Book reveals government plans to intimidate and burn boats of Shoah-Holocaust survivors trying to reach Palestine
Jewish refugees on the deck of the immigrant ship Dov Hoz at
Haifa in May 1946
Haifa in May 1946
British spies staged covert operations to sabotage Holocaust survivors' attempts to reach Palestine between 1946 and early 1948.
Among the tactics used by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in Operation Embarrass were the bombing of five ships used by potential immigrants, intimidation and the creation of a fake Palestinian defence group.
The British government gave the go-ahead to the campaign to slow illegal immigration into Palestine, provided there was "no risk of casualties being incurred" and no link could be traced back to the government.
The revelations come in the first authorised history of the SIS, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, by Professor Keith Jeffery. The book was published on Tuesday.
I just stumbled on it - it was like a spy novel
Prof Jeffery said: "Operation Embarrass was one of the most amazing stories I found. I just stumbled on it. It was like a spy novel. These are astonishing operational stories. Uncovering them made the hairs stand up on the back of my neck."
Before searching the archives, he had to agree to keep certain stories secret for national security reasons, but Operation Embarrass is revealed in full.
Prof Jeffery said: "It's quite explosive and you can see why the anxiety levels might go up, not just in the agency but in Whitehall as well. A lot of stuff in the archives was destroyed, so finding this tale was a reassurance. If it had been me, I would have shredded stuff like this.
"There is the possibility it could make things difficult for the Foreign Office. But I dug my heels in, and said it was very important this was revealed.
"It says a lot about the organisation of the SIS at that time, about the government's Palestine policy and about relations between the agency and the government."
In late 1946, the government asked the SIS to develop "proposals for action to deter ships' masters and crews from engaging in illegal Jewish immigration and traffic". Around £13,000 was spent on the operation.
A SIS report stated: "Action of the nature contemplated is, in fact, a form of intimidation, and intimidation is only likely to be effective if some members of the group of people to be intimidated actually suffer unpleasant consequences."
Options put forward for the campaign included the use of sabotage devices, tampering with a ship's fresh water supplies and crew's food, or setting fire to ships in port.
SIS chief Sir Stewart Menzies suggested blaming the action on a specially-created Arab organisation. The agents were instructed to devise failsafe reasons for their presence abroad and were told that if rumbled, "they were under no circumstances to admit their connection with the government".
Prof Jeffery said: "The book really does show the James Bond side of it. Embarrass is closer to the perception of the spy image than other stories in the book."
In summer 1947 and early 1948, the plot led to attacks on five ships in Italian ports. The British made it a priority that no one was on board in order to avoid casualties. One ship was a a "total loss" and two others were damaged.
The British set up a notional organisation - Defenders of Arab Palestine - which claimed responsibility for the work against Jewish immigration.
Operation Embarrass ended in April, before the UK pullout from Palestine the following month. But Prof Jeffery concludes that the campaign had little or no effect. One SIS officer wrote that the failure to carry out a planned operation to disable the President Warfield ship in the summer of 1947 had been the biggest missed opportunity.
Instead, the renamed Exodus set sail with 4,500 Jewish refugees, leading to one of the most infamous episodes in the battle to create Israel. British forces seized the Exodus off the coast of Palestine. Three people died and the immigrants aboard were forcibly returned
to Europe.
to Europe.
"The cost," said one SIS officer, "both direct and indirect to the government, must have been enormous. All of this could have been spared if the Foreign Office had permitted the SIS to take the appropriate action against the President Warfield."
Prof Jeffery said: "After the disaster with the Exodus, the SIS guys pretty much said 'we told you so'. They could have blown its rudder off and averted the crisis.
"This was a fantastic job for me. I was like a child in a sweetshop. But I also feel this is part of the accountability process. British taxpayers funded these operations. You might say after 60 years what difference does it make, but you can tell it does. People will look at this and put the record straight.."
British warned of 'bitterness'
over handling of the Exodus ship
The SS Exodus (Photo: British Admiralty)
The High Commissioner to Palestine warned officials in London that the "bitterness evoked" by events on board the SS Exodus in 1947 should not be underestimated.
The extent of the damage to relations between the Jews and their British rulers as a result of the decision to force those on board – many of them Holocaust survivors - to return to Europe is made clear in a series of newly-released intelligence reports from the colonial era.
"The Yishuv has followed events… with close attention," said one report, authored by Sir Alan Cunningham, then the British High Commissioner, noting the end to "the intermission in illegal immigration".
He wrote: "The intransigent attitude of the passengers has been applauded… Meanwhile the Hebrew press seizes every opportunity to use this incident as a stick with which to beat the Palestine Administration and His Majesty's Government, and to sustain the bitterness which the deportation undoubtedly aroused."
The ship, which was originally named the President Warfield and was referred to as such in the intelligence reports, is the most famous example of the illegal immigration that occurred in the years before independence, as Zionist groups sought to bring refugees from Holocaust-ravaged Europe to Palestine.
Their efforts were opposed by the British, with refugees held in camps in Atlit and Cyprus.
The Exodus set sail on July 11, but when it approached the Mediterranean coast of Palestine, British forces seized it. Three people died and those aboard were forcibly returned to Europe, at which point they declared a hunger strike. It was a public relations disaster for the British, but it still resulted in the Jewish refugees being transferred to displaced persons camps in Germany.
Another report reveals how the decision to return the illegal immigrants on the ship to France "undoubtedly caught the [Jewish] Agency unaware, and the successful preservation of secrecy until the transports were well on their way probably prevented a sharper reaction by the Yishuv [the Jewish community].
"Nevertheless the bitterness evoked by this departure from practice must not be underestimated," the report stated. "The Arabs are naturally gratified."
The High Commissioner noted that the decision to permit pregnant women to disembark at Gibraltar had been "met with little appreciation" and reported that the Yishuv signalized its solidarity with the refugees "by observing a day-long fast, which passed off uneventfully."
In a sign of the divide between the establishment and the Haganah, Sir Alan also said that the Jewish Agency had been "at particular pains to emphasize that it was not Zionist propaganda which had induced those on board the transport to refuse disembarkation in France".
The incident, later immortalised by Leon Uris, was a turning point in attitudes towards the Zionist cause, as photographs and reports were seen around the world. But it did not dispose the British towards easing restrictions; a report from later that year discussed use of force while searching rebellious detainees in Athlit, with the comment "In fact no greater degree of force was used than was needed to overcome opposition to the search".
It also details the methods used by Jewish detainees to evade their British guards. "When the camp was searched a number of pistols, bombs and uniforms were found, which had apparently been introduced into the camp in the false bottoms of food boxes supplied by the officially-recognised Jewish Prisoners Aid Society," explained one briefing. "In consequence visitors and food parcels have been stopped."
Foreign Office fears for Palestine prompted by
intercepted Ben-Gurion papers
A blue plaque outside a former residence of David Ben-Gurion in Mayfair (Photo: Simon Harriyott)
Foreign Office hopes that a resolution to the situation in Palestine could be delayed until after the war were shattered in 1941 after they intercepted the private papers of David Ben-Gurion detailing Zionist objectives and his discussions with Anglo-Jewish leaders.
Secret records released this week at the National Archives reveal that in late 1941 as he set off for America, against a climate of growing British suspicion toward the Zionists, the censorship authorities "removed from Mr Ben Gurion's luggage" papers relating to his time in the UK.
The Foreign Office described the papers as of "first class interest and importance" and circulated them around senior officials, the High Commissioner and later to officials in the United States.
The seized papers included a lengthy study of the status-quo in Mandate Palestine, "Outlines of Zionist policy," in which Ben-Gurion detailed the need for a Jewish army to help the Allied effort (which was never realised) and discussed longer-term strategy for the Zionists. They also included the minutes from a meeting he and Chaim Weizmann had held that September with prominent British Jews, among them Anthony de Rothschild and Sir Robert Waley-Cohen.
Ben-Gurion in 1950 (Photo: Eldan David)
The meeting yielded little agreement between the parties – indeed, in a March 1942 letter to Chaim Weizmann, also found in the files, de Rothschild said he remained "unalterably opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state" - but the minutes raised fears in the Foreign Office that these individuals, who had previously been avowedly anti-Zionist, were coming round to the Zionist cause.
In a letter of warning, Foreign Office official SEV Luke noted that while de Rothschild and Waley-Cohen, "who no doubt represent a strong body of opinion among British Jewry, showed themselves frankly hostile and apprehensive of the conception of a Jewish state" it was still "not possible to draw much comfort from the cleavage of opinion".
"All those present at the meeting were united on the need for large scale immigration of Jews into Palestine at the first possible opportunity, and were therefore equally united on the need for smashing irrevocably the White Paper policy," he said.
And after reading Mr Ben-Gurion's study he concluded "there is no hope that the question will be allowed to rest where it is… there is now no hope that they would agree to anything less than the whole of Palestine".
Luke explained that it was clear "that we must expect that from now on the Zionist's campaign will steadily increase in intensity irrespective of any embarrassment that it may be likely to cause the British war effort.
"It has hitherto been our assumption that the Palestine question will remain in abeyance until the end of the war," he said. "It is fairly clear from this memorandum that the Zionist leaders will not permit this. They will make every effort henceforth to exert pressure to marshal public opinion on behalf of their programme, and it is specifically stated in the memorandum that the question of immigration of Jews on a large scale to Palestine need not necessarily be deferred until after the war. They consider that, if the military situation permits, there is no reason to await the return of peace".
Although Luke's view of Ben-Gurion's report was that it was "a typical Jewish Agency document, detailed, lucid and logical", Oliver Lyttelton, a minister of state in the Middle East, described it as "the work of a fanatic idealist" and warned that if his scheme was carried out "it would inevitably lead to rebellion from Iraq to the Suez Canal, with strong repercussions in India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt".
The newly released documents also include warnings from between 1941 and 1943 about the tactics of the Stern gang, and discussion of the activities of illegal Jewish organisations operating in Mandate Palestine. "These organisations… constitute a potential danger far more serious than Arab violence," wrote Sir William Battershill, assistant under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, in March 1942, "since it would be infinitely less easy to meet by the methods which were employed against Arabs".
The documents emphasise the hostility felt by some in the Foreign Office towards the Zionists, with Luke writing in a document in December 1941: "It is impossible not to feel… that in the Zionist organisation we are faced with a most formidable power, fascist in conception, tireless and ruthless in the attainment of its objectives, with great powers of organisation and backed by very important international political support.
"The political ideas and methods described in this memorandum are those which created the Fascist Govt. in Italy, the Communist Govt. in Russia and the National Socialist Govt. in Germany."
Secret documents reveal plans for
'British Haganah' in Palestine as Mandate ended
A telegram from March 1948
British men and women living in Jerusalem during the last days of the Mandate period planned to establish a "British Haganah" to protect themselves.
In a series of secret documents from the colonial period, newly released by the national archives after almost seven decades, the uncertainty felt by the British in what was then Palestine in the spring of 1948 becomes apparent.
Members of the British community in Jerusalem met in early 1948 to discuss setting up a group, which they described as a "British Haganah", noting that it was "the first time in 42 years" that they were discussing the question of protection.
The Jerusalem British community council was created "for the protection of their individual and collective interests", although it was predicted that the situation would not deteriorate "to such extent that all physical means will be used for protection". But a document explained that the aim "would be protection of life and property" and stating that "about 100 men of the community will be able to use arms". It continued: "The problem of arms will certainly not be a difficulty… as the withdrawing administration will provide them with enough equipment".
Minutes from regular meetings held from January to April detail discussion about medical supplies and policing arrangements for after the end of the Mandate period, including consideration of whether remaining British personnel should be concentrated "in a distinct and neutral residential area" and whether "a municipal police force in Jerusalem… could be left in being after the evacuation".
From the start of the year a series of warnings were issued urging Britons who were not government workers to leave Palestine "by the end of April", because "thereafter it will not be possible to arrange escort or transport facilities for them". On April 19, the High Commissioner noted that after the next day, any Britons who remained in the area did so at their own risk.
British officials seemed concerned not least as to who would bear the cost of the conflict, with one document noting that "in the event of a serious worsening of the situation many British subjects will approach this Government or subsequently His Majesty's Government's Political Mission, with requests for evacuation".
In a telegram to the Foreign Office on March 30, the High Commissioner for Palestine wrote that "the question arises regarding the care of British subjects… after the evacuation of Jerusalem". Sir Alan Cunningham explained that there would be around "100 Britishers", and that while they had been advised to stockpile supplies "the question of their subsistence during such a period is causing some anxiety".
In a sign that standards were not diminished even as war was imminent, a document from March 1948 reveals discussion about the provision of a British chauffeur for the representative arriving to oversee the transition.
But it was not all panic and planning for the worst. One document contained a request for British officials to acknowledge the efforts of those remaining in the area "to carry on the good work and keep the flag flying". And the minutes from a community council meeting two months before the British left reveal that a screening of the film Great Expectations had been arranged for members for March 17 – although there is no mention of whether the event went ahead as planned.
Archive revelations:
Shmuel Katz a founder of the ‘struggle’
Shmuel Katz
An outspoken call to arms by Shmuel Katz — an Irgun member and founder of the right-wing paper the Jewish Standard — at a crowded meeting hall in a North-West London Jewish arts club was met with enthusiastic applause. But Katz was unaware that his audience, included Special Branch officers.
Their report, among secret papers just released by the National Archive, quotes Katz, who later became a founder of Herut and member of Knesset, telling the 1946 annual conference of the Revisionist New Zionist Organisation that all members should take part in “an international campaign” to provide firearms to the Irgun.
The British government had acted with “ferocity” against Jews in Palestine, he added. “There must be no compromise, because the survival of the whole Jewish people is at stake.”
South African-born Katz had been sent to London by Ze’ev Jabotinsky to represent the Revisionist movement. As British intelligence officials tracked him around the country, and intercepted letters and telegrams he sent to associates, they found that his hard-line views had caused splits in the movement.
There were fierce squabbles over funding with one intercept of internal communications revealing the NZO had a monthly budget of only £350.
Agents also intercepted a resignation letter from Katz to NZO protesting that the organisation was showing a tendency towards “giving up the struggle.”
Finally, in 1946, intelligence chiefs, despite their warnings about his “extremist views” — admitted that Katz and his wife Doris had managed to travel to Palestine and that their movements were “uncertain.” However a “top secret” report warned they “have been in close touch with the terrorist leadership…”
In fact Katz had joined the Irgun’s high command and became the movement’s de facto foreign minister and Jerusalem area commander. After independence he was elected to the Knesset for Herut. He later co-founded the Movement for a Greater Israel. In 1977 he became an adviser to Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
However, in 1978 Katz resigned in protest at the government’s peace negotiations with Egypt. He joined the far- right Tehiya party and later Herut after it split from Likud.
Katz died, aged 93, in 2008.
Archive revelations:
‘Holy war’ fears after Jerusalem bombing
The aftermath of the King David Hotel bomb in July 1946
A British intelligence chief’s personal diary, just released by the National Archive, contains his assessment that the bombing of Jerusalem’s King David Hotel in 1946 persuaded the Arabs they could not take on the Jews in face-to-face battle. He also warns that the attack, on what had been British Mandate headquarters, could spark a wave of Arab terrorism and even lead to a “holy war.”
In his closely typed, post-war diary Guy Liddell, deputy director general of the Security Service, records that he had met Sir John Shaw, chief secretary to the High Commissioner in Palestine who told him it was his conviction that the Arabs would prove to be “entirely intransigent” and that the authorities had been “lucky to have got over the funerals of Arab victims without serious violence.”
The Arabs, noted the security chief, “know that in a street fight with the Jews they could not hope to win.” However, he warned: “They might at any moment commit some outrage that would cause things to flare up. It might even lead to a holy war.”
In another entry, shortly before Israel independence, Mr Liddell described the developing situation in Palestine as being in “a shocking state.”
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