war? Netanyahu had the nerve to announce a refurbishment of all the Jewish heritage sites south of Jerusalem. Needless to say, every anti-Semitic country within the United Nations immediately fell in line and expressed “concerns” over what Abbas and his buddies in Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, and even Jordan and Egypt deemed a “provocation.” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/136173


This so called provocation is just another ploy within a grand scheme by the Islamic world to delegitimize Israel as a Jewish State. Unfortunately, it’s an effort which has taken on greater traction in recent months. Presently, delegitimization is the holy grail of this conflict and is recognized as such by both the Israelis and the Palestinians. It’s now the linchpin of the dispute. Will the Palestinians ever recognize the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish nation-State? The answer, for previously mentioned reasons is a resounding no. It is no less an effort to accomplish through soft jihad what it has failed to do militarily and through terrorism; cast Israel as a pariah state. Boycotts, divestments, false ancestral claims, filing criminal suits at the Hague, attempting to have Israeli governmental and military personnel arrested in foreign countries, all part of an increasingly successful effort. What’s most disturbing and potentially most harmful is the acceptance of these charges by a segment of Diaspora Jewish groups such as J Street and other organizations within Israel which for a myriad of reasons fail to close ranks and dispute these scurrilous accusations but in many instances find common cause with them.


Just this past month, on the 6th anniversary of Yasser Arafat’s death; you remember him, Israel’s other partner for peace; Abbas proclaimed, he will “never recognize Israel as a Jewish State.” He then went on to say that he planned, “to continue in Arafat’s footsteps:” http://www.nowpublic.com/world/abbas-we-will-not-recognize-israel-jewish-state. One can only surmise, like his predecessor, he plans to abrogate all agreements with Israel while absconding with billions of dollars in foreign aid earmarked for the Palestinians.


Fiction, two states, one Jewish one Palestinian, living side by side in peace will happen under present circumstances. Fact, pollyanna thinking notwithstanding, an independent Palestinian state with contiguous borders between Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would be suicide for Israel. It would cut Israel in half and allow hostile armies to further encroach upon the lifeblood of the Jewish State. The Palestinians would never allow Jews to live within its borders and certainly would never submit to a military presence safeguarding the essential Jordan Valley. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_XUM740LHA


The right of return? Does any rational person believe Israel could absorb 7,000,000 million displaced Arabs, most of which are the progeny of those which left During the War of Independence and still maintain her Jewish character? Isn’t it strange that in any discussion of repatriation no mention is ever made of Jewish compensation for the estimated 800,000-1,000,000 Jews which were unceremoniously evicted from their homes throughout the Arab world subsequent to 1949?


Yet, even in the remotest possibility that the recalcitrant PLO; remember they are now the good guys, were truly be placated, could the spigot of endemic bitterness be turned off in their population following generations of professed hatred of Jews. Throughout every strata of Palestinian society, particularly the young, children have been brainwashed on a daily basis; there is no Israel, only Palestine; the Jews are apes and pigs which stole the land from the Palestinians; Jews ritualistically drink the blood of Palestinians and so on infinitum. Does anyone old enough not to believe in Santa Claus think an exchange of land will stem this abhorrence?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09pmTh64vD8


Without expanding the parameters of this essay and factoring in Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and a soon to be a nuclear Iran, one can safely conclude; short of all out war as a determinant, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is just the business end of a larger struggle between the enlightened West and Islamo/fascism. From the standpoint of a just, equitable peace between Israel and the Palestinians, for the foreseeable future, it is indeed an irreconcilable situation.

Monday, January 17, 2011

The End of the Age of America? The Middle East After America!

The End of the Age of America?
The Middle East After America!
The Middle East – like other regions in the world – has gone through eras
of projection of influence by external powers, adapting to the balance of
power between them. This was the case during the age of colonialism
(predominance of Britain and France), the Cold War (competition between the US and the USSR) and the period since the end of the Cold War, during which the US became the sole superpower in the region.
The passage from one era to another, however, is never clearly demarcated and the process of adaptation does not begin only when a new era has been “declared”. Thus, years before the fall of the Soviet Union, countries began to hedge their relations with the two Superpowers, reflecting their anticipations of the future status of the “power market”. Today, the Middle East and other regions of the world are in the throes of a re-alignment which is primarily a response to American policies and actions and reflects the expectation of a power void which will be left with the end of the “Age of America”. The re-alignment of the Middle East will have a profound influence on other theatres and on the domestic and economic interests of the United States and the rest of the West.

The Strategic Weltanschauung of the Obama Administration
The American Middle Eastern policy under the Obama administration aims first and foremost at reducing American projection of “hard power”, particularly in the Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya)
2
Middle East, as part of a fundamental change in US foreign and defense policies.
The new American policy has already found its way into six major policy
documents issued issued during the administration’s first year - between
February 1 and May 29, 2010:
(1) the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR); (2) the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) both issued on February 1st; (3) the Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), issued on April 6th; (4) the New START Treaty signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation (Prague, April 8th); (5) the Washington Nuclear Summit Conference declaration (on April 12th); (6) and the National Security Strategy for 2010, issued on May 29th.
Together, these documents present a comprehensive description of the
underlying beliefs held by the administration about how the world works, what threats and potential threats need to be addressed, and how best to address them.
The publication of this number of strategic policy documents in such a short time period and in such an early stage of the administration is unprecedented. The documents reflect the world view with which the administration came to office more than an attempt to interpret the events of its first year in office. They reflect a strategic assessment based on the supposition that America has engaged in strategic overreach. They conclude that the solution is a fundamental change in
America’s strategic profile. They also reflect an assumption in international affairs of the inherent rationality of all parties that can facilitate conflict resolution through dialogue; a rejection of confrontation, projection of hard power and unilateralism (all of which are seen as having characterized the Bush administration); and an aversion to American exceptionalism and export of values on one hand, and a belief in the intrinsic “rightness” of engagement, consensus and “communities of interests” as a means to solve international conflicts and, on the other hand.
This worldview contradicts in many of its elements key perceptions of the world held by America’s allies in the Middle East (and even in the world at large) and creates a gap in the threat perception between the US and those countries.
It has several key elements:
1. The NPR views acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists (or
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya)
3 alternatively the breakdown of a nuclear state which could result in transfer of nuclear weapons to sub-states) as the primary threat to the entire international community, but one that can be best contained by multilateral cooperation on technical measures such as better safeguards, isotope ID and others.
2. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue states and subsequent
regional proliferation among other countries (including but not only in the
Middle East) is relegated to the status of a challenge that can be contained by traditional cold war deterrence. This position drives the administration’s interest in a dialogue with rogue states that are open proliferators to states in order to ensure that they do not proliferate to terrorists as well.
3. An equation between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear North Korea, ignoring the different motivations and strategic environments of the two countries 1
1 The NPR refers to the two proliferation challenges as follows:
“As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them.” Whereas al-Qaeda is assumed to be willing to use such weapons, the reference to proliferation of nuclear weapons among states does not make that assumption: "Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community – may acquire nuclear weapons. …North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions
and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of their own. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community."
. In doing so, it suggests that further proliferation in the Middle East in the wake of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran can be contained as was the case in East Asia.
4. The adoption of the thesis that a declared policy of general nuclear
disarmament will reduce the motivation of rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This thesis implicitly accepts the “third world” claim that the key motivation for the drive of those states for nuclear weapons is the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the hands of the veteran nuclear powers and ignores the local strategic and cultural motivations.
5. The assumption that extended assurances will suffice to stem the tide of Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 4 nuclear proliferation or will even be feasible in a scenario in which Iran will have become a nuclear power. This assumption ignores the damage that such a scenario will have on American credibility in the region.
6. The downplaying of the possibility that such new nuclear states in the
region may actually use their nuclear weapons or that deterrence may fail in an escalating crisis situation. The administration clearly does not accept the view that inherent political, cultural and religious features of the region raise the risk of nuclear confrontation due to escalation in the Middle East in comparison to other nuclear “neighborhoods” (the Indian sub-continent, Europe during the Cold War and East Asia.
7. The emphasis of multi-lateral action by the international community and “isolation” of offenders of the world order as the ultimate punishment. The concept underlying this assumption is that all nations accord a high value to their international legitimacy. Experience with Cuba, North Korea, Iraq and Iran does not seem to bear this thesis out.
8. The downgrading of the war against radical Islamist ideology to one
against “a specific network – al-Qaida and its affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies and our partners” and disregard of the strength of the radical Islamist ideology in the Muslim street and the broad support that the terrorist organizations succeed in gathering.
These principles have been put to the test during the first half of the Obama administration and have been found wanting. Engagement has not succeeded in bringing Iran or North Korea to cease their nuclear programs, nor has it mitigated the bellicosity of the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and its successes visà-vis Russia and China have also been limited. This is, first and foremost, due to the perception that America is indeed “speaking softly” and carrying “a big stick”, but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield it if and when push comes to shove.
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 5
Real Power vs. Perceived Power
The actual power of a nation is something that only the leadership of that nation can really know. The probability that that leadership will actually employ that power in given circumstances is a question which cannot be answered even by that leadership, as it will depend on circumstances – political and psychological – at that time. Therefore, projection of power does not correspond precisely to real power; it is measured in terms of the perception by friend and foe alike of that nation’s power, resolution and willpower. The perception of American power has long been a central component in the security of America’s allies around the world. Hence, decline in the perception by US allies of American willingness/capacity to project power holds strategic implications for the security of America’s allies.
While this is true in all theatres – from Central Europe to South American and East Asia, it is particularly acute in the Middle East, where American resolve and projection of power have been put to the test in recent years. Local expectations and opinions as to what the US course of action will be, and not only the actual American choice of action, will have a far reaching influence on the behavior of local actors. The expectations of countries in the region and the messages that Washington sends – intentionally or unintentionally – will determine the readiness of its Arab allies to still rely upon it against the growing Iranian threat.
Ostensibly, the real strength of the United States has not declined. American military power has proven itself in the last decade in simultaneous involvement in two major wars and numerous other interventions. Objectively, the US has the strongest military in the world. America's broader economic, financial, social and technological strength also remains robust.
Despite all of these dimensions of American power, there is a growing perception of the decline of American power. In the Middle East, this perception is based on the conventional wisdom in the region that the US will disengage from Iraq, leaving it to Iranian predominance, will engage the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan; will not act with resolution to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (and will even try to prevent Israel from acting) and will even attempt to reach a “modus vivendi” with Iran as a regional hegemon.
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 6
In Asia (particularly China) and in South America (Venezuela and Brazil) there is a growing perception of America as a declining giant, hollowed out of its essential source of power, which is economic, unable to respond to market challenges.
American Regional Policy
US involvement in the Middle East and the driving force behind most American initiatives in the region since the 1930’s have traditionally stemmed from the need to acquire and maintain access to vital economic interests – first and foremost among them – energy resources. The underlying assumptions of this
strategic worldview were that:
• The US economy is the bedrock of all American power. Hence, a
constraint on US economic activity is at heart, an attack on the US, both
hard and soft.
• Unrestrained access to energy sources is essential to the growth and
prosperity of the American economy.
• Middle Eastern oil (and possibly central Asian gas) is essential to
maintaining sufficient energy sources.
• More recently - the image of the Saudi and Gulf states as “bank vaults” for dollars, available for investment at short notice. This is a growing
consideration in the light of the decline of the European economy and of
Europe as an actor in the American economy and the competition with
China for the Asian market.
With the possible exception of the invasion of Iraq (regarding which there is a debate about the motivation of the administration), the option of American military intervention has been raised over the years only in the face of a direct attack or clear and imminent danger to those interests.
Ostensibly, the threat to US vital interests posed by the anticipated denial of economic interests and access to energy by a nuclear Iran or the breakdown of the conservative pro-American regimes in the region and there replacement with Islamist governments should be viewed as severe.
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 7
This, however, will not be so if the administration believes that the threats to the United States can be mitigated by pre-emptive engagement with the forces (Iran and fundamentalist Islam) that are on an inevitable course to gaining power in the region. In practice, US policy in the Middle East focuses on five key interrelated issues –some of them anchored in specific geographical areas, and some with trans-national implications: (1) Iraq (with the implications for future Sunni-
Shiite relations in the region and for Iranian and Jihadi influences); (2)
Afghanistan (with implications for Pakistan and potential for nuclear
proliferation); (3) Iran (with implications for possible nuclearization of the Middle East); (4) al-Qa'ida and (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process.
Iraq
The primary aim of American foreign policy in Iraq is to end the war, withdraw US forces and hand the security of the new nation over to Iraqi military forces, based on President Obama's February 27, 2009 declaration on his intention to bring the war to a conclusion following a "responsible drawdown" of American troops from this country. On the security level, this aim may be achievable. The Iraq of today is quite different than the Iraq of 2006-2007. The insurgency in Iraq continues to decline and at current levels it does not pose a major threat to
the stability of the Iraqi government. While al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni extremists continue their attacks, they have thus far failed to provoke the type of tit for tat retributive cycle of violence, of revenge killings that used to take place.
Hence, with or without a large American presence, a return to the sectarian strife of the years 2006-2007 seems unlikely: the Sunni terrorist networks have been devastated (for the time being); the Shiite militant groups have for the most part moved into the political process; and the Iraqi security forces are much more numerous and capable today.
On the other hand, six months after the March elections, the Iraqi parties have not succeeded in forming a new national government. This is primarily due to Iranian intervention. Tehran has a vested interest in keeping Iraq in a status of limbo until after the first stage of American withdrawal and has succeeded in doing so. The sense of growing Iranian influence and declining American presence feeds the willingness of the Shiite parties to take the Iranian position.
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Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 8 into account. Another important long-term political challenge to political stability in Iraq is embodied in Arab-Kurd tensions over Kirkuk and other disputed territories, oil revenues and the balance of power between the central government and the Kurdistan regional government. These tensions could lead to a wider conflict. Here too, in the light of the waning of the waning of American influence,
both sides are turning to Iran and the neighboring Arab states (and Turkey) for support.
The fact that the US itself is not averse to engaging Iran in order to guarantee an orderly withdrawal process raises concerns in the region of a "grand bargain" based on an Iranian commitment to cooperate in Iraq (and Afghanistan) in return for a softening of the American position on the nuclear issue. Whether or not such a bargain is being contemplated by the administration already does not change the perception in the region that it is likely, and the influence of such an assessment on the positions of the countries of the region. The Sunni countries surrounding Iraq are already developing their own areas of influence and nurturing relationships with groups inside Iraq. Today there are already close ties
between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, and between the Turks and Shiite delegates such as Muqtada al-Sadr and others. The US may encourage this trend as a preferable alternative to Iranian influence. Iraq, after the American withdrawal, will become a microcosm of regional struggles at the expense of both Iraqi and wider American interests.
Afghanistan
The Afghani surge declared by President Obama (November 2009) will not achieve the success of the surge in Iraq. This is due to basic differences between the two theatres. However, by declaring that the American troops will start their drawdown from Afghanistan in mid-2011, the administration has sent a message to all the actors in the theatre that the present military effort is temporary and if they can ride it out, the American agenda will eventually fizzle. The US military has already recognized the futility of achieving the administration’s goals and
recommended a shift in focus from nation-building to simply destroying al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan and creating areas of stability under the central government in lieu of extending Kabul’s sway over the entire country.
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The US may decide to forego the goal of pacifying the entire territory of
Afghanistan and to attempt to stabilize only areas controlled by the central government in order to reduce terrorist attacks in these areas. Naturally, this will be perceived by the administration as an accomplishment. However, a rise in American casualties could cause a shift in American public opinion, which still sees the Afghanistan war as a "just war" against terrorism, as opposed to Iraq which was the "wrong war". Such a shift, bringing public opinion to perceive it as a second "Vietnam War" may bring the administration to look for a way to "cut
losses" and to initiate an even earlier withdrawal, or alternatively, to invest further resources in order to achieve an image of success.
The price of an American “cut and run” strategy in Afghanistan may be high. A resurgence of Taliban influence in Afghanistan will surely revive the Pakistani Taliban and further weaken the regime in Islamabad. A failed nuclear state of Pakistan will have dire consequences for the proliferation regime, nuclearization of the Middle East and the potential transformation of Pakistan and Afghanistan together into a staging ground for Jihadist attacks against the West.
The Iranian Challenge
Probably the greatest contributor to the perception of the decline in America’s resolve to support its allies in the Middle East – or alternatively the perception of a conspiratorial undeclared shift in American policy from support of those allies – has been the policy of the Obama administration towards Iran. Seemingly unambiguous statements of non-acceptance of Iran’s nuclear aspirations (“unacceptable”, “all options are on the table”) have given way to a perception that the US has already reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran (at best) or even is
realigning its interest in the region to accommodate Iranian  predominance. The outcome of the administration’s engagement policy to date has been to encourage Iran to take more strident and provocative moves towards a nuclear capability.
The sanctions regime creates an illusion of action in consensus, but few truly believe that it will achieve the necessary effect.
The case for continuing this policy is primarily the absence of alternatives and particularly the potential consequences of an Iranian retaliation to a military strike. The argument against military action (or even threat of military action) is Friends of Israel Initiative
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Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 10 based on the assessment that such action will be met with a broad Iranian response that will be catastrophic for the region, generate upheavals in moderate states, ignite a war between Iran and the Gulf States, cause a steep rise in energy prices, endanger American troops in Iran and Afghanistan and give the Iranian regime the opportunity to make short thrift of the “Green Revolution” opposition.
This assessment is applied by the administration also to the implications of an Israeli strike. The administration is aware of the consensus among the political leadership in Israel that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that it would lead to a long list of negative outcomes: the end of the Peace Process; undermining the stability of moderate regimes and strengthening Hezbollah and Hamas.
Ostensibly, a credible Israeli threat against Iran would serve the US as pressure against Iran. However, the administration fears that even the perception of US support for Israeli action would lead to severe reactions in the Muslim world, would damage friendly regimes and inspire terrorist activities against the US.
This apocalyptic assessment regarding Iranian reactions to a military strike is fed by various circles in Washington and is deeply flawed. The Iranian military capability to close the Straits of Hormuz or to attack American interests in the Gulf is limited. So is the Iranian subversive and terrorist capacity to ignite the Sunni Arab world in response to an attack on its nuclear project (deeply feared by the Sunni world). However, there is little or no challenge within the US administration to these assumptions, which continue to determine the limits of US policy towards Iran.
Internal events in Iran are also conjured by the administration as a kind of a potential “deus ex machina” for solving the issue without violence. This is based on the belief that regime change in Iran would bring about suspension of the nuclear program or even its complete dismantling. Some observers argue that the Iranian regime will change or the Green Movement will take over in a year or two and therefore, the best way to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat is to wait.
These argue that although the changing of the regime in Iran will probably not bring about a liberal democracy, there might be a rise to power of “religious democrats” who have an interest in restoring Iran’s international legitimacy and would prefer good relations with the West over perseverance with the nuclear program.
A major source of differences between the United States and its allies in the region is in the definition of the “nuclear Iran” which must be prevented: is it Iran
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Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 11 with a nuclear bomb which has done a test? Is it Iran with a bomb in a basement?
Is it Iran with enough for one bomb and a proven capability for one bomb? Or is it an Iran with stockpiles of enriched uranium for a large amount of weapons and half a year away from breakout or sneak-out? It seems (though there is no formal definition by the administration on this issue) that the American definition is the first – an Iran which has completed weaponization and testing of a weapon. For most of the countries in the Middle East, both Israel and the Arab countries,
stockpiles alone would be seen as an Iran which has already crossed the nuclear threshold, de facto.
The administration also seems to believe that Iran does not really intend to break out with a military nuclear capability but will suffice with being a “threshold nuclear power” along the lines of the Japanese model. This assessment leads it to redefine its objectives regarding the Iranian threat: from the complete prevention of a "nuclear" Iran to the acceptance of Iran as a nuclear threshold state, while convincing Tehran not to cross the threshold.
This assessment though does not seem to hold water. There is broad anticipation in the region that Iran will not stop at a threshold status and the states of the region will be driven by this assessment and not by an optimistic American attitude. The basis for this assessment is the belief that Iran cannot achieve its goals in the region just by announcing such a status. These goals – driving the US out of the Gulf, imposing hegemony on the countries of the Gulf, having immunity for subversive action – can only be achieved by actually having a weapon capability. The "threshold assumption" may have fit the Iranian policy a few years back. Today, given the present balance of power between the more circumspect “old guard” and the IRGC leadership, the possibility of a policy of reaching the threshold and staying there is highly unlikely.
Al-Qaeda
A leitmotif that has characterized the Obama administration has been outreach to the Muslim world. President Obama came to office at a time when relations between the US and the Muslim world had reached a nadir and he saw himself as particularly suited – as one who was brought up as a Muslim and lived in a Muslim country - to rectify them. As part of this policy, the administration refuses
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Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya) 12 to acknowledge any link between Islam and the phenomenon of Jihadi terrorism (to the extent that the administration refuses to use the terminology of “Jihadist” on the grounds that “Jihad” in Islam is a personal moral struggle) and presents the latter as an aberration with no real link to “true Islam” - individual acts of
personal violence and not part of a wider phenomenon.
Furthermore, the engagement policy also dictates outreach not only to bone fide moderates and mainstream Muslims, but also to the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates and “moderate” Taleban elements on the Sunni side and Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi proxies of Iran on the Shiite side. The rationale for such engagement is rooted in (1) a tacit belief that these parties are not irrevocably anti-American but respond to America’s actions, policies and rejection of dialogue with them; (2) belief that preemptive engagement of these movements will neutralize their radicalism and anti-western positions; (3) and unwillingness to invest the necessary soft and hard power in order to perpetuate the “old guard”
of pro-American regimes in the region.
The insistence on ignoring the religious motivation and broader religious
legitimacy of the Jihadi phenomenon is very much out of sync with the concerns of the pro-American Muslim regimes which see the main problem in that very legitimacy. The strategy of using sanitized terminology as a means to woo the radicals from their fundamental religious, cultural and political hostility to the values that America represents (at least in their eyes) will ultimately fail.
Relations with Israel and the
Israeli-Arab Peace Process
The key area in which the administration sees a need to project active
involvement in the region is the Israeli-Arab Peace Process. The administration has, in essence, accepted the claim that the “Palestinian problem” and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the “core issue” of the Middle East and the key cause of instability in the region and that this conflict could be solved were it not for Israel’s obstinacy. The efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – and possibly Israeli-Syrian talks in the future - and the willingness to risk confrontation and crisis with Israel is seen by the Obama administration as a Friends of Israel Initiative
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means to garner Arab and Muslim sympathy. The result is an American policy vis-à-vis the peace process which is more Palestinian than that of the Palestinians. Washington demanded a total cessation of settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem when the Palestinian leadership itself did not, and joined the demand that Israel subscribe to the NPT. The voices heard from those close to the administration charging Israel, the Jewish lobby and even Jewish figures within government with subversion of strategic American interests in the region in favor of Israeli interests both reflect the true opinion of those individuals and serve as a lever for restraining Israel. The presentation of a fundamental conflict of interests between the US and Israel in regards to Iran exacerbates this narrative.
The efforts of the administration to distance itself from Israel and to present an “even-handed” or even pro-Palestinian stance, however, have not significantly improved the chances of a peace settlement. The decline in the perception of American power was evident in the long refusal of the Palestinian leadership to American requests to renew direct negotiations. As American presence in the region wanes, the Palestinians and the Arab regimes will have to take into account growing domestic radicalization as a severe constraint against moving forward in the peace process.
By distancing itself from Israel and by lowering its profile in the Middle East in general, however, the administration also distances itself from influence on the peace process. The image of American power in the region is an important component of Israel's own deterrent image. This is expressed in the very image of American capacity to act in the region to support its allies and in the assumption of a strategic alliance and special relationship between the US and Israel. The erosion of the image of American power is not due to the perception of American capabilities per se, but to the perception of willingness of the US to act in the
region to support its allies, buttressed by a perceived decline in US economic preeminence.
Erosion of the image of support for allies in general and for Israel in
particular, will have a detrimental effect on Israel's deterrence. The erosion of Israel’s deterrence will have, in turn, a detrimental effect on that of the United States.
The Obama administration – backed up by parts of the US military establishment – views Israeli military action against Iran as fraught with negative consequences for American interests. Paradoxically, this view contradicts the expressed interest
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of many of America’s Arab allies in an immediate (and military) solution to the Iranian nuclear program. Whether such action – if it takes place – will achieve its goals or not and whether the doomsday scenarios of Iranian responses will take place or not, an Israeli attack will certainly be exploited by the administration to create a crisis with Israel in order to demonstrate non-complicity in the attack.
Implications for the Strategic Position of the US
The perception in the Middle East of a future “de-Americanized” region is not baseless. The United States will most probably pull out of Iraq by the end of 2011, leaving Iran to play a pivotal role of power-broker. Until then, the US will be constrained by its Iraqi agenda to refrain from any serious crisis with Iran, lest it retaliate in the Iraqi theatre. In the AFPAK theatre, without (the unlikely) investment of sufficient additional resources, the US will not achieve strategic  defeat of the Taliban and their supporters, nor will the current level of military intervention or efforts to reach agreements with parts of the Taliban achieve the
elimination of al-Qaida in Afghanistan. There are grounds for the scenario that continued American military engagement in Afghanistan without any real resolution on the horizon (especially if the number of American casualties rises) may change American public opinion about this war. The war with the Taliban has already spilled over to Pakistan. However, while the US must rely on Pakistan in the war against al-Qaida, there exists a real possibility that the Taliban will broaden their "sphere of influence" in Pakistan, both geographically and institutionally in the Pakistani religious establishment, and even within the regime itself. Such a development would affect the stability of this country and its willingness to cooperate with the US and signal the decline of American power in yet another area. From the point of view of the Sunni Arab states, US policy in Iraq, allowing Iran a foothold in that country, acceptance of Hezbollah predominance in Lebanon and overtures towards the (relatively pro-Iranian) Muslim Brotherhood movement all indicate that the US sees Iran as the future power in the region.
The future of American interests in the Middle East– and the interests of
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America’s allies in the region - hinge primarily on the outcome of the efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear status. If Iran is perceived as having crossed the nuclear threshold it will have "won" against the pressures of the international community. It will become a model for radical movements throughout the Muslim world and will be on its way to achieving its desired hegemony in the region. As long as this threshold has not been crossed the US government can claim success of its engagement policy – at least as a holding tactic. Delaying Iran’s crossing the threshold however does not delay the process of decline in the willingness to rely on the United States. The cumulative impression of American reluctance to confront Iran out of fear of Iranian reprisal
exacerbates the concerns in the region that the pro-Western countries will not be able to rely, when the chips are down, on the United States.
Failure to prevent Iran from nearing the nuclear threshold will certainly intensify the drive of other states in the region for nuclear weapons. The increased demand for nuclear materials and know-how will probably induce increased supply. The prime suppliers of these will be Pakistan and North Korea – two nuclear nations which may become failed states on short notice. The possibility of a “melt-down” in these countries may bring the elements responsible for the nuclear program to enter the market. Increased demand would probably bring Chinese and Russian
companies back into the market. Increased supply will most likely induce
additional demand, with countries in the Middle East and other regions speeding up their nucler programs to take advantage of the market. The assumption in Washington that American promises of extended deterrence will stem the tide of proliferation to other countries, as it did in East Asia ignores the damage that the credibility of such guarantees will have sustained after the US has failed to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The willingness of the regional parties to rely on American assurances has already declined and will decline further once Iran
achieves even a nascent nuclear status. It is doubtful that the US will be able to provide the high profile military deployment necessary to back up such assurances Difficulties will come both from domestic American considerations and from domestic pressures in the region, with America’s allies facing Iranian fed and Islamist opposition to close security relations with the US.
The administration may attempt to balance the perception of having abandoned its Arab allies by selling them advanced weapons – a step already initiated vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some of the Gulf States – and by the argument that the withdrawal from Iraq, and eventually from Afghanistan will ultimately
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enhance America's operational flexibility and hence its deterrence vis-à-vis Iran.
However it is not likely that the conservative Arab regimes will be satisfied by such a claim and it is unlikely that reinforcement of their strategic capabilities will provide them with the level of confidence they would need to challenge Iranian aspirations. In any case, the Sunni Arab states would probably demand – at least for domestic reasons - that American promises of extended deterrence include guarantees against Israel and efforts to disarm Israel as well as Iran.
Thus, certain steps that may be taken by the administration to counter-balance the decline in American projection of power may have an adverse effect on Israel’s deterrence posture.
The strategic – indeed historic - implications of a nuclear Iran should ostensibly galvanize the countries of the region into action. However, in light of the perception that the United States is withdrawing from the region, many of the regimes therein are already accommodating themselves to the new “neighborhood strongman”. This is evident in the behavior of Qatar, Oman and even Saudi Arabia itself. Iran will probably take advantage of this period of Arab strategic inferiority to cement its hegemony in the region. A prime example may be by renewing its call for “leaving the security of the Gulf in the hands of the Gulf countries themselves” - a euphemism for Iranian hegemony without American or
British presence. In this demand, Iran will be able to leverage the fact that the very failure of the US to prevent Iran from going nuclear and the regional image of the Obama administration as conciliatory towards Iran will diminish any faith that the countries of the region may have in American guarantees. The Iranian ability to employ subversion will also make it difficult for those regimes to continue to rely on the “infidel” to defend them against (Muslim) Iran. Other consequences will be felt in the heart of the Middle East; the chances of weaning Syria out of the Iranian orbit and promoting stability in Lebanon, where Iran’s surrogate – Hezbollah – has already become the key power broker will become
even slimmer. Hamas, Iran's Palestinian proxy will feel that it has a longer leash.
The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be willing to take bold steps towards a peace agreement with Israel will also wane.
For the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia, which was born as an anti-Shiite movement, Iranian (i.e. Shiite) hegemony is a nightmare come true. At the same time, secular conservative Arab regimes such as Egypt and Jordan fear that the US is in the process of shifting its support from the "old guards" in the region to oppositional popular forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The growing
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anxiety in the Gulf States from a "Shiite threat" due to the prospects of a nuclear Iran and increasing Shiite (Iranian) influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could lead to enhanced strategic collaboration between these regimes and radical Islamic elements on the basis of an anti-Shiite "platform", common to both parties. However, these regimes will not be able to compel the radical organizations they sponsor to restrict their militant activities solely to Shiite and Iranian targets and to avoid action against the Western "infidel" and Israel.
These trends are not irreversible. Events in the region may impose on the administration a change of policy and return to a higher level of involvement in the region. Some possible scenarios and events may cause change and reassessment in US regional policy: regime change (or even succession within regimes that will bring younger, more radical and inexperienced leaders to the helm) in key states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt); domestic developments in Iraq and Afghanistan that could undermine plans for redeployment and withdrawal of the US from those countries; deterioration of the internal situation in Pakistan; significant progress in the Iranian nuclear program; the future of
Yemen as a base of al-Qaida in the region, and major terrorist attacks originating in one of the countries of the region. US policy towards the Middle East may also be overturned by developments in the relations with Russia, China and North Korea.
Politics – like nature – abhors a vacuum. The conscious disengagement of the United States from the role it played since the mid-1970’s as leading power in the Middle East will open the door wide for other players – local ones like Iran that will seek regional hegemony and global ones like Russia and China. The United States can still reverse the trend by re-drawing its lines in the sand and reevaluating of global re-positioning.
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The Challenge to Israel’s Legitimacy

The Challenge to Israel’s Legitimacy
Ambassador Dore Gold
Former Permanent Representive from Israel to the United Nations,
President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
The Challenge to Israel’s Legitimacy

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Looking at recent developments, there is a dangerous global shift occurring with respect to Israel’s international standing, which must be urgently addressed. Over the last decade, former Israeli officers have been threatened with arrest for alleged war crimes if they visit certain European countries. From Norway to the UK, there is increasing talk of boycotts against Israeli universities. There is more talk about
trade sanctions, as well. European media outlets from France-2 to the BBC spread complete fabrications about Israeli behavior, like the famous case of the 2001 killing of the boy Muhammad al-Dura, that often come from politicized reporters and by agenda-driven non-governmental organizations. The imbalanced conclusions adopted in the report by Justice Richard Goldstone for the UN Human Rights Council may have been discredited in Israel, but it only reinforced many of these negative
trends in Europe and elsewhere.
The cumulative impact of these developments is the creation of an increasingly hostile environment for Israel, as every negative report about Israeli policy is accepted at face value. The tremendous risks for peace that Israel itself undertook in the last seventeen years – from implementing the 1993 Oslo Agreements with the Palestinians to withdrawing from the Gaza Strip in 2005 – are completely ignored.
In this milieu, Israeli diplomats find themselves accosted in European universities and even attacked by mobs, as was the case in Manchester this year. In political terms, members of European parliaments from the UK and Ireland are preparing to discuss suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement, signed in 1995. Already, the planned upgrading of the agreement was suspended in December 2008. As a consequence, in many Western intellectual circles there is more talk today questioning the very legitimacy of the Jewish state, as well as its fundamental rights.
The Irony of the Legitimacy Struggle
The assault on Israel’s legitimacy is ironic. Israel is a unique country in the world community by virtue of the fact that it is the only member state of the United Nations whose right to exist was recognized by both the League of Nations and the UN itself.
It is a country with deep national roots and a more than two-thousand-year-old history. Looking back to the period after the First World War when the victorious Allied powers formally recognized the rights of the Jewish people to reconstitute their national homeland, the European powers did not create that right but rather acknowledged what they viewed as a pre-existing right. For Western civilization, it was axiomatic that the Jewish people had a legitimate right to their ancient homeland.
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Yet what was axiomatic a century ago is no longer the case today. It is not just the circumstances that Israel faces which have caused this shift, but also intellectual and political changes in the West. The results of this shift are deeply disturbing. It is rare to find a university debate over the legitimacy of France or Italy, yet such debates over Israel have been held at British universities. And while many states in Africa and Asia
owe their origins to arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers a century ago, it is not acceptable to question their validity as nation-states even though their boundaries artificially cross ethnic or tribal lines, making national cohesiveness very difficult. But denying the validity of Israel’s borders is common.
A major theme used by those seeking to delegitimize Israel is to make false analogies between the Jewish state and apartheid South Africa. Unlike South African blacks under the apartheid regime, the Israeli-Arab population is represented in the Knesset – the Israeli Parliament, is treated in the same hospitals alongside the Jewish population, and attends the same universities with Israeli Jews. Yet these facts do not prevent Israel’s adversaries from using the apartheid label. They have
an additional interest in reinforcing the image of Israel as having been created by a colonial-settler movement, like the Afrikaaners, backed by Western imperialism, with no authentic connection to the land which it claimed. Israel’s case against this defamation is very strong, but unfortunately this anti-Israel narrative is often voiced with no effective opposition. Undoubtedly, delegitimization of Israel also emanates from a revival of classical Western anti-Semitism, which has become more permissible as more time passes since the Holocaust. It is for that reason that delegitimizers also engage in Holocaust-denial, or “Holocaust inversion,” attributing to Israel the crimes committed against the Jewish people during the Second World War.
During the last decade, the campaign to delegitimize Israel has been reinvigorated and given new momentum through several repeating themes:
1. Denying Israel’s Fundamental Right to Self-Defense
Using the automatic majority which the Arab states can marshal in the main bodies of the UN system, the PLO and its allies have successfully exploited international law to dilute Israel's right of self-defense. This began to acquire momentum when the Arab bloc pushed through the UN General Assembly a resolution calling on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue a nonbinding advisory opinion on the legality of Israel's security fence. Following the terms of reference it was given, the ICJ questioned the legality of the fence without considering the waves of suicide bombing 7 attacks on Israeli civilians that caused Israel to build the fence in the first place. And the ICJ went so far as to question whether the right of self-defense, enshrined in the UN Charter, applied to the terrorist threat Israel faced in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Goldstone Report reinforced this trend. Israel had completely pulled out from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and received a 500 percent increase in rocket fire on its civilian population centers, launched from the very Gaza territory from which it had withdrawn. When Israel responded to these attacks in late 2008, it found itself under a UN investigation. The Goldstone Report charged that Israeli soldiers “deliberately” killed Palestinian civilians in the Gaza operation, even though it did not produce a shred of evidence to prove that Israel had a policy of intentionally killing civilians.
In fact, these charges were contradicted by the unprecedented use of multiple warnings to civilians, by telephone and text messages, if their residences were used to store rockets and other munitions, and were thus determined to be legitimate military targets. The effect of the Goldstone Report was to remind Israelis that if they decide
to exercise their legitimate right of self-defense in the future, they are likely to come under another international investigation.
In parallel, on the diplomatic side, there has been an international diplomatic effort to replace UN Security Council Resolution 242 – which in November 1967 recognized Israel’s right to “secure and recognized boundaries” – with alternative UN resolutions which, as distinct from Resolution 242, would require Israel to withdraw completely from the territories it captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. Up until today, Resolution 242 has served as the only agreed basis for all Arab-Israeli peace agreements, yet there is a growing desire to erode it because of the rights it granted to Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War.
2. Unfairly Portraying Israel as an International Criminal
When Israel was forced to eliminate the centers of terrorism in the West Bank in 2002 that were located in areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, UN officials, taking their cue from Palestinian spokesmen, repeated unsubstantiated allegations that Israel had committed a massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Jenin
refugee camp, which was quickly disproven. The truth was the opposite of what was being alleged, for rather than uprooting the terrorist infrastructure in Jenin with airpower or artillery, Israel sent in ground forces who engaged in house-to-house combat in a densely populated area, resulting in the loss of 22 Israeli soldiers.
Again in 2009, at the initiative of Cuba, Pakistan and Egypt, the UN Human Rights 8
Council launched an investigation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza that sought to expose improper actions by the Israel Defense Forces, without even looking at the eight years during which Hamas fired mortars and rockets at the civilian communities of southern Israel from the Gaza Strip. This became the famous Goldstone Report, that was noted earlier. The UN has become the traditional theater in which the Palestinians and their supporters seek to brand Israel as a war criminal
and to thereby isolate it internationally. Even at the height of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, the Palestinians kept up the pressure in this regard by trying to draw attention to allegations about Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, and getting UN bodies to repeatedly adopt one-sided resolutions. More recently, this year, the Palestinian leadership sought to prevent Israel’s membership in the OECD,
arguing that Israel was obstructing the peace process.
The campaign to depict Israel as a criminal state includes the active support of extremist non-governmental organizations that exploit legal loopholes in Western legal systems in order to initiate legal measures against Israeli officers visiting Europe, accusing them of having violated international law. Using universal jurisdiction, they have tried to have leading Israelis arrested in the UK – from Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Oftentimes, radical Islamist groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are behind these initiatives, which
could be applied equally to American, British, or German officers who fought in Afghanistan.
This legal campaign entails the abuse of universal jurisdiction, which the West originally adopted in order to bring to justice real perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity, even though their crimes were committed outside the country whose courts might decide to act.
3. Attacking the Historical Connection between the Jewish People and Their Historical Homeland, Including Jerusalem The third form of delegitimization was witnessed at the end of the July 2000 Camp
David Peace Conference, when PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat denied that there ever was a Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. This contention has been reasserted by most of the leading Palestinian figures, from Saeb Erekat to Yasser Abd Rabbo to Mahmoud Abbas. The destruction of pre-Islamic artifacts during the unauthorized removal of tons of debris from the Temple Mount by the Palestinian Islamic authorities served as further evidence of an effort to eradicate Jewish history in Jerusalem. 9
When Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad spoke at an inter-religious gathering at the UN in late 2008, he mentioned Muslim and Christian ties to Jerusalem, but failed to say even a word about the Jewish connection to the Holy City. In the Palestinian discourse, it is conveniently forgotten that Jerusalem had a Jewish majority already in the nineteenth century; the British Consulate in Jerusalem determined that a Jewish majority existed in the city in 1863.
The International Political Context of Delegitimization: The Palestinians’
“Kosovo Plan”
These recent efforts at the delegitimization of Israel have occurred within a very specific international political context: at a minimum, they seek to advance the Palestinian goal of establishing an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza without any negotiations with Israel. Palestinian unilateralism is borrowing from other international cases, like in the Balkans. For example, just like Kosovo emerged from the abuses of the Serbian Army, the new delegitimization campaign requires
that Israel lose international standing and support in order to serve the Palestinians’ political agenda.
At the extreme, the new delegitimization takes a page out of the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa by seeking to internationally condemn and isolate the Jewish state, perhaps with the hope of even undermining its continued existence.
The Iranian Agenda with Delegitimization: Security Implications of the Delegitimization Campaign. The danger to Israel from this delegitimization campaign is not just economic or political. It affects national security as well. Israel’s adversaries in the Middle East,
led by Iran, carefully calibrate the use of force on the basis of how the international 10 community responds. Deterrence of Iran from making good on its repeated threats to “wipe Israel off the map” will be influenced by how the Iranians calculate the response of the West. Historically, Middle Eastern states have used chemical weapons when they assumed that the international community would not react:
Egypt employed chemical weapons in Yemen in 1962, because few would notice their use in an isolated area, while Iraq massively employed chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980s because the Islamic Republic was seen as a pariah by the Western powers, who wanted to block the export of its Islamic Revolution.
Today, if Israel is increasingly portrayed as a pariah state, then Middle Eastern states might be more prone to allow themselves certain liberties that they would not have adopted before. For example, the current Iranian leadership, and its regional allies, like Hizbullah and Syria, will be less concerned about international reaction to their use of clearly escalatory weapons systems with greater destructive force.
In a period in which Iran is coming closer to crossing the nuclear threshold, and Hizbullah is obtaining thousands of heavy rockets, the implications of a successful delegitimization campaign against Israel can potentially affect the lives of thousands of Israeli citizens if a war breaks out in the future.
It must not be forgotten that major legal authorities in the world, like former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin Cotler, believe that the statements of the Iranian leadership toward Israel contain clear signs of genocidal intent. Historically, genocide is preceded by the delegitimization and demonization of the target population: the Jews of inter-war Germany were called vermin, the Tutsis of Rwanda were called
cockroaches, while the Marsh Arabs of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq were called monkeyfaced people. Iran calls the Israelis today microbes or a cancer. Delegitimization of Israel serves their interest.
This is the harshest context of the delegitimization effort, but, nevertheless, it would be a cardinal mistake for the West to ignore it.

Jewish Unity and Disunity, Then and Now by Aryeh Rubin

Jewish Unity and Disunity, Then and Now by Aryeh Rubin
The following is the text of a lecture delivered by Aryeh Rubin at the conference, Who Abandoned the Jews—And Who Tried to Save Them? A Conference on Religious Zionists and Rescue from the Holocaust, held on May 30, 2010 at Bar Ilan University.
Mr. Rubin’s lecture, “Jewish Unity and Disunity, Then and Now,” focuses on current existential threats to Israel, specifically the multiple military threats and the global campaign of delegitimization. We, the Jewish people, despite our disunity, must collectively wake up, face the reality of our imperiled existence, and take action. We must learn from the example of the Holocaust, in which disunity and a failure on the part of American Jews to protest effectively enough on behalf of European Jewry had devastating consequences. If ever there was a time to transcend our differences, to address the weaknesses in our leadership, and to face and fight the threats bombarding us, it is now. The Israeli government is not equipped to fight delegitimization on its own. It is time to contract out to leading experts to create a massive publicity campaign based on cohesive, consistent messaging that will change hearts and minds, favorably influencing thought leaders globally about Israel, and turn back the rising tide of negative propaganda. The text of the lecture is followed by Mr. Rubin’s bio. Text from the lecture may be reproduced in whole or in part only if taken in context, with proper credit given, and with a link to the pdf of the full text, to be posted on the Targum Shlishi website at www.targumshlishi.org. Please note that there are slight variations between the written text and the spoken lecture. Comments may be sent to info@targumshlishi.org.
Jewish Unity and Disunity, Then and Now
Good afternoon. I’d like to begin by thanking Dr. Medoff, Dr. Baumel, and Bar Ilan University for organizing this important conference.
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As we know, and as we have heard today from several speakers, the lack of Jewish unity prior to and during the Holocaust had devastating consequences. Today we, the Jewish people, are again facing challenges to our continued existence, and yet we remain hampered from within by our disunity. We are geographically scattered, divided in religious and political ideology, subject to a fractured and ineffective leadership, and so concerned with individual survival that we fail to understand that individual survival is predicated on group survival, which is what all Jews should prioritize. And yet we are not placing a premium on group survival—not as a people, and not as individuals.
The events of sixty-five years ago offer up sobering lessons that are unfortunately strikingly relevant today. And yet, we, the Jewish people, do not seem to be paying attention. The continued existence of the State of Israel is under serious threat.
We need to heed the lessons of the Holocaust, lessons that should be fresh in our collective mind but that we, in our misguided complacency and in staking out our small bits of meaningless territory, have set aside. Perhaps we have, as a people, a skewed sense of continuity because there have been so very many threats to our existence throughout our history. We have survived every other threat, the thinking goes. We will survive this one, too. But today the weapons of annihilation are so very much more deadly—the unthinkable could happen in an instant. At the same time, the poisoning of worldwide public opinion against Israel and, by extension, the Jewish people, through a persistent and infectious propaganda campaign delegitimizing the State of Israel continues to gain significant ground. That it is based on skewed and deliberately misleading fragments of information is beside the point—there is a perception, for example, that Palestinian aggression is justified and in fact imbued with moral value, whereas actions to defend Israel from attack are viewed as unjustified and morally bankrupt. Israel is the only country in the world whose very right to exist is questioned by an increasingly global, persistent, and persuasive campaign. If ever there was a time to transcend our differences, to address the weaknesses in our leadership, and to come together as best we can to face and fight the threats bombarding us, it is now.
During the Holocaust, we did not acquit ourselves well in terms of banding together, of defending each other, or of exercising our collective power to
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intervene on behalf of European Jewry, although that is not to diminish the remarkable efforts by individuals and small groups.
Looking back, the Bergson Group’s efforts and those of others—courageous endeavors such as the Kindertransport, the Europa Plan, and the Rabbis’ March on Washington—despite their nobility, in the grand scheme of the catastrophe were mere drops in the bucket. So much more could have been done. American Jews during World War II had power, they had resources. They could have made noise, they could have pushed for bombing the tracks to Auschwitz, they could have rocked the boat. The simple but sad truth is that during the Holocaust, the American Jewish community did not do nearly enough. The way one survived the furnaces of Europe was to be rich enough, smart enough, lucky enough, or a combination of these factors. You were on your own.
The Current Situation The grace period that we the Jewish people had after Auschwitz is over. The playing field has changed. The political decision-makers and the citizens who elected them, whose gestalt was formed in the wake of Treblinka and Dachau, are gone. The children of Esau, whose collective conscious was jogged by the severity of the Shoah, have gotten over it. Anti-Semitism is back in all its regalia. However this time, rather than Christian religious anti-Semitism or Nazi racial anti-Semitism, the strategy is a pseudo-intellectual, self-righteous targeting of the State of Israel as the embodiment of all evil.
Ladies and gentlemen, the barbarians are at the gate. A sober assessment of today's situation, comparing it to events close to two millennia ago, leads me to the argument that we are close to being at the point of the seventeenth of Tammuz. The circling of Jerusalem has begun.
There are nuclear threats on the horizon and missile challenges that could be launched at any moment. From the east, Israel faces an existential threat from Iran. From the north, Israel faces a strategic threat from Syria and from Iran’s proxy, Hezbolla, with its more than 40,000 missiles. From the west, Hamas is rearming and openly declaring its dedication to the destruction of Israel. The Palestinians are not showing any serious signs of a willingness to accept Israel as a Jewish state.
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The survival of the Jews as a people is inextricably tied to the survival of Israel. Without Israel, we are in jeopardy, all of us, Jews from Austria to Zimbabwe, from the assimilated to the ultra-Orthodox. Regardless of geographic or ideological distance, regardless of our disaffection and disunity, in this way all Jews are united.
Delegitimization There is another challenge Israel is facing, and that is the pervasive and growing campaign of delegitimization, a demonization of Israel led by the left that questions Israel’s right to exist as an independent Jewish state.
The delegitimization of Israel has its roots and derives its energy from the academic left. It has offshoots in the old media and the new media, driven in part by online social networking. The delegitimization has become increasingly accepted among the intelligentsia of Europe, among both the left and the right. Consider that in March the appalling Israel Apartheid Week saw events held on college and university campuses in more than forty cities throughout the world. Or the ongoing Gaza Activist Sail. Or the singling out of Israel by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Conference a few days ago, or the very public demonstration calling for a boycott of Max Brenner’s chocolate store in Union Square in New York on Friday. We must recognize the influence of the mass media, which has been readily manipulated by the delegitimization campaign and is largely acquiescing with it. In the media’s selective coverage of certain stories and its biased portrayal of Israel, we are witnessing what amounts to an abdication of the media’s role as watchdog, and in this we can discern disturbing parallels to the mass media during the Holocaust, which was essentially silent.
This corrosive questioning of Israel’s right to exist cannot be underestimated—it is a very serious threat. Many, including the Reut Institute, the non-partisan Tel Aviv think tank, are sounding the alarm that the delegitimizers, despite claims that their goal is to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and promote a two-state solution, are actually aiming for the same goal as the Islamist rejectionists—their objective is to weaken Israel politically and economically through their calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions, and to ultimately force a one-state solution in which there is a Muslim majority. The delegitimizers are engaged in a full-out campaign, modeled on the fall of supremacist white South Africa, to erode Israel’s
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legitimacy by insisting that it is based on segregationist and racist principles. And when delegitimazation reaches a tipping point, it can move very quickly.
I wish that was the end of my list of the challenges facing Israel, but it is not. Perhaps even more potentially devastating is the possibility that Israel’s traditional allies will not stand by when they are most needed. Throughout its existence, Israel could count on the powerful backing and good will of the U.S. and to some extent its Western allies. Under the current administration—and we all hope that we are wrong—that is no longer assured.
Yes, today is not 1939. Today the Jewish people are arguably more powerful than we have been at any time in the past two thousand years. We are powerful because the Jews of the Diaspora have a voice in the U.S. and Europe but mainly we are powerful because we have Israel and its military might.
Disunity Yet, at a time when we should recognize our strength, join our voices, and be up in arms in protest, we are essentially ineffective. Those of us who are alarmed and understand the need for immediate action should also acknowledge that regardless of the countless e-mails and articles we forward to friends, and how many conversations we have, we are not accomplishing much other than making ourselves feel marginally better—it is time to stop speaking only among ourselves.
One would hope that these serious threats to Israel would catalyse a coming together of Jewry worldwide, but that is a quaint and unrealistic notion. The religious and political disagreements continue. Even the once-plausible concept of a common fate is losing credibility. The traditionally steadfast bond between U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews is losing strength, particularly among members of the younger generation. While the distance in miles has not changed, the two communities are drifting ever-further apart. This division has been exacerbated by the current U.S. administration.
The Obama administration’s relationship with Israel, to be polite, is not friendly. The president of the United States and his secretary of state have chosen to pursue a strategy that de-prioritizes Israel on multiple levels in an effort to appease the much larger, oil-rich nations of the Muslim world, despite the ongoing belligerent animus of this group. It is clear that the president has different priorities than the
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Jewish people, and that, unlike some of his predecessors in the White House, President Obama does not endorse Israeli exceptionalism.
Only four to six percent of Israelis believe that Obama is a supporter of Israel. Yet, despite his recent performance, American Jews feel very differently about Obama. Seventy-eight percent of the country’s Jews voted for him. While a recent survey tells us that of those voters, one-third regret their decision and feel that Obama is no friend to Israel, two-thirds of the Jews who voted for Obama still support him. Clearly, there is a disconnect between U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews.
What that divide between the politics of American Jews and Israeli Jews means, in the most basic terms, is that the overwhelming majority of American Jews either: 1) believed that Obama would favour Israel and did not understand what their decision could mean for Israel, 2) did not prioritize the well-being of Israel when making their voting decision, or 3) did understand the ramifications but had other priorities when electing their new president. Consequently, there is disagreement between what the Jews of U.S. believe should be done to defend Israel and what Israelis believe should be done.
Israel should act in its own interest, without hesitation, and without being influenced by American Jews or American Jewish leaders, who in their complacency can not fully comprehend the situation in Israel or may, in fact, have different priorities.
Liberalism and American Jews How did this happen, this lack of unity between U.S. and Israeli Jews? It is part of a larger divide, one that includes an alienation from Jewish leaders, a growing gulf between committed and assimilated Jews, and the primacy of the liberal values in much of the American Jewish community. And unfortunately and potentially tragically, it echoes the divide between American Jews and European Jews during the Holocaust.
Much of American Jewry has become somewhat de-Judaicized. In lieu of our traditional belief or value systems, many Jews have adopted what is essentially a theology of universalism and tikkun olam, or social justice. These liberal values are so predominant that rather than being staunchly pro-the Jewish people or pro-Israel, much of American Jewry is pro-humanist. Those who fit this category either
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do not understand or do not care that, at a time when the future of the Jews is at stake, if they do not step up to the plate in defense, they will be abdicating their responsibility as Jews. They are, in a sense, victims and products of a flawed system in which we have poor leadership, abysmal Jewish education, assimilation is the norm, and intermarriage is skyrocketing.
The liberal wing of organized Judaism, along with the broader Jewish establishment, long ago eschewed traditional religious beliefs and instead adopted the mantra of tikkun olam. So what we have now is a population that for one hundred years has been distanced from the larger core values of Judaism and can easily assimilate if it so chooses. This situation is not dissimilar in certain ways to the experience of the Jewish people of the Former Soviet Union, who after seventy years of Communism essentially lost their sense of Jewish heritage and history.
During World War II, Jews may have not done enough to save their brethren, but never before today have so many Jewish actions benefited the causes of our enemies. Most of these Jews are not consciously setting out to undermine Israel, but that is in effect what they are accomplishing. Throughout history there have always been a few Jews who opted out, and that is an acceptable reality. What is not acceptable is that today, entire legions of Jews are inadvertently working against the survival of the Jewish people, whether out of ignorance, out of misguided loyalties, or out of a lack of understanding of the global perspective. I believe that we can reverse this trend, or at the very least slow it down, as I will discuss in a moment.
I should make it clear that I, myself, have solid credentials on the left. Like seventy percent of the Israeli population, I supported Oslo. I’ve met with the Palestinian Authority leadership including Arafat, as part of a delegation of the Israel Policy Forum (IPF), an American Jewish group on the left. But after the intifada began, I came to believe that the IPF, and a number of other Jewish organizations on the left, were not protecting Israel as they should, and I withdrew from the organization. I personally believe that we continue the negotiating process until the Palestinians are ready to deal in earnest.
Leadership That American Jews incorporated the religion of liberalism to the exclusion of the
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traditional, multifaceted, rich practice of Judaism is a direct consequence of the continuing absence of effective Jewish leadership. Today the decision-makers, the ones on the boards guiding collective Jewish action, are predominantly the moneyed class, most of whom are unschooled in Jewish history and ritual, often unappreciative of the mystique and grandeur of our heritage, and lacking a solid grasp of what is most beneficial for the Jewish people and Israel. As a consequence, they often make ill-considered decisions that lead to poor outcomes.
In the latest Obama flare-up, about two months ago, we did witness some examples of strong and appropriate Jewish leadership when a few individuals notably spoke out on the treatment that Israel and its leaders received. Unfortunately, their response was not the norm. The reaction of the vast majority of our leaders was abysmal—they kept quiet. These same leaders are not speaking out about the global jihad and its implications for the Jews. Perhaps they are silent because, as during World War II, they think it is in the best interests of world Jewry to keep quiet, or perhaps they are silent because their true religion is universalism and humanism and not Judaism, or perhaps they are silent because they simply don’t know what to do. History will treat many of today’s Jewish leaders with scorn, much as we look upon Stephen Wise or some of the ludicrous antics by the rabbis discussed in Rabbi Haskel Lookstein’s lecture today.
Some Solutions Clearly, we need to change the way we choose our leaders. Our leaders should be learned, wise, accomplished, compassionate, ready to speak out and fight for the good of our people and Israel, and whether they are Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, unaffiliated, or secular, they should be Jews who are connected to core Jewish values. I have long advocated for a diverse leadership that includes members of the clergy, the academy, and the creative community. Their wisdom, combined with the acumen of some of the current leaders, should improve the process of the decision-making and lead to better outcomes. Those who donate the big bucks should not be chosen exclusively over the learned and committed Jews among us. It is time to change the rules of the game.
That is what we in America need to do. That is our homework, and it will take some time.
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But we have to act now. What can the Jewish people of the Diaspora and the people of the State of Israel do right now to avoid catastrophe? To me one thing is clear. If we continue to do things the way we have done them in the past, and are reactive rather than proactive, we are in deep trouble. Radical Islam and delegitimization present formidable threats. I believe that part of why we are not sounding the alarm is because we are at a loss as to what to do. At the same time, calling for Jewish unity is a pipe dream. It did not happen during the Holocaust and it is not going to happen now unless specific actions are undertaken.
As is clear from the growing momentum around the propaganda of the delegitimization of Israel, we are losing the public relations battle. Make no mistake—propaganda can be used both as weapon of attack, as so many totalitarian regimes including the Nazis have demonstrated time and again, and as a method of defense, which is what Israel must now do.
We must try something that has been attempted piecemeal, privately and institutionally by both Israelis and Americans, with very little success. Israel must establish a world-class propaganda machine like no other country or people has ever attempted before, the goal being to foster a positive perception of Israel based on cohesive, consistent messaging. It is important to note that I am not talking about manipulation and lies, but about positively influencing people with the truth conveyed persuasively.
I and others believe that the Israeli government has not fully grasped how devastating the wave of worldwide negative propaganda is and can yet become, and at the same time, is ill-equipped to respond to it. The American Jewish community is asleep at the wheel as well and too fractured to effectively defend Israel against delegitimization. The development of anti-delegitimization techniques needs to be formulated with the same intensity, forethought, and action that, for example, goes into tactical battle plans, strategic war modeling, or the development of the Merkava tank. Big bucks have to be spent on changing the hearts and minds of the people. And while Jewish unity is an unattainable goal, becoming more unified is not—this campaign should strive to foster old-fashioned Jewish unity, along the lines of the pride that was forged in the aftermath of the Six Day War. This needs to be an all-out campaign.
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Israel's current "rebranding" program is handled by the Foreign Ministry, which is not well versed in dealing with the soft power of NGOs and the left. The government can not turn the tide of delegitimization on its own. The Israeli government needs to appoint a propaganda czar, if you will, to supervise a massive campaign that will cost billions of dollars over the next several years, to change the hearts and minds of multiple audiences globally. The campaign must be geared to reach people, rather than reaching out to other governments, as has been the primary approach to date. The tourist ads running in the States saying, “Shalom, Welcome to Israel” are not going to change anyone’s mind.
The campaign should contract out to world leaders in the fields of marketing, public relations, advertising, branding, social networking, old media, new media, and more. We need to harness genus ha Yehudi—the Jewish genius––that has been so successful in so many fields, and apply it to the existential threat. The campaign must incorporate cutting-edge research on the science of influence from social psychology, cognitive psychology, biology, neuroscience, and related fields. These scientists analyze behavioral responses and examine neurological responses with data drawn from sources such as intracranial EEG recordings and MRIs. We need to gain a solid understanding of how the lies told by the delegitimizers have such power, and how to counter those lies with the truth. This is not an outlandish proposal—consider that retail giants and software companies routinely apply these types of technologies with great success. The knowledge exists. We need to synthesize and apply it.
Ultimately, the campaign must appeal to people’s emotions in order to change hearts and minds about Israel. It must have multiple messages for multiple audiences across the world. I would start with the general population of the U.S. and Europe—the people of instant opinion; the creative class globally, the thought leaders who are people of considered opinion and are generally very liberal; Christians on both the right and left; the Arab masses; and the Jewish audience in the U.S. and Europe. It must portray Israel truthfully, to counter the tsunami of misinformation. It must connect with each core audience.
I have no idea if the following ideas are the ones that would be the most effective. Extensive testing and research would determine that. But as food for thought, I would suggest that for the general population, the ultimate objective is to
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undemonize Israel; for the creative class, it must not only counter delegitimization, but must clearly demonstrate that the apartheid argument is entirely false and deliberately misleading; for liberal Christian denominations, who are so politically influential, it must forge a solid connection; for Christians on the right, who are in large part staunch supporters of Israel, it is important to reinforce that crucial relationship; for the Arabs, it could emphasize the Koran’s support of the biblical claim that Israel was given to the Jews by God and promote an alternative to jihad; and for the Jewish people, we must forge a connection with our rich heritage, and demonstrate the reality that Israel is a wellspring of positive Jewish values, creativity, and positively channeled energy.
The difficulty of this task should not be underestimated. What this campaign must do is change the course of current events, literally change the course that history teaches us we are moving in. With a massive campaign using the same application of Jewish genius that Israel has demonstrated on the battlefield and in the workplace, we can undo the legacy of inaction that we earned during the Holocaust, and we can change the course of history.
If delegitimization continues, if the military threats to Israel escalate and there is an attack that forces Israel to retaliate, it could have catastrophic results that affect the entire world. We must do all we can to reach out to the world. We must take action because if we save Israel, we save the Jews, and in the process we just may save the world. Should the Israeli government issue a call for suggestions on what to name the counter-delegitimization program, my recommendation would be to call it Operation Light Unto the Nations.
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Aryeh Rubin’s bio
Aryeh Rubin is the founding partner and managing director of The Maot Group, an investment company established in 1991. Previously, he was the publisher of the New York–based KSF Group, a medical publishing company. In 1974, Mr. Rubin visited eleven concentration camps throughout Europe, an experience that helped influence his decision to found and publish Jewish Living magazine in the late 1970s.
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Mr. Rubin is also the founder and director of Targum Shlishi, a foundation dedicated to fostering positive change in the Jewish world. Targum Shlishi has undertaken several initiatives related to Holocaust knowledge, awareness, and justice, including: conceiving and funding Operation Last Chance through the Israel office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a campaign that provides a cash award for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Nazi war criminals; spearheading a fundraising initiative for Father Patrick Desbois, a Catholic priest who is systematically locating mass graves of Jews massacred in Ukraine and Belarus and uncovering the history that occurred there; and sending out 1500 complimentary copies of David Wyman and Rafael Medoff’s book A Race Against Death: Peter Bergson, America, and the Holocaust to decision-makers in the Jewish world. Targum Shlishi’s recent grants awarded include support for video documentation of an archeological investigation of Sobibor, the concentration camp in Poland that was closed in 1943 after a successful revolt; Voices from the Ashes, a project to translate and publish very early Holocaust testimonies from a previously unexplored archive at the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw; and a forthcoming documentary on the history of Nazi hunting by Jonathan Silvers.
In addition, Mr. Rubin is the editor of Jewish Sages of Today: Profiles of Extraordinary People (Devora Publishing and Targum Shlishi, 2009). His opinion pieces have appeared in The Jewish Week, The Jerusalem Report, and Moment Magazine and he has been profiled in articles in several publications, including The New York Times, The Miami Herald, The Daily Business Review, and The Jewish Star Times. His opinion piece “What Did You Do After the War, Dad?” appeared in The Jewish Week and has been downloaded multiple thousands of times. Mr. Rubin received a B.A. from Yeshiva University. He is married, has three daughters, and lives in Florida.
www.targumshlishi.org