The Irgun Zvai Leumi:
From Terrorists to
Politicians
Brandon Sellers
PSCI 362
The Irgun Zvai
Leumi (National Military
Organization) was
a Jewish terrorist organization
that transitioned from a terrorist group to a politi-
cal party. As a movement the group was founded
in 1931 under Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s leadership, but
even then their operations did not include vio-
lence against their enemies, the British or Arabs.
Not until 1939, when group leaders recognized
the need to start initiating violence, can the Irgun
really be called a terrorist organization.
The source of the Irgun’s grievances can be
found in the settlement of Israel. They were
founded upon Jabotinsky’s doctrine of Revisionist
Zionism, which included “relentless pressure on
Great Britain, including petitions and mass dem-
onstrations, for Jewish statehood on both banks
of the Jordan River; a Jewish majority in Pales-
that transitioned from a terrorist group to a politi-
cal party. As a movement the group was founded
in 1931 under Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s leadership, but
even then their operations did not include vio-
lence against their enemies, the British or Arabs.
Not until 1939, when group leaders recognized
the need to start initiating violence, can the Irgun
really be called a terrorist organization.
The source of the Irgun’s grievances can be
found in the settlement of Israel. They were
founded upon Jabotinsky’s doctrine of Revisionist
Zionism, which included “relentless pressure on
Great Britain, including petitions and mass dem-
onstrations, for Jewish statehood on both banks
of the Jordan River; a Jewish majority in Pales-
tine; a
reestablishment of the Jewish regiments;
and military training for youth” (Jewish Virtual
Library). Essentially, they wanted to create a
Jewish state. This broad goal was largely ful-
Library). Essentially, they wanted to create a
Jewish state. This broad goal was largely ful-
¿lled nine years later when “the national council proclaimed the
state of Israel on May 14th, 1948” (Henry 27).
The end of World War II led the
United Nations to create the state of Israel and
lay out a partition plan separating Muslims and
Jews.
lay out a partition plan separating Muslims and
Jews.
As Alice Henry points out, war immediately
broke out the next day: “the Palestine war began. Egypt invaded, Syrians and a
few Lebanese
attacked from the
north, Jordan from the east”
(Henry 27). This last detail, including Muslims in
a partitioned region, did not satisfy the Irgun as
described in a New York Times article printed just
(Henry 27). This last detail, including Muslims in
a partitioned region, did not satisfy the Irgun as
described in a New York Times article printed just
two months after
the conÀict began. C.L. Sulz-
berger interviews Menachem Begin, one of the most
prominent leaders of the Irgun, and writes that “the extremist organization
Irgun Zvai Leumi does not recognize the partition of Palestine as binding upon
its supporters and is insistent that the State of Israel shall include all of the
former Palestinian mandate as well as all of the King-
dom of Trans-Jordan” (Sulzberger 9).
dom of Trans-Jordan” (Sulzberger 9).
When a terrorist group such as the Irgun
Zvai Leumi sees their key objective completed,
what do they do? In the case of their use of ter-
rorism, the Irgun came to an end not because the
funds died out or support waned, but because
Zvai Leumi sees their key objective completed,
what do they do? In the case of their use of ter-
rorism, the Irgun came to an end not because the
funds died out or support waned, but because
the leadership recognized the need to move to a more
democratic and non-violent strategy. In or-
der to continue
pushing for additional change, no
longer would the Irgun act under overt auspices
of violence. Their primary purpose ful¿lled, they
had no agenda supportable with violence any-
more due to the creation of the state of Israel’s
presence. Instead of disbanding after their suc-
cess, the Irgun continued to remain active, shift-
ing into a productive political role. Most notably,
this shift can be seen in the leadership of both
the Irgun and Israel’s political institutions.
longer would the Irgun act under overt auspices
of violence. Their primary purpose ful¿lled, they
had no agenda supportable with violence any-
more due to the creation of the state of Israel’s
presence. Instead of disbanding after their suc-
cess, the Irgun continued to remain active, shift-
ing into a productive political role. Most notably,
this shift can be seen in the leadership of both
the Irgun and Israel’s political institutions.
After the state
was declared in 1948, Brit-
Terrorism
ain moved out and
there was no need for vio-
lence against
them. However, the Irgun, instead
of stepping down and removing themselves from
the political scene shifted in a new direction, spe-
ci¿cally turned themselves into a political move-
ment named Herut. Led by Menachem Begin
and several other Irgun leaders, Herut estab-
lishes itself as a powerhouse within the Knesset,
Israel’s parliament. The Irgun’s strategy and
tactics through the year 1948 consisted of terror-
ist attacks on British and Arab hotspots as they
violently opposed British inÀuences and the Arab
presence in Palestine. The Irgun then transi-
tioned into the political movement Herut after the
creation of the Jewish state, spurned on by the
Altalena incident in which the Israeli government
made its presence known to the Irgun, making it
clear that their terrorist actions would not be toler-
ated. Begin spearheaded this transition and re-
mained the face of Herut and its respective politi-
cal coalitions until his retirement in 1983; in fact,
many faces and families can be seen in the inner
circle of both the Irgun terrorist organization and
the Herut political party due to the shared political
ideology of Revisionist Zionism present in both
groups. For decades after and into the present
day, Irgun’s legacy lives on through the politi-
of stepping down and removing themselves from
the political scene shifted in a new direction, spe-
ci¿cally turned themselves into a political move-
ment named Herut. Led by Menachem Begin
and several other Irgun leaders, Herut estab-
lishes itself as a powerhouse within the Knesset,
Israel’s parliament. The Irgun’s strategy and
tactics through the year 1948 consisted of terror-
ist attacks on British and Arab hotspots as they
violently opposed British inÀuences and the Arab
presence in Palestine. The Irgun then transi-
tioned into the political movement Herut after the
creation of the Jewish state, spurned on by the
Altalena incident in which the Israeli government
made its presence known to the Irgun, making it
clear that their terrorist actions would not be toler-
ated. Begin spearheaded this transition and re-
mained the face of Herut and its respective politi-
cal coalitions until his retirement in 1983; in fact,
many faces and families can be seen in the inner
circle of both the Irgun terrorist organization and
the Herut political party due to the shared political
ideology of Revisionist Zionism present in both
groups. For decades after and into the present
day, Irgun’s legacy lives on through the politi-
2
cal careers of
such men as Menachem Begin,
Yitzhak Shamir,
and Yaakov Meridor. Through these men and
many other individuals, the Irgun’s stamp on Israeli society resonates even
today as conÀict in Palestine rages on.
In this paper, I explore the roles of these
three men within the Irgun terrorist group and how
the group’s core leadership shifted to a political
role, even while they maintain the same key goal.
First, the Irgun’s primary goal must be de¿ned,
and their terrorist activities made clear. Then I
three men within the Irgun terrorist group and how
the group’s core leadership shifted to a political
role, even while they maintain the same key goal.
First, the Irgun’s primary goal must be de¿ned,
and their terrorist activities made clear. Then I
ist Zionism, an
ideology that essentially calls for
a Jewish state
reaching the Jordan river at both ends.
In order to do this, the Irgun had to, as
David Fromkin succinctly puts it, “combat Great Britain, then a global power whose armed forces in the Second World War numbered in the mil-
lions, and to expel Great Britain from Palestine” (Fromkin 687). Removing the British from the
region would also remove the 1939 immigration policy known as the White Paper, “which limited
David Fromkin succinctly puts it, “combat Great Britain, then a global power whose armed forces in the Second World War numbered in the mil-
lions, and to expel Great Britain from Palestine” (Fromkin 687). Removing the British from the
region would also remove the 1939 immigration policy known as the White Paper, “which limited
Jewish
immigration to Palestine from European
will describe the
period of tumult when the Irgun’s
then leader,
Menachem Begin, realized the need
to transition from a terrorist organization to a po-
litical party. While the creation of the Jewish state
was a positive for the Irgun, they had to now work
within the Israeli government to push forward their
agenda. Finally, I will make clear the connec-
tions between the Irgun and the political parties
formed, ¿rst Herut and then the coalitions Gahal
and Likud, through the core leadership and its
consistency for so many years, spearheaded by
the men mentioned above among many others.
to transition from a terrorist organization to a po-
litical party. While the creation of the Jewish state
was a positive for the Irgun, they had to now work
within the Israeli government to push forward their
agenda. Finally, I will make clear the connec-
tions between the Irgun and the political parties
formed, ¿rst Herut and then the coalitions Gahal
and Likud, through the core leadership and its
consistency for so many years, spearheaded by
the men mentioned above among many others.
Irgun’s Goals and Strategy
The Irgun’s goals have already been brieÀy covered: they
align with Jabotinsky’s Revision-
Schemata 2013
Displaced Person
(DP) camps” (Wagner 631).
According to
these sources, the key group of
people that the Irgun planned to antagonize were the British.
people that the Irgun planned to antagonize were the British.
However, some
claim that in fact the Arab popula-
tion was the Irgun’s primary enemy. Removing
both the British and the Arabs would allow their
ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state to be-
come a reality, but it is unclear which group the
Irgun detested more. Y.S. Brenner, in his article
on the splinter group the Stern Gang (also known
as Lehi), claims that while “the majority of the
Irgun considered the Arabs to be their ultimate
adversary, Stern’s splinter group looked upon the
Arabs as mere rivals and on the British as the
real enemy” (Brenner 4). He cites the Irgun’s
tion was the Irgun’s primary enemy. Removing
both the British and the Arabs would allow their
ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state to be-
come a reality, but it is unclear which group the
Irgun detested more. Y.S. Brenner, in his article
on the splinter group the Stern Gang (also known
as Lehi), claims that while “the majority of the
Irgun considered the Arabs to be their ultimate
adversary, Stern’s splinter group looked upon the
Arabs as mere rivals and on the British as the
real enemy” (Brenner 4). He cites the Irgun’s
3
decision, under
David Raziel’s command, to ally
themselves with
the British for certain activities
(Brenner 3). Brenner, however, does not give
enough weight as to why this is done. The British
are in the midst of World War II ¿ghting Germany
and their infamous Anti-Semitic Nazi regime. In
Terror Out of Zion, J. Bell Bowyer notes that
“even the Irgun felt it mad to oppose Hitler’s
most effective enemy [Britain]…a few followers
(Brenner 3). Brenner, however, does not give
enough weight as to why this is done. The British
are in the midst of World War II ¿ghting Germany
and their infamous Anti-Semitic Nazi regime. In
Terror Out of Zion, J. Bell Bowyer notes that
“even the Irgun felt it mad to oppose Hitler’s
most effective enemy [Britain]…a few followers
of Avraham Stern would undertake armed action against the alien
occupier” (Bowyer 51). Brenner, in his
attempt to contrast the Stern Gang and
Irgun, cites a temporary Irgun policy held due to the
extenuating circumstances of World War II.
The Irgun’s key goal, excepting this short period of alliance, was to
eliminate the British presence in Palestine.
But how did they plan to achieve these
goals? Their general plan, according to From-
kin’s Irgun source, was to “attack property inter-
ests. After giving advance warning to evacuate
them, his small band of followers would blow up
buildings...economic pressure would drive the
Attlee-Bevin government either to withdraw from
Palestine or else to try some reckless and pos-
sibly losing gamble in an effort to retrieve the situ-
ation” (Fromkin 688). This strategy of attracting
goals? Their general plan, according to From-
kin’s Irgun source, was to “attack property inter-
ests. After giving advance warning to evacuate
them, his small band of followers would blow up
buildings...economic pressure would drive the
Attlee-Bevin government either to withdraw from
Palestine or else to try some reckless and pos-
sibly losing gamble in an effort to retrieve the situ-
ation” (Fromkin 688). This strategy of attracting
Terrorism
the attention of
the British Empire did quickly win
the Irgun and the Jewish people their state and
expel the British, but not without a signi¿cant loss
of credibility and a shift from their intended tac-
tics.
expel the British, but not without a signi¿cant loss
of credibility and a shift from their intended tac-
tics.
Their shift in strategy was made complete
when one act, an actual accident, forced them
to embrace a more violent means to their goal.
The infamous King David Hotel bombing that
occurred on the 22nd of July, 1946, resulted in
the deaths of nearly a hundred people including
Britains, Jews, and Arabs (Fromkin 688). While
Irgun members claim that the deaths were an ac-
cident, their popularity dwindled after the attack.
In his memoir The Revolt, Menachem Begin
recalls the lead-up to the explosion, careful to
note that an Irgun member “telephoned the King
David Hotel and warned them that explosives
had been placed under the hotel and would go
off in a short time” (219). Begin himself insists
that “there were many civilians in the hotel whom
we wanted, at all costs to avoid injuring;” he even
claims that the Irgun created a “new device,” a
timer, for their mines so that the bombs could be
set off to “allow for evacuation by hotel guests,
workers and of¿cials” (Begin 212-213). Which-
ever party is to blame for the miscommunication,
when one act, an actual accident, forced them
to embrace a more violent means to their goal.
The infamous King David Hotel bombing that
occurred on the 22nd of July, 1946, resulted in
the deaths of nearly a hundred people including
Britains, Jews, and Arabs (Fromkin 688). While
Irgun members claim that the deaths were an ac-
cident, their popularity dwindled after the attack.
In his memoir The Revolt, Menachem Begin
recalls the lead-up to the explosion, careful to
note that an Irgun member “telephoned the King
David Hotel and warned them that explosives
had been placed under the hotel and would go
off in a short time” (219). Begin himself insists
that “there were many civilians in the hotel whom
we wanted, at all costs to avoid injuring;” he even
claims that the Irgun created a “new device,” a
timer, for their mines so that the bombs could be
set off to “allow for evacuation by hotel guests,
workers and of¿cials” (Begin 212-213). Which-
ever party is to blame for the miscommunication,
4
the end result
was that the Irgun received a large
amount of
negative publicity. This publicity not
only drove the Irgun to take on a more violent strategy against the Arab
population and British of¿cials, but it also allowed the Israeli government breathing room to
take action against the Irgun later during the Altalena incident.
The Altalena incident demonstrated the lack of trust that the Israel
government had in the organization as an ally and ultimately forced the Irgun
to take on the form of a political party
writing that “at
an early morning cabinet meet-
ing, Ben-Gurion received a vote of seven to two
authorizing all measures necessary to assure that the ship was turned over to
the government” (Bell 324). The reasons
for this rejection are fairly
straight-forward: a truce disallowing further arms
to be gathered was declared while the Altalena
was on the water and unreachable by radio, and
the Irgun were not to be trusted with weapons.
to be gathered was declared while the Altalena
was on the water and unreachable by radio, and
the Irgun were not to be trusted with weapons.
One important note to make here is that
this distrust was warranted. Prominent members
this distrust was warranted. Prominent members
to get their
voice heard. Begin and other Irgun
leaders heard the message given by the Israeli military Zahal: if you
are not with us, then you
are against
us. The boat, sailing much-needed
men and weapons to Israel to reinforce the army
during the Israeli-Arab War, never landed with the
supplies and men. Through a series of miscom-
men and weapons to Israel to reinforce the army
during the Israeli-Arab War, never landed with the
supplies and men. Through a series of miscom-
munications,
technical dif¿culties, and general
distrust between the Irgun and the government,
the Altalena was disallowed from landing, Àoating
just off the coast of Kfar Vitkin and then Tel Aviv.
The of¿cial Israeli military, the Zahal, were or-
dered to ¿re on the Irgun men unloading the boat
and the boat itself in both cities. In Terror Out of
Zion, J. Bowyer Bell describes the situation for
Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion and the cabinet,
distrust between the Irgun and the government,
the Altalena was disallowed from landing, Àoating
just off the coast of Kfar Vitkin and then Tel Aviv.
The of¿cial Israeli military, the Zahal, were or-
dered to ¿re on the Irgun men unloading the boat
and the boat itself in both cities. In Terror Out of
Zion, J. Bowyer Bell describes the situation for
Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion and the cabinet,
Schemata 2013
of both the Irgun
and the splinter terrorist group
Lehi refused to be
integrated into the of¿cial
Israeli army Zahal. Bowyer notes that the city of
Jerusalem, “decreed a completely international
city…gave the Irgun a welcome opportunity to
postpone the inevitable self-liquidation…what
Ben-Gurion would have preferred, as far as the
Irgun-LEHI was concerned, was instant and total
dissolution and enlistment in the Zahal” (Bow-
yer 316-317). In addition, the weapons from the
Altalena were never clearly earmarked for either
the Irgun or the Zahal. Both sides, although sup-
posedly allies, wanted as many arms as possible
available in case of later conÀict (Bowyer 321).
Israeli army Zahal. Bowyer notes that the city of
Jerusalem, “decreed a completely international
city…gave the Irgun a welcome opportunity to
postpone the inevitable self-liquidation…what
Ben-Gurion would have preferred, as far as the
Irgun-LEHI was concerned, was instant and total
dissolution and enlistment in the Zahal” (Bow-
yer 316-317). In addition, the weapons from the
Altalena were never clearly earmarked for either
the Irgun or the Zahal. Both sides, although sup-
posedly allies, wanted as many arms as possible
available in case of later conÀict (Bowyer 321).
To make matters worse, after trying to gain
the
shore in Tel Aviv, the Altalena put the white
5
Àag up as the
universal signal of surrender after
the ship was
nearly blown to pieces, yet “the artil-
lery was still shelling the ship after the white Àag
had gone up” (Bell 326). As Begin (who was at
this point still on the boat) claims, their reasoning
for still ¿ring on the boat was that “there is a gen-
eral ‘cease ¿re’ but the order has not yet reached
all the units of the Army” (Begin 175). In the
end, the losses were not great; considering the
Irgun leadership was on the boat or the shore,
the group could have been completely wiped out.
Instead Begin, Yaakov Meridor, and others lived
to see another day and made their voice heard
through democracy.
lery was still shelling the ship after the white Àag
had gone up” (Bell 326). As Begin (who was at
this point still on the boat) claims, their reasoning
for still ¿ring on the boat was that “there is a gen-
eral ‘cease ¿re’ but the order has not yet reached
all the units of the Army” (Begin 175). In the
end, the losses were not great; considering the
Irgun leadership was on the boat or the shore,
the group could have been completely wiped out.
Instead Begin, Yaakov Meridor, and others lived
to see another day and made their voice heard
through democracy.
Begin recognized
what the Altalena in-
cident meant to the Irgun and expressed his
organization’s plans to Sulzberger in the New
York Times article mentioned previously. The
organization’s plans to Sulzberger in the New
York Times article mentioned previously. The
Irgun leader
reveals his and the Irgun’s plans as
Sulzberger writes that the “Irgun does not intend
to seek to gain power by a coup and will merely
work to achieve authority by electoral means”
(Sulzberger 9). The threat of the Irgun staging
a coup had to be present in Ben-Gurion’s mind,
especially after both the Irgun and Lehi refused
to be totally integrated into Zahal. Begin, as
commander of the Irgun, had to make a decision
Sulzberger writes that the “Irgun does not intend
to seek to gain power by a coup and will merely
work to achieve authority by electoral means”
(Sulzberger 9). The threat of the Irgun staging
a coup had to be present in Ben-Gurion’s mind,
especially after both the Irgun and Lehi refused
to be totally integrated into Zahal. Begin, as
commander of the Irgun, had to make a decision
Terrorism
weighing the costs
and bene¿ts of trying to main-
tain the
terrorist group in its current form, turning it into a political entity like a
movement or political party, or even breaking apart the group altogeth-
er. The Israeli government posed an additional threat upon the group’s survival, raising the cost of maintaining the group and causing Begin to
turn Irgun into a non-violent political actor. After the Altalena incident revealed the distrust be-
tween the Irgun and the Israeli government, the Irgun had to transition into a non-violent political entity, and transition they did.
er. The Israeli government posed an additional threat upon the group’s survival, raising the cost of maintaining the group and causing Begin to
turn Irgun into a non-violent political actor. After the Altalena incident revealed the distrust be-
tween the Irgun and the Israeli government, the Irgun had to transition into a non-violent political entity, and transition they did.
Another act that does not speak well for
the Irgun is the Deir Yassin Massacre, a terror-
ist attack carried out in conjunction with Lehi, a
splinter terrorist group. The terrorists effectively wiped out a predominantly Arab-populated town, killing over 100 people, including women and chil-
dren. This attack was perpetrated on April 9th,
1948, just a month before the state of Israel was declared by the United Nations. Bookended by
the King David Hotel bombing and the Altalena
incident, this massacre demonstrates how ruth-
less the Irgun could be in this short period of time between the bombing and the declaration of the Israeli state (Jewish Virtual Library).
the Irgun is the Deir Yassin Massacre, a terror-
ist attack carried out in conjunction with Lehi, a
splinter terrorist group. The terrorists effectively wiped out a predominantly Arab-populated town, killing over 100 people, including women and chil-
dren. This attack was perpetrated on April 9th,
1948, just a month before the state of Israel was declared by the United Nations. Bookended by
the King David Hotel bombing and the Altalena
incident, this massacre demonstrates how ruth-
less the Irgun could be in this short period of time between the bombing and the declaration of the Israeli state (Jewish Virtual Library).
6
The Herut Movement’s Goals and Strategy
Herut, of course, did not rely on the same
strategy of violence that the Irgun did.
As a politi-
cal movement and then a political party, Herut
cal movement and then a political party, Herut
had to establish
its ideas through a platform. The
most obvious political agenda remained consis-
tent with the Irgun’s true goal: expand the terri-
tory of the Jewish state. In his book The Politics
of Compromise, Ervin Birnbaum notes, tongue
¿rmly in cheek, that “it has abandoned the slogan
of ‘a Jewish State on two banks of the Jordan,’
most obvious political agenda remained consis-
tent with the Irgun’s true goal: expand the terri-
tory of the Jewish state. In his book The Politics
of Compromise, Ervin Birnbaum notes, tongue
¿rmly in cheek, that “it has abandoned the slogan
of ‘a Jewish State on two banks of the Jordan,’
manner through
which to support their Revision-
ist Zionism ideals.
However, some interested groups saw through this charade and sought to
bring ruin upon the political movement by bring-
ing its origins to the forefront.
ing its origins to the forefront.
The potential dangers of the Herut party
were recognized by some outside of Israel.
In fact, in a letter to the editor of the New York
Times, several prominent Jewish-Americans ex-
pressed their fears about the formation of Herut
and what it meant for the future of Israel. The
pressed their fears about the formation of Herut
and what it meant for the future of Israel. The
but only by
substituting for it the claim to the his-
toric boundaries of the Jewish People” (Birnbaum 62). Despite more politically correct phrasing,
the main goal of both the Irgun and Herut was
the same. This can be attributed to both who
the leaders of the movement are and who the
the same. This can be attributed to both who
the leaders of the movement are and who the
members are. Alan S. Zuckerman,
in his study of
the Herut party, describes the composition of the
Herut ranks, writing that “in the early years, Herut
activists were volunteers, committed to an expan-
sive vision of the Land of Israel and opposed to
Labor. Intimate friends and former comrades in
arms, Herutniks were veterans of Etzel [Irgun] or
its counterpart, Lehi [Stern Gang] (sic)” (Zucker-
man et al. 236). The majority of Herut members
were former terrorists who found a non-violent
the Herut party, describes the composition of the
Herut ranks, writing that “in the early years, Herut
activists were volunteers, committed to an expan-
sive vision of the Land of Israel and opposed to
Labor. Intimate friends and former comrades in
arms, Herutniks were veterans of Etzel [Irgun] or
its counterpart, Lehi [Stern Gang] (sic)” (Zucker-
man et al. 236). The majority of Herut members
were former terrorists who found a non-violent
Schemata 2013
letter, published
on the 4th of December, 1948,
claims that
“within the Jewish community they
have preached an admixture of ultra-nationalism,
religious mysticism, and racial superiority…They
have reclaimed no land, built no settlements, and
only detracted from the Jewish defense activ-
ity” (Abramowitz 12). Among the signers are
prominent Jewish-Americans like Albert Einstein,
Herman Eisen, and Harry Orlinsky. Despite
this warning, the Herut movement rolled on and
established itself as the main opposition party to
Mapai.
have preached an admixture of ultra-nationalism,
religious mysticism, and racial superiority…They
have reclaimed no land, built no settlements, and
only detracted from the Jewish defense activ-
ity” (Abramowitz 12). Among the signers are
prominent Jewish-Americans like Albert Einstein,
Herman Eisen, and Harry Orlinsky. Despite
this warning, the Herut movement rolled on and
established itself as the main opposition party to
Mapai.
In preparation of the 1965 elections to the
6th Knesset, the Liberal party and the Herut party
merged to form Gahal in order to gain strength
through greater numbers. In the previous elec-
6th Knesset, the Liberal party and the Herut party
merged to form Gahal in order to gain strength
through greater numbers. In the previous elec-
7
tion in 1961,
both parties received 17 seats in the
Knesset, with the
majority leader Mapai winning
42 (knesset.gov.il). In order to reconcile the
Liberal party and Herut party’s differences, Birn-
baum writes that “the program carried the stamp
of Herut in the clauses dealing with security and
foreign affairs, and the imprint of the Liberals with
regard to economic and ¿nancial matters” (Birn-
baum 64). This temporary coalition helped the
Herut in the short term, but with their markedly
different political platforms the coalition could not
last for long. Indeed, Birnbaum notes “it cannot
be foreseen when and how, if at all, Gahal will be
able to act in the capacity of a substitute govern-
ment for Mapai” (Birnbaum 65). The real win for
the Herut party, however, was Menachem Begin’s
promotion within the government: “Prime Minis-
42 (knesset.gov.il). In order to reconcile the
Liberal party and Herut party’s differences, Birn-
baum writes that “the program carried the stamp
of Herut in the clauses dealing with security and
foreign affairs, and the imprint of the Liberals with
regard to economic and ¿nancial matters” (Birn-
baum 64). This temporary coalition helped the
Herut in the short term, but with their markedly
different political platforms the coalition could not
last for long. Indeed, Birnbaum notes “it cannot
be foreseen when and how, if at all, Gahal will be
able to act in the capacity of a substitute govern-
ment for Mapai” (Birnbaum 65). The real win for
the Herut party, however, was Menachem Begin’s
promotion within the government: “Prime Minis-
ter Eshkol
invited the leader of Herut…to join the Cabinet” (Birnbaum 65). The peaceful participa-
tion of the Herut party in the democratic system effectively earned their leader a recognition of
legitimacy by the opposition. This recognition
eventually led to greater things for the Herut party and Begin himself.
tion of the Herut party in the democratic system effectively earned their leader a recognition of
legitimacy by the opposition. This recognition
eventually led to greater things for the Herut party and Begin himself.
With Birnbaum’s book being published in
1970, he had no idea what was to come for the
Herut party but states that “a circumstance that
1970, he had no idea what was to come for the
Herut party but states that “a circumstance that
Terrorism
could help Gahal
to power would be a peaceful
and slow
revolution of the type that helped the
Democratic Party in Turkey to power in 1950,
after 28 years of uninterrupted rule by the Repub-
lican Party” (Birnbaum 65). Naturally, this is ex-
actly what happened; the Herut party leadership, through the Gahal and then the Likud, gradually climbed to the top of the Israeli government and eventually won their leader, Begin, the executive position of Prime Minister.
Democratic Party in Turkey to power in 1950,
after 28 years of uninterrupted rule by the Repub-
lican Party” (Birnbaum 65). Naturally, this is ex-
actly what happened; the Herut party leadership, through the Gahal and then the Likud, gradually climbed to the top of the Israeli government and eventually won their leader, Begin, the executive position of Prime Minister.
The Herut party
formed Likud with different pre-
tenses than they did the Gahal. Brimming with
con¿dence, the party created Likud in 1973 with
a number of other Zionist political parties. In his
article “The Legacy of Begin and Beginism for
the Israeli Political System,” Ilan Peleg notes that
“from the very beginning it became clear that the
Likud would be dominated by Herut” (Peleg 26).
This coalition’s political agenda was a cohesive
force in stark comparison with the disjointed-
ness of Gahal. Peleg writes that “the territorial
message of the Likud was simple: ‘not an inch!’”
(Peleg 27). Now, uni¿ed, Herut and the rest of
Likud could ¿nally move past their more liberal
opponents. The Herut party reached this preci-
pice of success, through a cooperative strategy,
working from within the Israeli government sys-
tenses than they did the Gahal. Brimming with
con¿dence, the party created Likud in 1973 with
a number of other Zionist political parties. In his
article “The Legacy of Begin and Beginism for
the Israeli Political System,” Ilan Peleg notes that
“from the very beginning it became clear that the
Likud would be dominated by Herut” (Peleg 26).
This coalition’s political agenda was a cohesive
force in stark comparison with the disjointed-
ness of Gahal. Peleg writes that “the territorial
message of the Likud was simple: ‘not an inch!’”
(Peleg 27). Now, uni¿ed, Herut and the rest of
Likud could ¿nally move past their more liberal
opponents. The Herut party reached this preci-
pice of success, through a cooperative strategy,
working from within the Israeli government sys-
8
tem to win
support. In addition, the party man-
aged to keep its primary goal from its Irgun years
intact: to expand the borders of the state of Israel.
intact: to expand the borders of the state of Israel.
Same Leaders, Same Politics
Herut participated in Israel’s ¿rst elections
and immediately experienced some success. In
the ¿rst election held for Israel’s Constituent As-
sembly Herut won 14 of the 120 seats, making
them one of the more popular political parties in
the new state (knesset.gov.il). Upon examining
and immediately experienced some success. In
the ¿rst election held for Israel’s Constituent As-
sembly Herut won 14 of the 120 seats, making
them one of the more popular political parties in
the new state (knesset.gov.il). Upon examining
the list of
representatives from the Herut Move-
ment for the 1st Knesset, many of these individu-
als stayed involved in the Israeli government and represent the group for years. Through a few
als stayed involved in the Israeli government and represent the group for years. Through a few
of these leaders -
including Menachem Begin,
Yitzhak Shamir, and Yaakov Meridor - an an-
cestral line of sorts can be followed from the last
days of the terrorist organization into the 21st
century.
Yitzhak Shamir, and Yaakov Meridor - an an-
cestral line of sorts can be followed from the last
days of the terrorist organization into the 21st
century.
The most important ¿gure of the Irgun who made his voice heard in the
political sphere
the list of
elected representatives from the Herut
Movement in the ¿rst Constituent Assembly, the
overlap between the Herut and Irgun leadership
is extraordinary. Figure 1 is a list of the 14 Herut
members who were elected to the ¿rst Constitu-
ent Assembly, and by extension the 1st Knesset.
Cross-examining this list with both the Jewish Vir-
tual Library and of¿cial Irgun websites, 11 out of
overlap between the Herut and Irgun leadership
is extraordinary. Figure 1 is a list of the 14 Herut
members who were elected to the ¿rst Constitu-
ent Assembly, and by extension the 1st Knesset.
Cross-examining this list with both the Jewish Vir-
tual Library and of¿cial Irgun websites, 11 out of
the 14 members
were recognized and prominent
members of the Irgun. Begin, Lankin, and Me-
ridor were all on the Altalena while it was being
blasted by the Zahal; Hillel Kook, Ari Jabotinsky,
Shmuel Merlin, and Aryeh Ben-Eliezer “founded
the Committee for the Rescue of European Jewry
and later on the Committee for National Libera-
tion” (Jewish Virtual Library). While this is only
members of the Irgun. Begin, Lankin, and Me-
ridor were all on the Altalena while it was being
blasted by the Zahal; Hillel Kook, Ari Jabotinsky,
Shmuel Merlin, and Aryeh Ben-Eliezer “founded
the Committee for the Rescue of European Jewry
and later on the Committee for National Libera-
tion” (Jewish Virtual Library). While this is only
Schemata 2013
is Menachem Begin
himself. Under Begin’s
leadership, Herut
was founded upon the same
principles as the Irgun; key to both groups is the
expansion of Israel’s borders. His efforts to move
the Herut party into power in Israel through the
Gahal coalition have already been noted above,
although ultimately Gahal did not deliver this
goal. However, the Likud coalition did.
In 1977, Menachem Begin was named Prime
Minister of Israel after his coalition party Likud
won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Begin
became Prime Minister despite his history of vio-
lence as leader of the Irgun. He was effectively
the commander of Likud during the King David
Hotel bombing, the Deir Yassin Massacre, and
the Altalena incident. Nevertheless, the coalition
principles as the Irgun; key to both groups is the
expansion of Israel’s borders. His efforts to move
the Herut party into power in Israel through the
Gahal coalition have already been noted above,
although ultimately Gahal did not deliver this
goal. However, the Likud coalition did.
In 1977, Menachem Begin was named Prime
Minister of Israel after his coalition party Likud
won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Begin
became Prime Minister despite his history of vio-
lence as leader of the Irgun. He was effectively
the commander of Likud during the King David
Hotel bombing, the Deir Yassin Massacre, and
the Altalena incident. Nevertheless, the coalition
9
with his name all
over it was elected to power. As
small right-wing Zionist parties, Herut and oth-
ers had little power separately. For this reason
the right-wing coalesced and even today, Likud
remains one of the two major political parties in
Israel.
ers had little power separately. For this reason
the right-wing coalesced and even today, Likud
remains one of the two major political parties in
Israel.
After Begin’s retirement, Likud lost its
Àag-bearer and brieÀy broke into factions as
several groups fought to gain control of Herut
Àag-bearer and brieÀy broke into factions as
several groups fought to gain control of Herut
and by extension
the coalition party Likud. In
Alan S. Zuckerman’s article “The Party’s Just
Begun: Herut Activists in Power and After Begin,” he notes that “Begin transformed the Revisionist
Alan S. Zuckerman’s article “The Party’s Just
Begun: Herut Activists in Power and After Begin,” he notes that “Begin transformed the Revisionist
movement into the
Herut party, and then at-
tracted other parties into the Likud, forming one
of the two largest political blocs in Israel. When
he stepped down…Herut and Begin were no
longer synonymous” (Zuckerman et al. 236). In
tracted other parties into the Likud, forming one
of the two largest political blocs in Israel. When
he stepped down…Herut and Begin were no
longer synonymous” (Zuckerman et al. 236). In
his article, Zuckerman describes how the factions
fall along new guard v. old guard lines as “politi-
cal professionals” from such regions as Asia and
Africa begin to permeate the Herut party (Zucker-
man 246)
fall along new guard v. old guard lines as “politi-
cal professionals” from such regions as Asia and
Africa begin to permeate the Herut party (Zucker-
man 246)
Begin, as commander of the Irgun be-
ginning in 1943 and ending with his retirement
from politics, became the emblematic leader and
practically the symbol of the Revisionist Zionism
ginning in 1943 and ending with his retirement
from politics, became the emblematic leader and
practically the symbol of the Revisionist Zionism
Terrorism
movement. His inÀuence on the creation of the
state of Israel
is debated, but there are no doubts that he had a large one. Peleg (19) concedes Begin’s inÀuence,
writing:
At this
historical juncture, Israel’s
fortieth
anniversary, it could be ar-
gued that with
the exception of David
Ben-Gurion,
Menachem Begin was
the single most
important personality
in the political
history of the State of
Israel…Begin was
instrumental in the
development of a
bipartisan system
in a country that
traditionally had one
dominant party.
Without Begin’s passionate leadership
of the Herut party, the coalitions of Gahal and
then Likud may never have matriculated and the
liberal parties such as Mapai may have stayed
in power to this day without a strong opponent.
Today, Begin’s only son Benjamin Begin serves
in the Knesset as a member of the Likud party
(knesset.gov.il).
of the Herut party, the coalitions of Gahal and
then Likud may never have matriculated and the
liberal parties such as Mapai may have stayed
in power to this day without a strong opponent.
Today, Begin’s only son Benjamin Begin serves
in the Knesset as a member of the Likud party
(knesset.gov.il).
Finally, similar to Begin, Yitzhak Shamir
also went from terrorist group leader to Prime
Minister. Shamir took a different path to politics,
actually spear-heading another similar terrorist
group for a few years after his time with the Irgun.
also went from terrorist group leader to Prime
Minister. Shamir took a different path to politics,
actually spear-heading another similar terrorist
group for a few years after his time with the Irgun.
10
The Irgun were
not the only Zionist terrorist group
during this time period. The
Stern Gang, also
known as Lehi, actually broke off from the Irgun
because of personality and ideological differ-
known as Lehi, actually broke off from the Irgun
because of personality and ideological differ-
ences. Avraham Stern, after losing out to David
Raziel as Irgun leader, formed his own group.
Stern created the Stern Gang and eventually was
killed. Stern and the ¿rst incarnation of Lehi fell
apart quickly, but Shamir restarted Lehi “after
his escape from Mizra in January 1943… [he]
became the organizer, a man of no doubts and
Raziel as Irgun leader, formed his own group.
Stern created the Stern Gang and eventually was
killed. Stern and the ¿rst incarnation of Lehi fell
apart quickly, but Shamir restarted Lehi “after
his escape from Mizra in January 1943… [he]
became the organizer, a man of no doubts and
did. During World War II, Irgun suffered a severe
setback when
Ze’ev Jabotinsky died, and just a
month later Jabotinsky’s chosen leader for the
Irgun, David Raziel, was killed in a bomb attack.
Ironically, Raziel was killed carrying out an opera-
tion alongside the British against Iraq, a German
ally (Bowyer 55). Meridor served the Irgun as
a caretaker leader of sorts until he handed the
reins over to Begin (Jewish Virtual Library). He
stayed active in the Irgun and eventually became
a founding member of Herut alongside Begin and
month later Jabotinsky’s chosen leader for the
Irgun, David Raziel, was killed in a bomb attack.
Ironically, Raziel was killed carrying out an opera-
tion alongside the British against Iraq, a German
ally (Bowyer 55). Meridor served the Irgun as
a caretaker leader of sorts until he handed the
reins over to Begin (Jewish Virtual Library). He
stayed active in the Irgun and eventually became
a founding member of Herut alongside Begin and
few words”
(Bowyer 84). Along with a few other
key Stern Gang
holdouts like eighteen-year-
old Joshua Cohen, Shamir and the Stern Gang
ultimately worked alongside the Irgun committing
terrorist acts such as the Deir Yassin massacre
(Bowyer). Shamir joined Herut in the 1960’s and
by 1973 was elected to the Knesset as a member
old Joshua Cohen, Shamir and the Stern Gang
ultimately worked alongside the Irgun committing
terrorist acts such as the Deir Yassin massacre
(Bowyer). Shamir joined Herut in the 1960’s and
by 1973 was elected to the Knesset as a member
of the Likud
coalition. He eventually succeeded Begin
as Prime Minister in 1983 (Jewish Virtual Library). These two men successfully overcame the odds
and went from violent, radical terrorist leaders to leading politicians in
their state. While never wavering in
their ideology and beliefs, their strategy underwent a shift from violent to
non-
violent as the situation called for it.
violent as the situation called for it.
Yaakov Meridor, another terrorist-turned-
politician, acted as Irgun’s leader before Begin
politician, acted as Irgun’s leader before Begin
Schemata 2013
Raziel’s sister
Esther. He served in the Knes-
set for several terms,
representing Herut, Gahal,
and even Likud later in life (knesset.gov.il). Me-
ridor, while never having the status that Begin or
Shamir had, represents a more typical Irgun ter-
rorist transformation into a politician. Both Begin
and Shamir had more authority within the Irgun
and then the political party, but many others such
as Meridor made the same transition that Begin
and Shamir did. He stands for more of a mid-
level leader among the Irgun and then the Herut
movement.
and even Likud later in life (knesset.gov.il). Me-
ridor, while never having the status that Begin or
Shamir had, represents a more typical Irgun ter-
rorist transformation into a politician. Both Begin
and Shamir had more authority within the Irgun
and then the political party, but many others such
as Meridor made the same transition that Begin
and Shamir did. He stands for more of a mid-
level leader among the Irgun and then the Herut
movement.
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir ef-
fectively created a base of Revisionist Zionism
through ¿rst terroristic and then strictly demo-
fectively created a base of Revisionist Zionism
through ¿rst terroristic and then strictly demo-
cratic means, solidifying themselves as leaders of the
community and gaining the respect of many
11
people. These men are not exceptions: others
such as Yaakov
Meridor also went from being prominent terrorist leaders to politicians in
Israel. Menachem Begin especially transitioned the
Irgun terrorist group into a cohesive, non-violent
political movement that eventually grew to domi-
nate the Israeli government even today. Their
nate the Israeli government even today. Their
violent acts behind them, these leaders shifted their
strategies from violence to non-violence to assert their political beliefs and
to succeed in ac-
complishing their goals.
complishing their goals.
Terrorism
Figure 1:
Herut Members in 1st Knesset (knesset.gov.il)
Yohanan Bader
Menahem Begin
Aryeh Ben-Eliezer
Haim Cohen-Meguri
Uri-Zvi Greenberg
Ari Jabotinsky
Shmuel Katz
Hillel Kook
Haim Landau
Eliyahu Lankin
Yaacov Meridor
Shmuel Merlin
Avraham Rakanti
Esther Raziel-Naor
12
Work Cited
Abramowitz,
Isidore, et al. Letter. New York Times.
Dec. 4 1948: 12. Web.
Begin, Menachem. The Revolt. New York: Nash Publishing, 1977. Print.
Begin, Menachem. The Revolt. New York: Nash Publishing, 1977. Print.
Birnbaum, Ervin. The Politics of Compromise: State and Religion in Israel. Cranbury: Associated University
Presses, 1970. Print.
Presses, 1970. Print.
Bowyer, J. Bell. Terror Out of Zion. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1977. Print.
Brenner, Y.S. “The ‘Stern Gang’ 1940-48.” Middle Eastern Studies. 2.1 Oct. 1965: 2-30. Jstor. Web. 1 October
2012.
2012.
Fromkin,
David. “The Strategy of Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs. 53.4 Jul. 1975: 683-698. Jstor. Web. 1 Oct.
2012.
Henry, Alice. “Jews in the Middle
East.” Off Our Backs. 13.1 Jan. 1983: 27. Jstor. Web. 1 Oct. 2012. Jewish Virtual Library. American-Israeli Cooperative
Enterprise, Web. 3 November 2012.
Knesset English Homepage. State of Israel. Web. 3 November 2012.
Knesset English Homepage. State of Israel. Web. 3 November 2012.
Peleg, Ilan. “The Legacy of Begin and Beginism for the
Israeli Political System.” Israel After Begin.
Ed. Grego-
ry S. Mahler. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 19-49. Print.
ry S. Mahler. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 19-49. Print.
Sulzberger, C.L. “Irgun Still Seeks All Palestine And
Trans-Jordan for Israel.” New York Times
30 July 1948: 9.
Web.
Web.
Wagner, Steven. “British Intelligence and the Jewish
Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945-46.”
Intelligence & National Security. 23.5 Nov. 2008: 629-657. Web. 26 Oct. 2012.
Intelligence & National Security. 23.5 Nov. 2008: 629-657. Web. 26 Oct. 2012.
Zuckerman, Alan S., et al. “The Party’s Just Begun:
Herut Activists in Power and After Begin.” Israel After
Begin. Ed. Gregory S. Mahler. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 235-255. Print.
Begin. Ed. Gregory S. Mahler. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 235-255. Print.
Schemata 2013 13
No comments:
Post a Comment