U.N. RESOLUTION 242 - The Drafters Clarify Its Meaning‏ - The Six Day War and its history since

U.N. RESOLUTION 242 - The Drafters Clarify Its Meaning‏ - The Six Day War and its history since

The Drafters Clarify Its Meaning

While the wording and intent of Resolution 242 is often correctly described, at times it is misrepresented as requiring Israel to return to the pre-1967 lines — the armistice lines established after Israel’s War of Independence. Such an interpretation was explicitly not the intention of the framers of 242, nor does the language of the resolution include any such requirement. Below are statements by the main drafters of Resolution 242 — Lord Caradon, Eugene Rostow, Arthur Goldberg and Baron George-Brown — as well as others, in which the meaning and history of Resolution 242 are explained. Lord Caradon (Hugh M. Foot) was the permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 1964-1970, and chief drafter of Resolution 242. • Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, pg. 13, qtd. inEgypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977, Yoram Meital, pg. 49: Much play has been made of the fact that we didn’t say “the” territories or “all the” territories. But that was deliberate. I myself knew very well the 1967 boundaries and if we had put in the “the” or “all the” that could only have meant that we wished to see the 1967 boundaries perpetuated in the form of a permanent frontier. This I was certainly not prepared to recommend. • Journal of Palestine Studies, “An Interview with Lord Caradon,” Spring - Summer 1976, pgs 144-45: Q. The basis for any settlement will be United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of which you were the architect. Would you say there is a contradiction between the part of the resolution that stresses the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and that which calls for Israeli withdrawal from “occupied territories,” but not from “the occupied territories”? A. I defend the resolution as it stands. What it states, as you know, is first the general principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That means that you can’t justify holding onto territory merely because you conquered it. We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it’s a rotten line. You couldn’t have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It’s where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It’s got no relation to the needs of the situation. Had we said that you must go back to the 1967 line, which would have resulted if we had specified a retreat from all the occupied territories, we would have been wrong. In New York, what did we know about Tayyibe and Qalqilya? If we had attempted in New York to draw a new line, we would have been rather vague. So what we stated was the principle that you couldn’t hold territory because you conquered it, therefore there must be a withdrawal to – let’s read the words carefully – “secure and recognized boundaries.” The can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it’s only when you get agreement that you get security. I think that now people begin to realize what we had in mind – that security doesn’t come from arms, it doesn’t come from territory, it doesn’t come from geography, it doesn’t come from one side domination the other, it can only come from agreement and mutual respect and understanding. Therefore, what we did, I think, was right; what the resolution said was right and I would stand by it. It needs to be added to now, of course. ... We didn’t attempt to deal with [the questions of the Palestinians and of Jerusalem] then, but merely to state the general principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. We meant that the occupied territories could not be held merely because they were occupied, but we deliberately did not say that the old line, where the troops happened to be on that particular night many years ago, was an ideal demarcation line. • MacNeil/Lehrer Report, March 30, 1978: We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did not put the “the” in, we did not say “all the territories” deliberately. We all knew that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier... . We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever. • Daily Star (Beirut), June 12, 1974. Qtd. in Myths and Facts, Leonard J. Davis, pg. 48: It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of 4 June 1967 because those positions were undesirable and artificial. After all, they were just the places the soldiers of each side happened to be the day the fighting stopped in 1948. They were just armistice lines. That's why we didn't demand that the Israelis return to them and I think we were right not to ... • Interview on Kol Israel radio, February 1973, qtd. on Web site of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Q. This matter of the (definite) article which is there in French and is missing in English, is that really significant? A. The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative section. And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary... Eugene Rostow, a legal scholar and former dean of Yale Law School, was US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 1966-1969. He helped draft Resolution 242. • Telegram from the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic summarizing Rostow’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin: Rostow said ... resolution required agreement on "secure and recognized" boundaries, which, as practical matter, and as matter of interpreting resolution, had to precede withdrawals. Two principles were basic to Article I of resolution. Paragraph from which Dobrynin quoted was linked to others, and he did not see how anyone could seriously argue, in light of history of resolution in Security Council, withdrawal to borders of June 4th was contemplated. These words had been pressed on Council by Indians and others, and had not been accepted. • Proceedings of the 64th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1970, pgs 894-96: US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow ... the question remained, “To what boundaries should Israel withdraw?” On this issue, the American position was sharply drawn, and rested on a critical provision of the Armistice Agreements of 1949. Those agreements provided in each case that the Armistice Demarcation Line “is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims or positions of either party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.” ... These paragraphs, which were put into the agreements at Arab insistence, were the legal foundation for the controversies over the wording of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Security Council Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967. ... The agreement required by paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Security Council said, should establish “secure and recognized boundaries” between Israel and its neighbors “free from threats or acts of force,” to replace the Armistice Demarcation Lines established in 1949, and the cease-fire lines of June, 1967. The Israeli armed forces should withdraw to such lines, as part of a comprehensive agreement, settling all the issues mentioned in the resolution, and in a condition of peace. On this point, the American position has been the same under both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations. The new and definitive political boundaries should not represent “the weight of conquest,” both Administrations have said; on the other hand, under the policy and language of the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, they need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines. ... This is the legal significance of the omission of the word “the” from paragraph 1 (I) of the resolution, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and not “from the territories occupied in the recent conflict.” Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word “the” failed in the Security Council. It is therefore not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the Cease-Fire Resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation Lines. • Jerusalem Post, “The truth about 242,” Nov. 5, 1990: Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 ... rest on two principles, Israel may administer the territory until its Arab neighbors make peace; and when peace is made, Israel should withdraw to “secure and recognized borders,” which need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949. ... The omission of the word “the” from the territorial clause of the Resolution was one of its most hotly-debated and fundamental features. The U.S., Great Britain, the Netherlands, and many other countries worked hard for five and a half months in 1967 to keep the word “the” and the idea it represents out of the resolution. Motions to require the withdrawal of Israel from “the” territories or “all the territories” occupied in the course of the Six Day War were put forward many times with great linguistic ingenuity. They were all defeated both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. ... Those who claim that Resolution 242 is ambiguous on the point are either ignorant of the history of its negotiation or simply taking a convenient tactical position. • The New Republic, “Resolved: are the settlements legal? Israeli West Bank policies,” Oct. 21, 1991: Five-and-a-half months of vehement public diplomacy in 1967 made it perfectly clear what the missing definite article in Resolution 242 means. Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrawals from “all” the territories were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Speaker after speaker made it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the “fragile” and “vulnerable” Armistice Demarcation Lines, but should retire once peace was made to what Resolution 242 called “secure and recognized” boundaries, agreed to by the parties. In negotiating such agreements, the parties should take into account, among other factors, security considerations, access to the international waterways of the region, and, of course, their respective legal claims. • The New York Times, “Don’t strong-arm Israel,” Feb. 19, 1991: Security Council Resolution 242, approved after the 1967 war, stipulates not only that Israel and its neighboring states should make peace with each other but should establish “a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” Until that condition is met, Israel is entitled to administer the territories it captured – the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip – and then withdraw from some but not necessarily all of the land to “secure and recognized boundaries free of threats or acts of force.” • The Wall Street Journal, “Peace still depends on the two Palestines,” April 27, 1988: ... Resolution 242 establishes three principles about the territorial aspect of the peace-making process: 1) Israel can occupy and administer the territories it occupied during the Six-Day War until the Arabs make peace. 2) When peace agreements are reached, they should delineate “secure and recognized” boundaries to which Israel would withdraw. 3) Those boundaries could differ from the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949. • Institute for National Strategic Studies, “The Future of Palestine,” November 1993: The second territorial provision of Resolution 242 is that while Israel should agree to withdraw from some of theterritories it occupied in 1967, it need not withdraw from all those territories. The Resolution states that there should be"withdrawal of Israeli's armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Five and a half months of vigorous diplomacy, public and private, make it very clear why the wording of the sentence took the form it did. Motion after motion proposed to insert the words "the" or "all the" before the word "territories." They were all defeated, until finally the Soviet Union and the Arab states accepted the language as the best they could get. Arthur J. Goldberg was the United States representative to the United Nations, 1965-1968, and before that a U.S. Supreme Court justice. He helped draft Resolution 242. • American Foreign Policy Interests, 1988: US Ambassador Arthur Goldberg The resolution does not explicitly require that Israel withdraw to the lines that it occupied on June 5, 1967, before the outbreak of the war. The Arab states urged such language; the Soviet Union proposed such a resolution to the Security Council in June 1967, and Yugoslavia and other nations made a similar proposal to the special session of the General Assembly that followed the adjournment of the Security Council. But those views were rejected. Instead, Resolution 242 endorses the principle of the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and juxtaposes the principle that every state in the area is entitled to live in peace within “secure and recognized boundaries.” ... The notable omissions in language used to refer to withdrawal are the words the, all, and the June 5, 1967, lines. I refer to the English text of the resolution. The French and Soviet texts differ from the English in this respect, but the English text was voted on by the Security Council, and thus it is determinative. In other words, there is lacking a declaration requiring Israel to withdraw from the (or all the) territories occupied by it on and after June 5, 1967. Instead, the resolution stipulates withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal. And it can be inferred from the incorporation of the words secure and recognized boundaries that the territorial adjustments to be made by the parties in their peace settlements could encompass less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. • Christian Science Monitor, “Middle East peace prospects,” July 9, 1985: ... all parties are apparently in agreement that the basis for negotiations would be Resolutions 242 and 338 adopted by the UN Security Council. These resolutions, although often referred to in the news media, are inadequately analyzed or explained. I shall attempt to provide a measure of enlightenment. * Does Resolution 242 as unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council require the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all of the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war? The answer is no. In the resolution, the words the and all are omitted. Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, without specifying the extent of the withdrawal. The resolution, therefore, neither commands nor prohibits total withdrawal. * If the resolution is ambiguous, and purposely so, on this crucial issue, how is the withdrawal issue to be settled? By direct negotiations between the concerned parties. Resolution 242 calls for agreement between them to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement. Agreement and acceptance necessarily require negotiations. * Any ambiguity in this regard has been resolved by Resolution 338, unanimously adopted by the Security Council on Oct. 22, 1973. Resolution 338 reaffirms Resolution 242 in all its parts and requires negotiations between the parties concerned aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. * Is Resolution 242 self-executing? The answer is no. Negotiations are necessary to put flesh on the bones of the resolution, as Resolution 338 acknowledges. * Is Israel's withdrawal confined to “minor” border rectifications? No. Resolution 242 reaffirms the right of every area state ‘to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.’ * How are secure and recognized boundaries to be achieved to enable every state to live in peace free from threats or acts of force? By negotiation, agreement, and accepted settlement. • U.S. Senate, The Arab-Israeli Dispute, 6, pgs 14-16, qtd. in Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977, Yoram Meital, pg. 50: At no time in my meetings with Foreign Minister Riad did I give him such an assurance [of a complete Israeli withdrawal]. It would have been foolish to make such an assurance, when the whole object of Resolution 242 was to allow flexibility in negotiations of territorial boundaries. • New York Times, "What Goldberg didn't say," letters, March 12, 1980: Resolution 242 in no way refers to Jerusalem, and this omission was deliberate. I wanted to make clear that Jerusalem was a discrete matter, not linked to the West Bank. In a number of speeches at the U.N. in 1967, I repeatedly stated that the armistice lines fixed after 1948 were intended to be temporary. This, of course, was particularly true of Jerusalem. At no time in these many speeches did I refer to East Jerusalem as occupied territory. Baron George-Brown (George A. Brown) was the British Foreign Secretary from 1966 to 1968. He helped draft Resolution 242. • In My Way, pgs 226-27, qtd. in the American Journal of International Law, “The illegality of the Arab attack on Israel of October 6, 1973,” Eugene Rostow: British Foreign Minister Baron George-Brown [Resolution 242] does not call for Israeli withdrawal from “the” territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word “all”. It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set out the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn’t attempt to say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a peace-treaty must be about. • Jerusalem Post, Jan. 23, 1970, qtd. on Web site of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council. I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said “Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied,” and not from “the” territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories. J. L. Hargrove was Senior Adviser on International Law to the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1967-1970: • Hearings on the Middle East before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, 1st Session 187 (1971), qtd. in the American Journal of International Law, “The illegality of the Arab attack on Israel of October 6, 1973,” Eugene Rostow: The provision of Resolution 242 which bears most directly on the question which you raised, Congressman, is subparagraph (1) of paragraph 1 of the resolution, which envisages “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The language “from territories” was regarded at the time of the adoption of the resolution as of high consequence because the proposal put forward by those espousing the Egyptian case was withdrawal from “the territories.” In the somewhat minute debate which frequently characterizes the period before the adoption of a United Nations resolution, the article “the” was regarded of considerable significance because its inclusion would seem to imply withdrawal from all territories which Israel had not occupied prior to the June war, but was at the present time occupying. Consequently, the omission of “the” was intended on our part, as I understood it at the time and was understood on all sides, to leave open the possibility of modifications in the lines which were occupied as of June 4, 1967, in the final settlement. United Nations Resolution 242 On Nov. 22, 1967, five months after Six Day War, the United Nations Security Council prepared a carefully-worded resolution to guide the parties. Since then, UN Resolution 242 has been invoked as the centerpiece for negotiating efforts, including the Oslo Accords and the Quartet's "Road Map" peace plan. The text of the resolution is below. Select Resolution 242 from the top menu for details about the resolution, its drafting and its meaning. The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting. "The citadel" towers over the city walls of Jerusalem Jerusalem is a holy city to three major faiths–Judaism, Christianity and Islam–and figures prominently in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1004 BCE, when King David established Jerusalem as the capital of his kingdom, there has been a continuous Jewish presence in Jerusalem, the holiest city in Judaism. Following the building of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the designation of other holy sites by Constantine the Great in 333 CE, Jerusalem became a destination of Christian pilgrimages. During Umayyad rule from 661 to 750 CE, the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque were built on the site where the Jewish Temples had once stood, and Jerusalem became the third holiest city in Islam. Jews have constituted the largest ethnic group in Jerusalem since 1820. During the 19 years when Jordan occupied eastern Jerusalem and its holy sites (1948-1967), Jerusalem was divided. Jews were expelled from eastern Jerusalem and barred from visiting their holy places. As a result of the Six Day War, the entire city of Jerusalem and its holy sites came under Jewish control. Israel reunified the city, extending Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the parts previously occupied by Jordan. The Israeli Knesset passed laws to protect holy sites and ensure freedom of worship to all, and offered Israeli citizenship to Jerusalem’s Arab residents, most of whom declined. Since 1967, Jerusalem has become a focal point of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1980, Israel passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel, reaffirming the unified Jerusalem as its eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians insist Jerusalem must be the capital of their intended state.   General References for the Jerusalem sections The Illustrated Map of Jerusalem, Dan Bahat, 1989. Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Martin Gilbert, 1993. Freedom of Religion in Jerusalem, ed. Ruth Lapidot and Ora Ahimeir, 1999. Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974, Ed. Meron Medzini, 1976. Whose Jerusalem?, Terence Prittie, 1981. Jerusalem: An Archaeological Biography, Hershel Shanks, 1995.  Select from the left-hand menu for more details.    Jerusalem in Jewish Tradition Model of Second Jewish Temple   Jerusalem, Judaism’s holiest city, is mentioned hundreds of times in the Hebrew Bible. It was the capital city of ancient Jewish kingdoms and home to Judaism’s holiest Temple (Beit HaMikdash). Jews from all over the ancient world would make pilgrimages to the Beit HaMikdash three times a year to participate in worship and festivities, as commanded in the Torah. Jerusalem and the Beit HaMikdash have remained the focus of Jewish longing, aspiration, and prayers. Daily prayers (said while facing Jerusalem and the Temple Mount) and grace after meals include multiple supplications for the restoration of Jerusalem and the Beit HaMikdash. Jews still maintain the 9th day of the Hebrew month of Av, the date on which both the First and Second Temples were destroyed, as a day of mourning. The Jewish wedding ceremony concludes with the chanting of the biblical phrase, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning,” and the breaking of a glass by the groom to commemorate the destruction of the Temples. And the conclusion of the Yom Kippur services and the Passover Seder conclude each year with the phrase “Next Year in Jerusalem.” The Temple Mount is the holiest site in Judaism. The Temple was built, according to Jewish tradition, on the Even Hashtiya, the foundation stone upon which the world was created. This is considered the epicenter of Judaism, where the Divine Presence (Shechina) rests, where the biblical Isaac was brought for sacrifice, where the Holy of Holies and Ark of the Covenant housing the Ten Commandments once stood, and where the Temple was again rebuilt in 515 BCE before being destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. The Temple Mount is also known as Mount Moriah (Har HaMoriah), mentioned frequently in the Bible. Jewish Worshippers at Western Wall The Western Wall (Kotel Hama’aravi, known simply as the Wall or Kotel) is the remnant of the outer retaining wall built by Herod to level the ground and expand the area housing the Second Jewish Temple. Its holiness derives from its proximity to the Temple site and specifically its proximity to the Western Wall of the Temple’s Holy of Holies (Kodesh Hakodashim---the inner sanctuary that housed the Ark of the Covenant–the Aron HaBrit–and where the High Priest–Kohen Gadol--alone was permitted to enter on Yom Kippur). According to Midrashic sources, the Divine Presence never departed from the Western wall of the Temple’s Holy of Holies. For the last several hundred years, Jews have prayed at Herod’s Western Wall because it was the closest accessible place to Judaism’s holiest site.    Partition Plan: Corpus Separatum UN Plan for Jerusalem     On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly recommended Palestine be partitioned into two states–Arab and Jewish. The plan called for Jerusalem to become a corpus separatum, an international city administered by the UN, for an interval of 10 years, after which the city’s status was to be redetermined in a referendum. While Jewish leaders reluctantly accepted this, Arab leaders rejected the entire plan, including Jerusalem’s internationalization. Arab delegates to the UN declared the partition invalid. Deadly Arab attacks on Jewish residents of Palestine increased, and Arab forces blockaded the road to Jerusalem. When Israel declared Independence in May 1948, five neighboring Arab countries invaded the new state.    1948-1967: Jordanian Occupation of Eastern Jerusalem Destruction and Desecration of Religious Sites Upon its capture by the Arab Legion, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City was destroyed and its residents expelled. Fifty-eight synagogues--some hundreds of years old--were destroyed, their contents looted and desecrated. Some Jewish religious sites were turned into chicken coops or animal stalls. The Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, where Jews had been burying their dead for over 2500 years, was ransacked; graves were desecrated; thousands of tombstones were smashed and used as building material, paving stones or for latrines in Arab Legion army camps. The Intercontinental Hotel was built on top of the cemetery and graves were demolished to make way for a highway to the hotel. The Western Wall became a slum area. Jordan’s Illegal Annexation In 1950, Jordan annexed the territories it had captured in the 1948 war–-eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank. The April 24th resolution declared “its support for complete unity between the two sides of the Jordan and their union into one State, which is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, at whose head reigns King Abdullah Ibn al Husain...” While Great Britain and Pakistan were the only countries that recognized Jordan’s annexation – all other nations, including the Arab states, rejected it -- Great Britain recognized only the annexation of the West Bank. It never recognized either Jordan or Israel’s sovereignty over any sector of Jerusalem, viewing both Jordan’s 1950 annexation and Israel’s  annexation of west Jerusalem as illegal. Religious Restrictions and Denial of Access to Holy Sites In direct contravention of the 1949 armistice agreements, Jordan did not permit Jews access to their holy sites or to the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Article VIII of the Israel Jordan Armistice Agreement (April 3, 1949) established a special committee which would “direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements” including “free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives.” Nevertheless, and despite numerous requests by Israeli officials and Jewish groups to the UN, the U.S., and others to attempt to enforce the armistice agreement, Jews were denied access to the Western Wall, the Jewish cemetery and all religious sites in eastern Jerusalem. The armistice lines were sealed as Jordanian snipers would perch on the walls of the Old City and shoot at Israelis across the lines. Israeli Arabs, too, were denied access to the Al Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, but their Muslim sites in eastern Jerusalem were respected. While Christians, unlike Jews, were allowed access to their holy sites, they too were subject to restrictions under Jordanian law. There were limits on the numbers of Christian pilgrims permitted into the Old City and Bethlehem during Christmas and Easter. Christian charities and religious institutions were prohibited from buying real estate in Jerusalem. And Christian schools were subject to strict controls. They were required to teach in Arabic, close on Friday, the Muslim holy day, and teach all students the Koran. At the same time, they were not allowed to teach Christian religious material to non-Christians.    1967: Reunification of Jerusalem Despite Israel’s appeal to Jordan to stay out of the war, Jordanian forces fired artillery barrages from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Although Israeli forces did not respond initially, not wanting to open up a Jordanian front in the war, Jordan continued to attack and occupied UN headquarters in Jerusalem. Israeli forces fought back and within two days managed to repulse the Jordanian forces and retake eastern Jerusalem. (For more details, see War: Jordanian Front) Israeli paratroopers at the Western Wall On June 7, 1967, IDF paratroopers advanced through the Old City toward the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, bringing Jerusalem’s holiest site under Jewish control for the first time in 2000 years. There are sound recordings of the scene, as the commander of the brigade,Lt. General Mordechai (Motta) Gur, approaches the Old City and announces to his company commanders, “We’re sitting right now on the ridge and we’re seeing the Old City. Shortly we’re going to go in to the Old City of Jerusalem, that all generations have dreamed about. We will be the first to enter the Old City...” and shortly afterwards, “The Temple Mount is in our hands! I repeat, the Temple Mount is in our hands!” General Rabbi Shlomo Goren, chief chaplain of the IDF, sounded the Shofar at the Western Wall to signify its liberation. To Israelis and Jews all over the world, this was a joyous and momentous occasion. Many considered it a gift from God.     Israeli Reaction to the Recapture of the Western Wall and the Old City of Jerusalem “For some two thousand years the Temple Mount was forbidden to the Jews. Until you came — you, the paratroopers — and returned it to the bosom of the nation. The Western Wall, for which every heart beats, is ours once again. Many Jews have taken their lives into their hands throughout our long history, in order to reach Jerusalem and live here. Endless words of longing have expressed the deep yearning for Jerusalem that beats within the Jewish heart..You have been given the great privilege of completing the circle, of returning to the nation its capital and its holy center...Jerusalem is yours forever.”  –Commander Motta Gur to his brigade upon their recapture of Jerusalem’s Old City and holy sites “We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again.”  –Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, upon reaching the Western Wall “The Wall was before us. I trembled. There it was as I had known it—immense, mighty, in all its splendor...overcome, I bowed my head in silence.” –General Uzi Narkiss, Head of Central Command during the Six Day War “I felt truly shaken and stood there murmuring a prayer for peace. Motta Gur’s paratroopers were struggling to reach the Wall and toudh it. We stood among a tangle of rugged, battle-weary men who were unable to believe their eyes or restrain their emotions. Their eyes were moist with tears, their speech incoherent. The overwhelming desire was to cling to the Wall, to hold on to that great moment as long as possible.”  –Chief of Staff Yitzchak Rabin “I am speaking to you from the plaza of the Western Wall, the remnant of our Holy Temple. ‘Comfort my people, comfort them, says the Lord your God.’ This is the day we have hoped for, let us rejoice and be glad in His salvation. The vision of all generations is being realized before our eyes: The city of God, the site of the Temple, the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, the symbol of the nation’s redemption, have been redeemed today by you, heroes of the Israel Defense Forces. By doing so you have fulfilled the oath of generations, ‘If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning.’ Indeed, we have not forgotten you, Jerusalem, our holy city, our glory. In the name of the entire Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora, I hereby recite with supreme joy, Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who has kept us in life, who has preserved us, and enabled us to reach this day. This year in Jerusalem – rebuilt! “  –General Shlomo Goren, Chaplain of the Israeli Defense Forces, at the Western Wall In a statement at the Western Wall, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan indicated Israel’s peaceful intent and pledged to preserve religious freedom for all faiths in Jerusalem: To our Arab neighbors we extend, especially at this hour, the hand of peace. To members of the other religions, Christians and Muslims, I hereby promise faithfully that their full freedom and all their religious rights will be preserved. We did not come to Jerusalem to conquer the Holy Places of others. Before visiting the Western Wall, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol met with the spiritual leaders of different faiths in his office and issued a declaration of peace, assuring that all holy sites would be protected and that all faiths would be free to worship at their holy sites in Jerusalem. He declared his intention to give the spiritual leaders of the various religions internal management of their own Holy Sites. Defense Minister Dayan immediately ceded internal administrative control of the Temple Mount compound to the Jordanian Waqf (Islamic trust) while overall security control of the area was maintained by Israel. Dayan announced that Jews would be allowed to visit the Temple Mount, but not to hold religious services there. Dayan also gave immediate orders to demolish the anti-sniping walls, clear the minefields and removed the barbed-wire barriers which marked the partition of Jerusalem. Within weeks, free movement through Jerusalem became possible and hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews flocked to the Old City to glimpse the Western Wall and touch its stones. Israeli Muslims were permitted to pray at the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock for the first time since 1948. And Israeli Christians came to visit the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. On June 27, 1967, the Israeli Knesset extended Israel’s legal and administrative jurisdiction to all of Jerusalem, and expanded the city’s municipal borders. Eshkol again assured the spiritual leaders of all faiths that Israel was determined to protect the Holy Places. The Knesset passed the Protection of Holy Places Law granting special legal status to the Holy Sites and making it a criminal offence to desecrate or violate them, or to impede freedom of access to them. Jerusalem became a reunified city that ensured freedom of religion and access to holy sites for all. The religious freedoms enjoyed by Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the reunified Jerusalem had been un heard of during Jordanian occupation of the city, prompting even a former Jordanian ambassador to the United Nations, Adnan Abu Odeh, to acknowledge that "the situation in Jerusalem prior to 1967 [under Jordanian rule] was one of ... religious exclusion" whereas post-1967, Israel seeks "to reach a point of religious inclusion ..." (The Catholic University of America Law Review, Spring 1996).    Israel Israel on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War was a country of more than 2.5 million people, of whom approximately 87 percent were Jews. Its 7,200 square miles meant it roughly equaled in size the state of New Jersey on the U.S. East Coast. That is, it comprised one-tenth of one percent of the Middle East landmass, and less than two percent of the region's total population.   Intensifying its demographic and geographic inferiority, Israel stretched 250 miles from the Red Sea port of Eilat in the south to the village of Metulla on the border with Syria and Lebanon in the north. That sliver of a country included a coastal waist just above its most populous point - Tel Aviv and its suburbs - pinched to only  nine miles wide. Israel's foreign minister and ambassador to the United Nations, Abba Eban, noted in an oft-cited December 5, 1969 interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel that his country's precarious pre-'67 boundaries had carried with them the memory of Auschwitz - the notorious World War II Nazi concentration camp in Poland.   The standing army had grown to roughly 75,000, with nearly 1,000 tanks and 175 jet planes. Nevertheless, the Arab armies combined "could field 900 combat aircraft, over 5,000 tanks and half a million men" (Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of The Modern Middle East,Michael B. Oren, Oxford University Press, 2002, page 164).  Meanwhile, anti-Israel Palestinian terrorism -  instigated or tolerated by Syria, Egypt, and Jordan - intensified between April, 1966 and April, 1967. So did direct attacks by Syria.   The vulnerable armistice lines reminded Israelis that they and their state literally lived on the edge. Syria on the Golan Heights overlooked northern Israel and Lake Kinneret (The Sea of Galilee) the country's main water source. Jordan on the hills of the West Bank (Samaria and Judea) dominated the coastal plain. Egypt in the Gaza Strip was only 30 miles from Tel Aviv's southern suburbs. Arab refusal to recognize Israel (hence the Arabs' insistence in 1949 and 1950 on armistice lines rather than permanent borders) and frequent pledges to destroy it made the possibility of a sudden attack plausible. Leaders and citizens lived with a recurrent nightmare: the country cut in two and prevented from successfully mobilizing reserves or regrouping for a counter-attack.   In addition to demographic and geographic vulnerability, on top of reiterated Arab threats of destruction, Israelis faced the failure of international guarantees made after the 1956 Sinai Campaign. In May, 1967, the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, stationed after '56 to help keep peace, complied with Egypt's demand that it withdraw. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser then began to move 80,000 troops, 550 tanks and nearly 1,000 artillery pieces into the peninsula. "Israel then made what has since been judged a psychological mistake. Hoping to assert her peaceful intentions, and to calm the jittery atmosphere created by Arab - and Soviet - accusations of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria, she held her May 15 Independence Day parade without the usual large numbers of tanks and heavy artillery" (Israel: A History, Martin Gilbert, Doubleday: Black Swan, 1999, page 366). The move backfired.   Egypt proceeded to close the Strait of Tiran, blockading Eilat in violation of post-'56 international assurances of free passage. Though diplomacy to re-open the strait stalled, France and even the United States warned Israel not to act first. Israeli leaders recognized that the blockade, acasus belli in its own right, represented an even greater threat - Arab dismissal of Israeli deterrence in general. This put not only free shipping, but also the country itself at risk.    Meanwhile, "converging on Sinai were military contingents from countries that only days before had regarded Egypt as a mortal enemy, from Morocco and Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. Even the Syrians finally relented and agreed to send a brigade to fight alongside the Iraqis in Jordan .... Added to this was immense political might. Arab oil producers had agreed to boycott any countries that assisted Israel .... The Suez Canal, warned Nasser, could be blocked." The Arab world "felt bound by a single, exalted effort, as expressed by President 'Aref of Iraq: 'Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the face of the map" (Oren.).   One Israeli, Lt. Yossi Peled (later a general), recalled the feeling in the weeks before the war: "We had seen photographs of the victims of Egyptian gas attacks in Yemen [during Cairo's intervention in Yemeni wars of the early 1960s] .... We had already started thinking in terms of annihilation, both national and personal" (Oren).   During the nerve-wracking Hamtana, "the waiting period" of May 23 to June 4, "the mood of the people of Israel came as near to despair as it had ever come .... A great bandwagon formed. [Jordan's King] Hussein came to Cairo and placed his armed forces under Egyptian command. The radios of the Arab world dropped their attacks on one another and concentrated their attention on Israel in a paroxysm of triumphant hate," journalist, diplomat and historian Conor Cruise O'Brien has written (The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, Touchstone: Simon and Schuster, 1987, page 413).   Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's responses to Egyptian provocations had "remained very mild, to the fury and disgust of many Israelis." Though Eshkol had diplomatic and military reasons to wait - including to gain British and especially American understanding if not intervention in reopening the straits and to gain time for Israel's citizen-army to mobilize - "the contrast between Eshkol and Nasser was profoundly distressing for Israelis" (O'Brien).   On May 31, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a congressional committee that the United States was not planning a separate military intervention in the Middle East, "but only within the framework of the United Nations ...." Meaning, there would be no such intervention. Rusk added that "I don't think it is our business to restrain anyone." Washington signaled that it understood Israel had tried diplomacy and that diplomacy would not roll back Egypt actions. "The Hamtanawas ending" (O'Brien).   In response to domestic political pressure, on June 1 Moshe Dayan replaced Eshkol in the cabinet as defense minister, though not as prime minister. Opposition leader Menachem Begin was brought in as the cabinet expanded to a national unity government. Four days later, Israeli planes  destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground, then defeated the Syrian and Jordanian air forces before breaking through on all three land fronts. Personal and national feelings of hopelessness had been vanquished, Middle East reality and Israel's place in it, dramatically changed. According to official Arab statistics, over 989,000 Jews were forced out of their homes in Arab countries from 1948 until the early 1970's. Some 650,000 resettled in Israel, leaving behind personal property valued today at more than $990 billion. Jewish-owned real-estate left behind in Arab lands has been estimated at 120,000 square kilometers (four times the size of the State of Israel). Valued today at about 15 trillion dollars.     Palestinians Some 600,000 Palestinians lived in the West Bank (occupied by Jordan) and another 356,000 lived in the Gaza Strip (occupied by Egypt) at the outbreak of the Six Day War. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians also lived in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In 1964, the Arab League founded the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, and largely controlled by Egypt. The 1964 Arab League summit also called for the deployment of a Palestine Liberation Army. Starting in 1965, the Syrian government supported Palestinian Fatah fedayeen (guerillas) attacks across the armistice line with Israel, greatly exacerbating Syrian-Israeli tensions leading up to the Six Day War. During the war, the Palestinian Division held the first line in the Gaza Strip, along with three Egyptian divisions. Though the Arab armies suffered crushing defeats at the hands of the Israelis, "the fedayeen, who had really provoked it, flourished as a result" of the war. "The war turned them into the only remaining focal point for Arab resistance to Israel at a time of despair and brought to their ranks large numbers of recruits" (Safran, 242-3). General References Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael B. Oren, 2002 Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran, 1981 Jewish Virtual Library    Egypt In the years before the Six Day War, Egypt was ruled by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who in 1952, as a lieutenant colonel in the Egyptian army, had helped lead the overthrow of the monarch, King Farouk, by the so-called “Free Officers’ Movement.” Nasser had named himself prime minister in 1954, and in 1956 had promulgated a constitution which would establish Egypt as a one party “socialist state,” with Islam as the official religion. Standing as the sole candidate for election as president, Nasser had won with 99.948 percent of the vote, while his constitution had garnered 99.8 percent of the vote. Nasser began his rule as a pan-Arabist, with plans to unify the Arab states into a single entity under his command, and as a reformer, who wanted to modernize the country and fight endemic corruption, all within the context of one-party dictatorial rule. While a founder of the so-called “Non-Aligned Movement” with India and Yugoslavia, Egypt under Nasser developed close relations with the Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Union and its satellites became Nasser's chief source of military equipment and financial aid, beginning with a massive arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955. Nasser soon began to have conflicts with other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which opposed his aspirations to lead the Arab world. There were multiple attempts by Egyptian intelligence to assassinate Jordan’s King Hussein, and in 1962 Egypt intervened in Yemen against royalists backed by Saudi Arabia. Expecting an easy victory, Egyptian forces instead got bogged down in a guerilla war. Nasser responded by attempting to subvert Saudi Arabia itself and by attacking supposed Yemeni royalist bases in Saudi Arabia. The attacks against Jordan and Saudi Arabia caused a marked deterioration in US-Egyptian relations and also harmed Nasser’s reputation in the Arab world. In 1964, Israel completed its National Water Carrier, a series of canals and pipelines to transport water from the relatively water-rich northern part of the country to the much dryer southern regions. This project promised to allow increased population growth and immigration, and also to spur industrial and agricultural development, and was therefore strenuously opposed by the Arab countries. Syria, by now led by a Ba’athist regime hostile to Nasser, took the lead in demanding Arab action to destroy the Israeli water project. It condemned Egypt, the largest Arab country, for not attacking Israel and for “hiding behind the skirts” of the UN peacekeeping force that stood between Egypt and Israel. Nasser, however, did not believe at the time that the Arabs were unified enough to defeat Israel, and he chose to defer a confrontation until what he saw as a more propitious moment. In May of 1967, Nasser expelled UN peacekeepers from the Sinai peninsula and announced a blockade of the Straits of Tiran to Israel-bound shipping. The blockade sealed off the major Israeli port of Eilat and violated the armistice agreements that had followed the 1956 Sinai war. It was regarded by most observers as a casus belli, or act of war. These bold — and in retrospect reckless — moves provoked massive pro-Nasser street demonstrations in Arab capitals, and one after another Arab government endorsed Nasser's steps and put its military under direct Egyptian control. Even Jordan’s King Hussein did so. In addition, the Soviet Union encouraged the Arab states in their militancy.  Open warfare had seemed a distant possibility before May, but now everything had changed. Nasser had engineered the Arab unity that he had judged necessary to confront Israel, he had openly declared that the time had come to destroy the Jewish state, and he had taken steps that constituted acts of war.    Syria Syria, the most stridently hostile towards Israel of the Arab so-called "frontline" states in the years leading up to the 1967 war, was ruled by the Ba'ath party, which derived its ideology and institutions from the model of the European fascist states of the early twentieth century. The Ba'ath party was dominated by members of the Alawite religious minority (12% of the Syrian population) and maintained a shrill anti-Israel stance in large part to divert the discontent of Syria's Sunni majority. The president of Syria at the time was Nur al-Din al-Atasi, but future dictator Hafez Assad also wielded much influence as the defense minister and head of the air force. Syria was closely aligned with the Soviet Union and was a recipient of extensive Soviet aid. In 1967, Syria had a population of 5.7 million. Its army numbered 100,000, and it possessed 550 tanks and 136 combat airplanes. Prior to the Six Day War, a low intensity conflict festered between Israel and Syria. In 1964, a Syrian attempt to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River was halted by Israeli aerial bombardment. Syria also shelled Israeli communities from positions in the Golan Heights and allowed its territory to be used as a staging area for incursions into Israel by Palestinian terrorists. On May 13, 1967, the Soviet Union relayed false information to Syria and Egypt that Israeli forces were massing on Syria's border. This prompted Syria and Egypt to activate their military pact and figured in Nasser's subsequent steps towards war. Syrian planes bombed northern Israel on June 5, the first day of the war. The following day, Syrian forces attacked the Israeli communities of Tel Dan, Kibbutz Shaar Yashuv and Ashmura but were repelled by Israeli forces. The Syrian air force unsuccessfully attempted to bomb oil refineries in Haifa. Israeli forces counter-attacked on July 9 and 10, driving the Syrians from the Golan Heights and bringing the Six Day War to a close. Estimated Syrian losses were 2500 killed, 5000 wounded, and 591 taken prisoner.   General References Asad, The Sphinx of Damascus, Moshe Maoz, 1988 Modern Syria, Moshe Maoz, 1999 Statistical Abstract / Central Bureau of Statistics, Syrian Arab Republic 1965-1998    Jordan Jordan (originally called Transjordan) was created out of the Palestine Mandate by Great Britain in 1923, and achieved full independence in 1946. In 1948, during the war against Israel, Transjordan conquered and annexed what became known as the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Old City of Jerusalem, but only Britain and Pakistan recognized its sovereignty there. Though the majority of Jordan’s population is Palestinian or Beduin, since its inception the country has been ruled by the Hashemite clan of Arabia. The Hashemites, said to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed, ruled the Islamic holy city of Mecca from 1201 until 1925, when they were expelled by the al Saud family (which is how Arabia became Saudi Arabia). From 1953 until his death in 1999 Jordan was led by King Hussein bin Talal, known more commonly as King Hussein. Under King Hussein’s rule Jordan maintained generally close ties with the United States and Great Britain. Though the King’s relations with Egypt’s President Nasser were very poor – Nasser’s intelligence service had tried to assassinate the King multiple times – when the rest of the Arab world lined up behind Nasser’s promises to destroy Israel in May of 1967, King Hussein followed suit. In a meeting with Nasser on May 30, he was presented with the treaty that Egypt had signed with Syria, placing the Syrian military under an Egyptian general. After quickly skimming the treaty, King Hussein suggested to Nasser “put in Jordan instead of Syria and the matter will be settled.” With his signature King Hussein tied his fate and that of his country to the judgement and wisdom of President Nasser. It was a decision he would quickly come to regret. General References My War with Israel, by Hussein of Jordan, 1969 Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 1948 – 1983, Clinton Bailey, Westview Press, 1984    Other Countries The Arab world in general was elated when Nasser moved to confront Israel, and cheerfully awaited what was expected to be an Israeli defeat. A number of countries, though, did much more than (prematurely) celebrate: • Iraq sent troops the Jordanian-occupied West Bank, where the 8th Mechanized Brigade saw action, and to Syria; its jets strafed several villages in northern Israel. • Lebanese jets, too, strafed Israeli positions in the north. • Algeria sent MiG jet fighters to reinforce Egypt's air force; and Pakistani pilots were said to have been behind the controls of several Jordanian jets. • Saudi Arabia sent soldiers to help Jordan; but they stopped short of entering the country. • Moroccan, Tunisian and Sudanese volunteer forces headed toward Egypt to join the fight against Israel, as did contingents from contingents from Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia. • Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, Iraq, Algeria and Qatar banned oil shipments to US and UK. Iraq and Libya closed down their oil facilities altogether. • Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania and Yemen severed diplomatic ties with the United States. General References Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael B. Oren, 2002 Time, "A Nation Under Siege," June 9, 1967 The Six-Day War involved three distinct battlefronts, tied together by a shared desire on the part of the surrounding Arab states to eliminate Israel and erase the shame of their defeat 19 years earlier when they failed to destroy the nascent Jewish state. Egypt, the largest Arab state with a population of 31 million, massed troops on its border with Israel and imposed a naval blockade of Israel’s southern port, an act of war. Confronted with these aggressive moves, and the Arab leaders' promises to destroy the Jewish state, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian army and airforce. Egypt’s air force was quickly crippled, and a well-executed Israeli ground offensive routed the Egyptian forces in Gaza and the Sinai peninsula in four days. Buoyed by false reports of Egyptian success, Jordan initiated offensive actions against Israel from the eastern portion of Jerusalem and from lands it occupied west of the Jordan river (the West Bank). Israeli forces responded by attacking Jordanian military positions. After a three days of fierce fighting, especially in and around Jerusalem, Israeli forces defeated the Jordanians and gained control of all of Jerusalem as well as the West Bank, the historical heartland of the Jewish people known to Israelis as Judea and Samaria. Following an air attack by the Syrians on the first day of the war, Israel dealt a shattering blow to the Syrian air force. Hostilites continued in the days that followed, and on fifth day of the war, the Israelis mustered enough forces to remove the Syrian threat from the Golan Heights. This difficult operation was completed the following day, bringing the active phase of the war to a close. Select from the left-hand menu for details about the fighting.      President Johnson's Five Principles As the United Nations was working its way through diplomatic stalemate, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson described his vision of how to achieve peace in the Middle East — in his words, the "five great principles of peace in the region." The following is an excerpt from his June 19, 1967 speech: President Johnson lays out his 5 principles (New York Times, June 20, 1967) The first and the greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbors. For the people of the Middle East, the path to hope does not lie in threats to end the life of any nation. Such threats have become a burden to the peace, not only of that region but a burden to the peace of the entire world. In the same way, no nation would be true to the United Nations Charter, or to its own true interests, if it should permit military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and its neighbors have interests of their own. Each nation, therefore, must accept the right of others to live. Second, this last month, I think, shows us another basic requirement for settlement. It is a human requirement: justice for the refugees. A new conflict has brought new homelessness. The nations of the Middle East must at last address themselves to the plight of those who have been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides have resisted the best efforts of outside mediators to restore the victims of conflict to their homes, or to find them other proper places to live and work. There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned. A third lesson from this last month is that maritime rights must be respected. Our Nation has long been committed to free maritime passage through international waterways, and we, along with other nations, were taking the necessary steps to implement this principle when hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Titan would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations. Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area--but upon the larger states outside the area. We believe that scarce resources could be used much better for technical and economic development. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited. Now the waste and futility of the arms race must be apparent to all the peoples of the world. And now there is another moment of choice. The United States of America, for its part, will use every resource of diplomacy, and every counsel of reason and prudence, to try to find a better course. As a beginning, I should like to propose that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of all military arms into this area, and to keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe. Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. We reaffirmed that principle at the height of this crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of all. This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war. Further, there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem. These five principles are not new, but we do think they are fundamental. Taken together, they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace. We believe there must be progress toward all of them if there is to be progress toward any. There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already said, this is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities. Certainly troops must be withdrawn, but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political independence and territorial integrity. But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more? Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together. But we must still ask, who can help them? Some say it should be the United Nations; some call for the use of other parties. We have been first in our support of effective peacekeeping in the United Nations, and we also recognize the great values to come from mediation. We are ready this morning to see any method tried, and we believe that none should be excluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be useful and all will be needed. So, I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view on these matters. I offer assurance to all that this Government of ours, the Government of the United States, will do its part for peace in every forum, at every level, at every hour. Yet there is no escape from this fact: The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East. In sharp contrast with the Arab position relayed in Khartoum, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol would later agree that these principles could serve as a basis for a future settlement. The Six-Day War had many long term implications on the region. Jordan's decision to join the fighting exacerbated the refugee problem by prompting some inhabitants of the West Bank to cross the Jordan river to the "East Bank" of Jordan. Some of these displaced people were able to return to Israeli-controlled West Bank and, along with their neighbors, witnessed unprecedented economic growth over the course of the next two decades. Israeli investment into the infrastructure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, coupled with policies that allowed Arabs to move freely increased the standard of living of Palestinians, who were now able to work both in Israel and in the oil rich countries in the Middle East.   Despite this relative prosperity and years of quiet under Israeli occupation, many Palestinians — and especially their leadership abroad, the PLO — were interested neither in continued occupation nor a state of their own alongside Israel. (The PLO insisted that Palestine should relace, rather than co-exist with, Israel.) With growing unrest in the territories came greater restrictions. Violent uprisings, often targeting Israeli civilians, prompted increasing Israeli security measures. These in turn led to an increasingly burdensome occupation. Eventually, peace with Egypt allowed Israel give up the Sinai Peninsula. A subsequent Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without a peace treaty failed to end violence against Israel from that territory. The war also put a strain on Christian-Jewish relations in the U.S. as some Jewish leaders faulted Christian institutions for not speaking out against Arab enmity toward Israel in the weeks before the war. Christian publications initially acknowledged Arab responsibility for the war, but by 1968, Christian commentators and activists started using different lens — one of Arab innocence and Zionist culpability — to interpret the Arab-Israeli conflict. Select from the left-hand menu for details about the long-term effects of the Six-Day War.      Post-War Economic Growth in the West Bank and Gaza After taking possession of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the war, Israeli officials were faced with a serious challenge: How to marginalize the fedayeen, or terrorists, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who, because of their close proximity to Israel and the support they received from Arab countries furious at having lost the war, could wreak havoc on Israeli civilians. Instead of attacking the fedayeen head on, Israeli officials, under the leadership of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, worked to keep, in the words of Mideast scholar Nadav Safran, a “low profile” in the occupied territories: They kept their armed forces away from occupied areas, allow the continuation of the existing administration and personnel, supported the existing law and law enforcement agencies, rapidly removed curfews and other security restrictions, restored essential services disrupted by the war, and encouraged the local authorities to redress themselves to public welfare projects. (Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran, 268) In the years after the 1967 War, Israel invested heavily in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, building hospitals, universities, public schools and new roads, improving the water supply and increasing the production of electricity available to the Palestinians. The Allenby Bridge between the West Bank and Jordan Israeli officials also instituted the “Open Bridges policy” which, according to Safran, allowed the “free movement of people and goods back and forth across the Jordan River in order to avoid the disruption of previous trade relations and family and personal contacts.” Israel also allowed Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to visit Israel proper. Additionally, Israel allowed Arabs from throughout the world to visit relatives in the territories, which Safran notes "quickly brought in over 100,000 visitors annually." Moreover, Arabs from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were allowed to work in Israel "a step that initiated a revolution in the life of the areas and their inhabitants." (Safran, 267-68) Although this free movement didn't necessarily endear Israel to Palestinians and made it easier for the Arab world to support Palestinian terrorists, it did allow residents of the West Bank and Gaza strip to generate substantial economic growth. According to the World Bank, the real per capita Gross National Product (GNP) in the occupied territories more than doubled between 1970 and 1980, making it the fourth fastest growing economy in the world. In 1993, the World Bank reported: The economy of the [occupied territories] grew rapidly between 1968 and 1980 (average annual increase of 7% and 9 percent in real per capita GDP and GNP respectively), triggered by a number of factors, including the rapid integration with Israel and the regional economic boom. In the early years of the occupation, there was a sharp expansion in the employment of unskilled Palestinian labor in Israel and a rise in incomes, which in turn spurred domestic economic activity, especially in the construction sector. Earnings of Palestinian workers in Israel rose from negligible levels in 1968 to almost one quarter of GNP in 1975. According to the World Bank, economic growth in the disputed territories continued even as Israel experienced an economic slowdown in the mid-1970s as many Palestinians were able to find work in other countries in the Middle East: Since unskilled labor played a central role in the growth, the poor shared in this growth, and as a result, in all likelihood, there was a significant reduction in poverty in this period. Household conditions improved substantially, with a several-fold rise in the possession of consumer durables and significant increases in access to municipal water and electricity connections. Life expectancy increased by a decade, and there was significant progress in reducing infant mortality. School enrollments also rose during this time. These advances mirrored substantial improvements in income levels and in living conditions all through the region during the 1970s.  Economic decline followed the onset of the Intifada which began in December 1987. The Palestinian economy suffered another blow after the first Gulf War, which disrupted the economies of the Gulf Region, where many Palestinians found work. (Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait resulted in many Palestinians being forced from that country after the war.) Just as Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip enjoyed substantial increases in well-being under Israeli rule before the Intifada shattered economic relations between Israel and Palestinians, the increase in living standards for Palestinians in the 1990s was set back sharply as a result of the terror war launched against Israel in 2000.    Arab Refugees Using the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) — which it had occupied illegally since 1948 — as launching point, Jordan attacked Israel on June 5, 1967. During the subsequent war, as many as 325,000 Arab residents fled to escape fighting in the area. According to historian Howard M. Sachar, "most of these 1967 fugitives departed voluntarily; no [Israeli] attempts were made to influence them to leave." Most crossed to the East Bank of the Jordan River, into Jordan proper. Since most were Jordanian citizens fleeing one area under Jordanian jurisdiction (up to that time) to another, it is more accurate to describe them as displaced persons than as refugees. Israel — having acquired the territory in successful self-defense — became the legitimate military administrative authority. It expelled a handful of Palestinian Arabs for "strategic and security reasons," but quickly allowed some to return. As for other alleged expulsions, most if not all West Bank Arabs who fled to the East Bank (Jordan) after the war did so of their own volition. Often they or their families were originally from the East Bank, or they were civil servants or pensioners afraid they might lose their Jordanian income if they stayed. The New York Times reported (June 11, 1967) that Jordanian radio broadcasts urged people not to flee, indicating this was a matter of choice, not compulsion: " ... the refugees are on the move in spite of repeated Jordanian radio broadcasts that say: 'To the Arabs of the West Bank, do not desert your homes. Be patient. Be men and do not desert your homes. Be patient. Do not create another refugee problem.'" Although Arab regimes claimed that Israel was expelling thousands of West Bankers, a Timesreporter found no supporting evidence: "At no time during a number of long talks with Arabs in this area was anything said to support Arab charges at the United Nations that thousands had been forced to cross the Jordan River from the west bank area occupied by the Israelis ...." ("War Brings Problems for '48 Palestine Refugees," New York Times, June 15, 1967). A detailed U.N. report, filed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Nils-Goran Gussing, also found little support for claims of expulsions. Among other things, the review noted that "during his visit to the area, the Special Representative received no specific reports indicating that persons had been physically forced to cross to the East Bank." Gussing did record "persistent reports" of acts of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and attempts to suggest to Arab residents that they might be better off in Jordan. But he noted that "the inevitable impact upon a frightened civilian population of hostilities and military occupation as such, particularly when no measures of reassurance are taken, has clearly been a main factor in the exodus from the West Bank." The Special Representative recorded that the mayor of Hebron, one of the largest Arab cities on the West Bank, told him that even with an Israeli assurance there would be no fighting nearby, "when the Arab Legion (Jordanian army) withdrew from the area, people began to flee. Approximately 15,000 to 18,000 out of a population of 150,000 in the area had left," the majority "before the arrival of the Israeli troops ... They had left of their own free will without any pressure from the army. Many had come back, and about 90 percent of all those who had gone would like to come back." Israeli law, passed in the 1950s to deal with Arab refugees from the 1948 war, in general also barred the return of Arabs who fled in 1967. However, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's government, at United Nations' urging, agreed to repatriate 40,000. The Israeli government, Gussing noted, decided that "persons who had resided on the West Bank, and who crossed over to the East Bank between 5 June and 4 July 1967" would be permitted to return. Israel arranged with the International Red Cross for the return of thousands who had fled. But Jordan discouraged large-scale return; by August, 1967 only 14,000 West Bank Arabs had done so. In 1968, Jordan prohibited those who intended to remain in the East Bank from emigrating to the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, by the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel had permitted the return of another 40,000. Sachar says that "their homes, land, and other property at all times were maintained intact." After the Six-Day War, Israel made repeated attempts to move Palestinian Arabs out of Gaza Strip and West Bank refugee camps in the into new, permanent housing. The goal was to assist in their "rehabilitation" as settled residents integrated into the local economy. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) opposed rehabilitation, murdering a few Arabs who participated and intimidating many others. The Arab states successfully sought U.N. resolutions to keep the refugees in the areas now under Israeli control in the camps. This stemmed from an attitude exposed earlier by former U.N. Relief and Works Agency official Ralph Galloway, who said in 1958: The Arab states do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don't give a damn whether the refugees live or die. It should be noted that a majority of the roughly 750,000 Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank did not flee the fighting or Israeli military administration. As Israel maintained an "open bridges" program to reintegrate the economies of the West Bank and East Bank in the years after the Six-Day War, both the West Bank and Gaza Strip experienced greater material growth than they ever had under their respective Jordanian and Egyptian occupations.   (Sachar gives a lesser figure for Arabs displaced during and immediately after the Six-Day War, 150,000. But he too puts the total number repatriated at close to 60,000.)     General References Encyclopedia Americana Annual, 1968. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, Knopf, 1996 edition. According to official Arab statistics, over 989,000 Jews were forced out of their homes in Arab countries from 1948 until the early 1970's. Some 650,000 resettled in Israel, leaving behind personal property valued today at more than $990 billion. Jewish-owned real-estate left behind in Arab lands has been estimated at 120,000 square kilometers (four times the size of the State of Israel). Valued today at about 15 trillion dollars.     Occupation - Liberation of Jewish Land Among the most discussed long-term results of the war is Israel's administration of territories it occupied during those six days of fighting — especially the West Bank and, until Israel withdrew in 2005, the Gaza Strip. The Historical Context Shortly after the war ended, on June 19, the Israeli cabinet secretly decided it would withdraw from the sovereign territories it had captured from Egypt and Syria — the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, respectively — in exchange for peace with those two countries. The Gaza Strip, which though previously occupied by Egypt did not belong to any sovereign, would remain under Israeli control. No decision was reached on the West Bank, which also did not belong to any sovereign. (Although Jordan annexed the West Bank shortly after it occupied the area in 1948, there was near unanimous consensus in the international community that the annexation would not be recognized.) But Israel insisted that it should not, and would not, simply return to the pre-war situation — the dangerous combination of precarious armistice lines and aggressive neighbors that had prevailed for 19 years. Territory would only be returned as a result of direct negotiations leading to a peace agreement. And even then, Jerusalem and portions of the West Bank would, for reasons of national security as well as Jewish history and culture, remain under Israeli sovereignty. The idea that Israeli security depended on continued control over parts of the West Bank was held not only by Israeli officials, but also by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a June 29, 1967 memorandum to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, they argued that, from a strictly military point of view, “Israel would require the retention of some captured territories in order to provide militarily defensible borders.” Referring to the West Bank, they argued that Israel required a new boundary that would “widen the narrow portion of Israel” and help protect Tel Aviv. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a definite idea of what territory Israel should retain, it was not clear what Israel itself had in mind — mostly because the country's leaders were deeply divided on this question. In any case, they felt no need to specify precisely their desired borders before the Arab countries agreed to negotiate a peace settlement. And it very quickly became evident that this desire was lacking. On Sept. 1, 1967, Arab leaders meeting in Khartoum, Sudan declared that there would be "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, [and] no negotiations with it." If this obstinate resolution allowed for a sliver hope — some point out that while the Khartoum resolutions clearly reject peace, they at least refrained from directly calling for an immediate return to war and the destruction of Israel — then even this was too much for some of the players. Syria, upset by even the slightest hint or pretense of “moderation,” boycotted the conference, while the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) made clear its strident opposition to the resolutions as they were worded. In this atmosphere, and with the Soviets replenishing the militaries of Egypt and Syria, Israel shifted to a more cautious, less yielding stance on what territorial concessions it should make. Egyptian attacks beginning in June 1968, and the subsequent "War of Attrition" it launched against Israel in March 1969, further diminished the possibility of a quick withdrawal. Anwar Sadat, who replaced Gamal Nasser as president of Egypt, would eventually announce his desire for peace with Israel. When the two countries signed a peace treaty, the entire Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt. The Palestinian Context Today, conversation about the occupation tends to focus less on its historical context — the Six-Day War and the continued refusal by Arab countries to recognize Israel’s right to exist — and more on what the occupation means for Palestinian statehood and Palestinians living in the West Bank. For 20 years after the war, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were relatively quiet. While the PLO terror organization based in Jordan and later Lebanon represented the Palestinians internationally, inside the territories Israel permitted Palestinian “notables,” the social and economic elite, to retain the positions of local leadership they enjoyed during (and prior to) the Jordanian occupation. Israeli officials had on several occasions approached these leaders to offer them greater autonomy and self-rule, but with no success. But during these years, Palestinian resentment grew. The economic and other advances in the territories did not change the fact that Palestinians did not want to be ruled by their historic enemies, Israel, whose popularity was not helped by the arrest and deportation of Palestinians and the growth of settlements. Palestinian frustration with the PLO, which seemed to do little to keep the “Palestinian cause” from fading to the background overseas and even less for Palestinians living in the territories, further contributed to a combustible situation. The spark came in December 1987, when, only a few days after an Israeli visiting Gaza was stabbed to death, an Israeli truck driver in the Gaza Strip lost control of his vehicle and killed four Palestinians. Palestinians, believing the driver intentionally killed the Palestinians as an act of revenge, rioted. The turbulence quickly spread across the Gaza Strip and West Bank, flaring into a full-scale rebellion. In the years that followed, with increasing involvement of the PLO, Palestinians would attack Israeli soldiers and civilians with rocks, knives, firebombs, grenades and other explosives. Israel, in turn, responded to the rioting with heavy military force. With hostilities being extensively covered by the media, the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the occupation became issues of much international attention. From 1987 through 1993, when the violence now known as the “first intifada” finally ended, the occupied territories were dramatically changed. The free movement that Palestinians had enjoyed before the uprising was often curtailed; the Palestinian economy (and Israel’s) suffered; Palestinian universities, all of which were opened under Israeli rule, served as centers of protest and were often shut down. As a result of these Israeli countermeasures, the burden of the occupation increased for all Palestinians, violent and peaceful alike. The pattern would repeat itself beginning in 2000, when Palestinians again turned to anti-Israel violence. This time, the level of violence went far beyond what was experienced in the first intifada; and to defend against the terrorists who were ravaging Israeli cities, the government set up an even more extensive network of checkpoints and roadblocks. Ordinary Israelis suffered greatly from the wave of suicide bombings, and ordinary Palestinians suffered from Israel’s attempts to stop the attacks. The far-reaching Clinton proposals of 2000 that were accepted by Israel’s government under Ehud Barak would have ended the occupation and created an independent Palestinian state in more than 95 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza with eastern Jerusalem as a capital, but Yasir Arafat rejected the proposal without so much as a counter-offer. A unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 failed to end anti-Israel violence from that territory, raising questions about the wisdom of further unilateral pullouts. Palestinian activists today often point to the occupation as a cause of anti-Israel violence, a claim often echoed by the media. The aggression against Israel that brought about the occupation is frequently ignored as is the most recent effort in 2000 to end it.     General References Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977, Yoram Meital, 1997 Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael B. Oren, 2002 Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran, 1981 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, (JCSM-373-67), published in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter 1984) "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II," Issa Al-Shuaibi, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter, 1980)      Settlements Settlements established by Israel in territories captured in the 1967 war have become a matter of great controversy among pro- and anti-settlement advocates who debate the legality of such communities. Opponents of the settlement policy claim that it a Jewish land grab — a form of expanding Israel’s territory by colonizing Arab land. Proponents argue that both legally and morally, Jews have every right to purchase property and live on land that was historically inhabited by Jews and is not legally Arab. Opponents believe that peace can only be achieved between Israel and her Arab neighbors by creating a neighboring Palestinian state on all the land Israel won in the 1967 war, without the presence of any Israeli communities. Israeli settlements are thus considered an obstacle to peace. Proponents of the settlements believe the obstacle to peace is the continued rejection by Palestinian leaders of Israel’s right to exist. They—as well as many others–believe that Israel’s pre-1967 borders were indefensible. The settlements are believed to create a secure buffer zone between the Israeli state and those who want to destroy it. Although built-up Jewish settlements account for less than 3% of the land in the West Bank, settlement opponents argue that the land controlled by Israeli authorities amounts to far more than that, and as a result, Arab residents are greatly inconvenienced. Proponents maintain that inconveniencing measures— including military controls, checkpoints on roads leading to the settlements and the clearing of olive groves used for ambushes—exist solely for security reasons to protect settlers and visitors from Arab terrorist attacks (which have claimed the lives of hundreds of Israelis since the 1993 Declarations of Principles that was to serve as the blueprint for peace). Israeli settlements were constructed after 1967 for security and/or ideological reasons and were supported by both the Israeli Labor and Likud parties. In many places, historic Jewish communities were re-established after having been destroyed by Arab fighters and prohibited to Jews during the Jordanian occupation of 1948-67. For example, Kfar Etzion, one of several Jewish communities in the area destroyed in 1948, was the first Jewish settlement re-established in the territories won by Israel in the 1967 war. Since 1967, Israeli leaders have repeatedly expressed willingness to relinquish territories won during the 1967 war and dismantle settlements built there — in exchange for peace. Indeed, in April of 1982, Israel dismantled or transferred settlements in the Sinai to Egypt and in the summer of 2005, Israel withdrew its entire military and civilian presence from the Gaza Strip, dismantling all the settlements constructed there, transferring thriving greenhouses to the Palestinians, and expelling Israeli residents from their homes in the hopes of establishing peace with the Palestinians. Instead, Palestinian militants—with the support of their Hamas-led government—have used the evacuated territory to launch rockets into Israel’s pre-1967 borders, shelling residents of Sderot and other neighboring communities and causing death, injuries and damage within Israel. Since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the territory has also become the site of deadly internecine violence among Palestinian factions, kidnapping of journalists, vandalism, looting and general mayhem. Far from bringing peace to the Gaza Strip, the withdrawal has resulted in  less secure borders for Israel. History As a result of the 1967 war, Israel gained control of the West Bank (from Jordan), the Gaza Strip (from Egypt) and the Golan Heights (from Syria). I. West BankJudea and Samaria, home to Jewish communities over thousands of years, was renamed the "West Bank" and annexed by Jordan in 1950. (This annexation was recognized by only two countries—Great Britain and Pakistan.) Iraqis, Syrians and Jordanians, and others built settlements on the land. Jews, however, were barred from living or buying property in the territories under Jordan’s regime. In July 1967, Israeli cabinet minister Yigal Allon of the left-wing Mapai (Labor) party, a member of the inner war cabinet, drew up a peace plan with a proposal to reallocate the West Bank territories between Jordan and Israel. According to the Allon Plan, Israel would relinquish heavily Arab-populated areas in the West Bank to Jordanian political control, while fortifying its vulnerable border with Jordan by retaining military control over a Strip along the Jordan River, through the Jordan Valley to the eastern hills of the West Bank. The territory retained (comprising less than half of the West Bank) was to include a corridor from the Dead Sea to Jerusalem and west of Ramallah to protect a Greater Jerusalem. The Labor government also approved and supported construction of settlements in the Gush Etzion (Etzion Bloc) located south of Jerusalem, the site of Jewish communities destroyed by Arab armies in 1948. Adhering to the Allon proposal, the Israeli Labor government sponsored the construction of settlements in strategic locations along the Jordan Valley, and in Gush Etzion, an area purchased by Jews long before the State of Israel was established. At the same time, the government resisted construction between the towns of Nablus and Hebron. In March 1974, following the Yom Kippur War, Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), an ideological, religious-nationalist group originally associated with the National Religious Party (NRP), was formed to initiate settlement in the biblical Land of Israel, "Eretz Yisrael." Some of the members had already been active in 1968, attempting to resettle Hebron (see below) and in 1973, attempting to establish a settlement at the biblical site of Elon Moreh. The group organized protests against the government for thwarting their attempts to settle the territories, and conducted tours and hikes of the territories to educate the Israeli public about the heartland of biblical Eretz Yisrael and to convince them of the need to resettle the territories. Seven failed attempts were made by Gush Emunim to settle the Nablus (Shechem) area in Samaria. (Each time, the army evacuated them.) On the eighth try, however, the government’s resistance was broken and settlers established a temporary community at the Kadum military base, which later became known as Kedumim. Over the next few years, several military posts and settlements were built in the area.  Between 1967-77, successive Labor governments supported the construction of over 25 communities in Judea and Samaria. After Likud came into power in 1977, dozens more settlements were built.in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Many settlements were built on the sites of previous Jewish communities or in places with biblical significance. Many began as military or Nahal (military combat service combined with civilian service) camps which eventually became civilian settlements. Peace Now, an Israeli organization vehemently opposed to the settlements, claimed in an October 2006 report that Israeli settlements are situated mostly on "private Palestinian land" based on Arab claims disputed by the Israeli government and by others who question the credibility of the organization’s information. For example, the organization stated that almost 90% of the settlement town of Ma’ale Adumim was built on private Palestinian land–a claim it was subsequently forced to admit was wrong. There are currently ~245,000 people living in 121 settlements in the West Bank II. HebronHebron, site of the Cave (Tomb) of the Patriarchs, is one of Judaism’s four holy cities (the others are Jerusalem, Safed, and Tiberias). For millennia, Hebron was inhabited by Jews. In 1929, Arab rioters massacred their Jewish neighbors as British soldiers stood by, and put an end to the Jewish community. In 1931, 35 families resettled in Hebron until further Arab riots in 1936 led to their evacuation. After Jordan occupied Hebron in 1948, Jews were barred from living there and from praying at the Cave of the Patriarchs. In April 1968, the eve of Passover, Rabbi Moshe Levinger and a group of his followers checked into the Park Hotel in Hebron in an attempt to re-establish the Jewish community there. They were opposed by both the local Arabs and the Israeli military. The settlers persisted and were eventually moved to Israeli military headquarters overlooking Hebron. In 1970, the government agreed to establish the adjacent town of Kiryat Arba, and the first housing units were erected in 1972. In 1979, settlers established the Committee of the Jewish Community of Hebron and moved into the former Jewish areas of Beit Hadassah and the Avraham Avinu synagogue. Israeli settlers, soldiers and visitors who came to the Cave of the Patriarchs were frequently subject to Arab violence. In 1976, Arabs destroyed the synagogue at the Cave of the Patriarchs and burned Torah scrolls. In May 1980, six Yeshiva students were killed and 20 wounded by Palestinian terrorists as they returned from prayers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs and in 1983, another yeshiva student was gunned down in the center of Hebron. Each murder and act of violence prompted the settlers to expand their presence in Hebron. By 1984, the Hebron Jewish community consisted of several enclaves. Hebron was the scene of even more violence during the first intifada and after the Oslo Agreements. Jewish settlers were the victims of stabbings, firebombings and shootings. In 1994, a Jewish settler killed 29 Muslim worshippers at the Cave of the Patriarchs and wounded 150 before being beaten to death. The violence continued during the second intifada with Palestinian suicide bombings, shootings and stabbings. Twelve security personnel—including civilian guards, border policemen and soldiers—were ambushed and killed as they accompanied worshippers returning from prayers at the Cave of the Patriarch, and a Jewish infant was targeted and shot dead by a Palestinian gunman. Settlers have been accused of stone throwing, verbal harrassment, and vandalism against Palestinians in the area. A Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) was established by the UN in 1997. In 2002, two TIPH members were shot and killed just outside Hebron by Palestinian gunmen. And in 2006, TIPH temporarily withdrew from Hebron after its headquarters were attacked and destroyed by Muslims angered about cartoons of Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. Because a Jewish presence in Hebron has long sparked a violent Arab response, there is debate both inside and outside Israel, about whether Jews should be permitted to live there. Opponents believe a Jewish presence irritates the local Arabs and requires military support that  intrudes on Arab residents' lives, while proponents believe Jews should not relinquish their right to live and pray in their holy city by giving in to violence. The Jewish community in Hebron currently numbers ~600 and Kiryat Arba’s population is ~7,000. III. Golan HeightsFrom 1967-77, successive Labor governments sponsored the building of settlements in the Golan Heights for security reasons. The Golan Heights, at an elevation of ~2000 feet and fortified by Syria with a dense network of fortifications, trenches, concrete behind mine fields, had served as a strategic fortress from which to shell Israel’s agricultural heartland. The capture of this area now provided Israel a defensible border with Syria. The first two kibbutzim to be established in the Golan were Merom Golan and Mevo Chama at either end. Between 1967 and 1977, 20 additional kibbutzim and moshavim were constructed in the Golan Heights. Additional settlements were built between 1978 and 1987 with the support of Likud governments. There are now 33 settlements in the Golan, including kibbutzim, moshavim and the town of Katzrin, with a population numbering ~18,000. In 1981, Israel ended its military rule of the Golan Heights, with the passage by Knesset of "The Golan Heights Law," applying "the law, jurisdiction, and administration of the state....to the Golan Heights." The Golan's Druze residents were offered full Israeli citizenship, but most have not accepted. IV. Sinai and the Gaza StripUnder the 1949 armistice agreements, Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip (part of the British Mandate and partially occupied by Israel during the 1948 war). Arab refugees from Jaffa and southern Israel moved to this small strip of land, but were kept by Egypt in squalid refugeecamps. During the 1950's, the Egyptians used the Gaza Strip as a staging site for terror attacks by Fedayeen inside southern Israel. In the 1956 war, prompted by Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the Israeli army captured Sinai and the Gaza Strip but withdrew after an agreement placed UN peacekeepers in the Sinai. As a result of the 1967 war triggered by Egypt which expelled the peacekeepers and used their position in Sinai to again close the Straits of Tiran, Israel was once again in control of the Sinai and Gaza Strip. This time, however, Israel’s leaders—including Yigal Allon—believed that settlements should be established in order to create a security buffer against Egyptian aggression. Military installations, early warning stations, and 15 settlements, including the town of Yamit, were established by the Labor government in the Sinai. In 1979, Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin, signed a peace treaty with Egypt, agreeing to withdraw from the Sinai and dismantle the settlements in exchange for peace. Israel also relinquished the Alma Oil Field, valued at $100 billion, which it had discovered and developed, thereby giving up the opportunity to become self-sufficient in providing for the country’s energy needs. In April 1982, over 170 military installations and early warning stations were dismantled and the settlements were forcibly evacuated by the Israeli army, overseen by General Ariel Sharon. By that time, Sinai was home to 7,000 Israeli residents. Most of the settlements were demolished. Neot Sinai, with its cultivated gardens, was given intact to Egypt. In 1988, the resort town of Taba, developed by the Israelis, was handed over to Egypt as well. Jews had long lived in Gaza before World War I. Kfar Darom was a Jewish-owned citrus grove in the 1930's. The Jewish National Fund bought the land from its Jewish owner and established a kibbutz there in the 1940's. During the 1948 war, Kfar Darom came under Egyptian attack and siege but managed to serve as a stronghold against the Egyptian onslaught before being evacuated. In 1970, Kfar Darom was re-established on the same site, supported by Israel’s Labor government. Twenty more settlements were established in the Gaza Strip in the late 70's, 80's and 90's. Some of the families evacuated from the Sinai settlements were resettled in Gaza settlements, such as Elei Sinai. The settlers transformed the Gaza dunes into lush oases of green. The presence of such settlements near squalid Palestinian refugee camps sparked envy and resentment among the local Arab populace. In 2005, the Israeli government forcibly evacuated and dismantled the Gaza Strip settlements, together with 4 additional settlements in Northern Samaria, and withdrew its military presence from Gaza. The thriving greenhouses that the settlers had built and maintained were transferred to the Palestinians. Debate over Legality of Settlements There is debate in the international community over whether or not the Israeli settlements are legal under international law. Many of the arguments are based on various false or questionable assumptions and claims. Those who maintain that the settlements are illegal rely on Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, which states: Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country…are prohibited… and in the sixth paragraph: The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. They interpret this as applicable to Israel’s settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, understanding Israel to have become a "belligerent occupant" of this territory through entry by its armed forces. They also argue that settlement policy leads to the violation of Palestinian rights under international humanitarian law–specifically, their right to self-determination, equality, property, freedom of movement, an adequate standard of living, and freedom of movement. Those who maintain that settlements are legal interpret Article 49 (6) of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention as inapplicable to Israel’s settlements. For example, the late Professor Julius Stone—considered one of the premier legal theorists —maintained that the effort to designate Israeli settlements as illegal was a "subversion. . . of basic international law principles." Among the 27 books he authored was Israel and Palestine: An Assault on the Law of Nationswhich dealt with the legal aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In it, Stone set forth the central principles of international law upon which Israel’s right to settle the West Bank is based and discussed the inapplicability of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the case of Israeli settlement. Stone drew upon the writings of Professor Stephen Schwebel, former judge on the Hague’s International Court of Justice (1981-2000), who distinguished between territory acquired in an "aggressive conquest" (such as Japanese conquests during the 1930s and Nazi conquests during World War II) and territory taken in a war of self-defense (for example, Israel’s capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 war). He also distinguished between the taking of territory that is legally held by another nation (such as the Japanese occupation of Chinese territory and the Nazi Germany occupation of France, Holland, Belgium and other European lands) as opposed to the taking of territory illegally held. The latter applies to the West Bank and Gaza, which were not considered the legal territories of any High Contracting Party when Israel won control of them. The West Bank and Gaza were never the territory of a High Contracting Party; the occupation after 1948 by Jordan and Egypt was illegal and neither country ever had lawful or recognized sovereignty. The last legal sovereignty over the territories was that of the League of Nations Palestine Mandate which encouraged Jewish settlement of the land. Regarding Israel’s acquisition of territories in the 1967 war, Schwebel wrote: Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title. ("What Weight to Conquest," American Journal of International Law, 64 (1970)) Proponents of the view that settlements are legal further argue that Article 49 was intended to outlaw the Nazi practice of forcibly transporting populations into or out of occupied territories to death and work camps  and thus cannot be applied to Israel because Israelis were neither forcibly transferred, nor were they intended to (nor do they) displace Arab residents of the territories. Arabs continue to live in these territories and their population continues to grow. Those who believe settlements are legal also maintain that it is not the existence of settlements that have an impact on Palestinians’ standard of living, right to self-determination, equality, property, and freedom of movement. Rather, the impact upon their freedom of movement and standard of living is directly a result of the threat they pose to their Israeli neighbors and their governance by the Palestinian Authority. The U.S. government, as well as others, presently hold the view that the settlements are not illegal and that the extent of Israeli withdrawal from the territories is subject to negotiation. The Carter administration held that settlements were illegal, relying on the opinion of its legal advisor Herbert Hansell. ( It is noteworthy that in supporting this view, Hansell quoted from a more general, earlier work by Professor Julius Stone – his 1959 analysis entitled "Legal Controls of International Conflict"–thus misrepresenting Stone’s opinion, which was that Israeli settlements are legal under international law.) The Reagan administration and subsequent U.S. administrations reversed Carter’s position, with the opinion that while it disapproved on political grounds of building new settlements in the disputed territories before negotiations, settlements are not illegal. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow wrote several articles explaining why settlements are legal and arguing that United Nations Resolution 242 stipulates that Israel withdraw from some of the disputed territory, but not necessarily all. It should be remembered that Rostow was one of the drafters of Resolution 242, the very resolution relied upon by Palestinians and their supporters to demand Israel’s complete withdrawal from all of the West Bank and Gaza and the dismantlement of all of the Jewish settlements. Proponents of the view that settlements are illegal often cite numerous U.N. resolutions criticizing Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza. Those who maintain settlements are legal indicate that  U.N. General Assembly Resolutions carry no legal weight, even if one ignores the U.N.’s history of bias against Israel, evidenced by the infamous "Zionism is Racism" resolution and the partisan, anti-Israel  indictments by special U.N. bodies set up exclusively to report on Israel's practices. The United States routinely abstains or votes against Security Council resolutions unfairly condemning Israel for building settlements. One exception–under former President Carter, the United States initially voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 465 which was passed on March 1, 1980. This resolution stating that Israeli settlements in the territories have no "legal validity" is often quoted to bolster the "illegality of settlements" argument. However, the American vote for this resolution was subsequently retracted, with the United States claiming that it had intended to abstain and blaming a communications failure as responsible for the vote. Finally, those who maintain settlements are legal indicate that although Article 25 of the U.N. Charter says: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter," this cannot invalidate Article 80 which says that: nothing in the [U.N.] Charter shall be construed . . . to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or peoples or the terms of existing international instruments. This would include the British Mandate’s granting the right to the Jewish people to settle in the whole of the Mandated territory. Article 6 of the Mandate encouraged "close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands not required for public use."    Christian Response Background In the two decades following the end of World War II, there was near universal acknowledgement that Christians had failed in their obligation to stand with the Jewish people during the during the 1930s and 40s. This failure led many, but not all, Christians in the U.S. to support the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948 where Jews would be a self-governing majority. Support for Israel on the part of Christians was not universal, however. Some Christians, especially American missionaries who had served in the Middle East, either opposed or expressed ambivalence about the creation of a Jewish state in the region. This was particularly true of American Protestant churches which had sent missions to the Middle East with great fanfare in the 1800s but had largely abandoned any pretext of converting Muslims to Christianity in the ensuing years. While the missionary zeal of these churches declined, they were vocal supporters of the cause of Arab nationalism. Some of their clergy regarded support for Israel as a threat to Christian and American relations with the Arab world and a threat to Christian minorities vulnerable to an angry response by the Muslims who dominated the region. On the opposite side of the debate were theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr who while acknowledging that Israel’s creation would impose some costs on Arab aspirations, also asserted that the formation of a Jewish state was a necessary response to the Holocaust. Intra-Christian debate between about Israel remained fierce in the years after Israel’s creation and took place against a backdrop of growing interest in Christian-Jewish relations. Researchers such as Franklin Littell, Alice and Roy Eckhardt, Sister Mary Rose Thering and others worked to document how Christian teachings about the Jewish people helped pave the way for the Holocaust. Their findings were embodied by a statement Thering quoted in the New York Timestwo years before her death: "It was evident from what I was reading that the church was trying to say that the Jews were not loved by God" (July 29, 2004). As a result of teachings that blamed Jews for the death of Christ and condemned them for rejecting Christianity, many Christians regarded Jews as a people sentenced to eternal wandering and not entitled to a homeland of their own. Response to Arab Threats Israel’s creation in 1948 seemed to put that issue to rest, but the buildup to the Six Day War, and the war itself, prompted a new round of discussion in Christian circles about Israel, Zionism and Judaism. Jews, alarmed by Arab calls for Israel’s destruction, watched this inter-Christian discussion closely, particularly in the United States. Judith Banki, an authority on interreligious relations, stated: … Jews in America looked to their fellow citizens, including Christian leaders and church organizations, for forthright positions on Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state, her right to free passage through the international waters of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the obligation of the United States to honor its commitments to Israel – preferably through the United Nations, and in concert with other major powers, if this were possible, but unilaterally if necessary. ("Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis: The New Agenda for Interreligious Dialogue," American Jewish Committee, 1968. Obtained from the John Howard Yoder Archives Collection.) Banki reported that many Christian individual leaders expressed support for Israel in late May 1967: In the weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, when it appeared that Israel might become the victim of combined Arab aggression, a number of Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christian leaders, as well as several Christian journals of opinion, took clear positions in support of Israel’s national integrity and her navigation rights. On May 29, 1967, a number of prominent Christians issued a statement calling on "our fellow Americans of all persuasions and groups and on the Administration to support the independence, integrity and freedom of Israel." Signatories include Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, President of the Southern Christian Leadership conference; Dr. Franklin Littell, President of Iowa Wesleyan College; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Professor emeritus of Theology at Union Theological Seminary, and Rev. Alexander Schmemann, Dean of St. Vladimir’s Russian Orthodox Seminary. Soon afterwards, "similarly forthright statements were issued separately by Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston; Lawrence Cardinal Shehan, Archbishop of Baltimore; and Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan of Atlanta" (Banki). On May 31, other prominent Christian leaders appeared at a rally in Washington, D.C., organized by the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington Additionally, Christian leaders from Philadelphia, St. Louis, Cleveland and Cincinnati issued statements in support of Israel. Compared to these expressions of support for Israel, the silence of the National Council of Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the weeks and days before the war was remarkable. In particular, there was little criticism of annihilationist rhetoric on the part of Arab leaders. The reluctance of the two most powerful "umbrella" organizations – the National Council of Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops – with whom Jews had been carrying on a continuous dialogue for some years, to commit themselves unequivocally on the basic question of Israel’s survival, especially in the face of Arab threats to annihilate the whole population, came as a surprise to many Jewish leaders. Neither of these two groups issued any clear-cut statement to this effect during the saber rattling days in May. (Banki) Christian publications, on the other hand, indicated their support for Israel in the face of Arab threats. On May 31, 1967, Christian Century, a magazine that caters to progressive mainline Protestants in the United States, criticized Egyptian President Nasser’s "blustering protestations of his solidarity with other Arab nations in their hostility toward Israel," stating that "it must not be assumed that Nasser is bluffing; certainly the Israeli government will not make so naïve an assumption." In the June 7, 1967 issue, the publication condemned Egypt’s announcement that it mined the Straits of Tiran: If Nasser’s interference with shipping through the strait is not halted by the United Nations or by the great powers working in concert, certainly Israel will undertake the job herself. Such a military move by Israel, however much it may be justified, could make a cauldron of the Middle East. To be sure, Christian Century’s criticism was marked with ambivalence over the potential use of force to re-open the straits and a tendency to blame Israel's response to Arab provocation, and not the provocation itself, for destabilizing the region. Nevertheless, the headline of the June 7 editorial —  "Nasser’s Bluster Threatens World Peace" — made it clear the magazine directed most of its ire at Egypt’s aggression. America, a magazine founded by the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) in 1909, acknowledged that Israel was indeed facing a substantive threat from its neighbors, that this threat could spiral into a "major East-West confrontation," and that the U.S. had an obligation to protect the "territorial integrity of all the nations in the area." The magazine did not stop there, but went on to criticize the American Jewish Congress for calling for unequivocal American support for Israel while at the same time expressing opposition to "American policy in South Vietnam—a policy that also involves commitment to a small, relatively defenseless nation": The President, we suggest, is not alone in his mystification over the attitude toward South Vietnam of many who have a deep, emotional interest in the protection of Israel. (June 3, 1967) The War Banki reports that when the war began, "most Christian comment was concentrated on appeals for a cease fire, concern for the fate and rights of new refugees and the status of Jerusalem." According to Banki, public Christian statements calling for peace in the region included: • A June 5 telegram to UN General Secretary U Thant from Pope Paul VI who stated he was "saddened and concerned" by the war and who, in Banki’s words, "expressed his hope that Jerusalem could be declared an open and inviolable city." • A June 6 telegram from the National Council of Churches to the Johnson Administration calling for the U.S. Government to "continue to make the utmost use of the UN; press for a cease fire; seek negotiations through UN of all conflicting claims … to establish national and international rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, the right of Arab refugees and the recognition by all of the State of Israel." (Ellipsis in Banki). • A statement from the World Council of Churches calling attention to the "fate of refugees of various nationalities" and a call for churches to pressure their governments to "bring about a cessation of hostilities and to lay the foundations of a just and durable peace." • A June 6 statement from the World Alliance of Reformed and Presbyterian Churches stating that "war has never solved political conflicts." • A June 8 call by the President of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops for the United Nations to work to bring an end to the conflict. • Another appeal for peace from Pope John Paul VI broadcast by Vatican Radio on June 7. Unlike to these statements, which do not address the issue of responsibility, a group of Catholic and Protestant leaders in the Boston area made explicit reference to Arab rejectionism and genocidal hostility: None of us can be indifferent or uninvolved in confronting the moral issues inherent in the current conflict in the Middle East. We cannot stand idly by at the possibility of Israel’s destruction, of decimating the two and a half million Jewish people. … We earnestly pray for a speedy cease fire. The end of hostilities, however, must be followed by a firm and permanent peace: one which will recognize Israel as a viable nation in the community of nations and which will include international guarantees of the territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East. The peace must also guarantee the right of all nations without exception to free passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. (Banki) After the War After the cease fire, Banki notes "Christian spokesmen began to look more deeply into the causes of the conflict, both immediate and long range"; opinions on the responsibility for the war "ran the entire gamut from those which viewed the State of Israel as an intruder into the Arab world to those which saw Israel’s claims as amply justified by history." For example, on June 26, 1967, the New York Times published a letter by Rev. Henry P. Van Dusen, a former president of the Union Theological Seminary, who wrote: All persons who seek to view the Middle East problem with honesty and objectivity stand aghast at Israel’s onslaught, the most violent ruthless (and successful) aggression since Hitler’s blitzkrieg across Western Europe of 1940, aiming not at victory but at annihilation – the very objective proclaimed by Nasser and his allies which had drawn support to Israel. (Qtd. in Banki) Roy Eckhardt, then Chairman of the Department of Religion at Lehigh University and a leading light in Christian-Jewish relations community, responded that comparing Israelis to Nazis was an "unspeakable distortion of the facts" that was akin to calling black white, to label as ‘aggressors’ the targets of aggression, and to identify as ‘annihilationsists’ those who barely escaped being annihilated by a foe pledged to turning them into corpses, and who, after their own victory, now manifested an almost incredible restraint and readiness to deal righteously with their would-be slayers." (Qtd. in Banki) The World Council of Churches was a bit more circumspect than Van Dusen, but still suggested that Arab fears of Israeli expansionism were legitimate and that Arab statements calling for Israel’s annihilation were just words. In a statement passed at its meeting in August 1967 held at Heraklion, Crete, Greece, the WCC adopted a resolution stating that the present crisis has developed in part because the rest of the world has been insensitive to the fears of the people in the Middle East; the fears of people of the Arab nations because of the dynamism and possible expansion of Israel, and the fears of the people of Israel who have escaped from persecution on other continents only to be threatened, at least by word, with expulsion from their new home. The resolution went onto state, among other things, that "no nation should be allowed to keep or annexe the territory of another by armed force" and that "there can be neither reconcilitation nor significant development in the area unless, in the general settlement, a proper and permanent solution is found to the problem of Arab refugees, both old and new." Because of the war’s short duration, Christian publications in the U.S., which were published on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, were unable to respond in detail to events as they were happening; but when the war ended, magazines devoted substantial coverage to the war and its aftermath. The coverage and commentary revolved around several issues, including Arab rejectionism and its impact on the prospects for peace, the plight of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. As time passed, however, coverage of Arab rejectionism gave way to commentary that subjected Israel, Zionism, and Judaism to close scrutiny while portraying Arab intentions toward Israel in a benign manner. Arab Rejectionism and Prospects for Peace Christian Century addressed the issue of Arab rejectionism by suggesting Israel’s possession of territory previously held by Jordan and Egypt could be used by Israel as a bargaining chip to secure normal relations with its neighbors. The magazine went so far as to say that the war might have had a "healthful" effect:  Israel’s astounding military repulsion of threats from its Arab neighbors – whatever else may be said of it – has added a new, important, and potentially healthful dimension to the 20-year-old conflict between the two sides. Until now the Arab states have shouted a recalcitrant "Never" to all proposals that the quarrels between them and Israel be negotiated. They have refused to recognize Israel’s legitimacy as a state, have denied it innocent use of the Suez Canal, have precluded any settlement of the Arab refugee problems by refusing to enter into diplomatic relations with Israel ant have constantly threatened to annihilate Israel at a time of their own choosing. Until now the situation was one that kept Israel under constant pressure. Now that Israel has penetrated deeply into and controls vast areas of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the situation is reversed. The Arab states are under pressure, and their "Never" does not have the permanence it appeared to have a month ago. Now men who refused to talk must talk. But this new dimension in the Middle East situation shifts the burden for the procuring of peace from the Arab nations to Israel. … In a situation in which Israel has demonstrated its military superiority and has put its Arab neighbors under duress, it more than they has the responsibility of deciding whether June 1967 marked the beginning of peace in the Middle East. (June 21, 1967) Ultimately, the Christian Century’s assessment that Arab leaders would be more willing to negotiate as a result of their military loss proved to be incorrect, as was its insistence that Israel was somehow in the driver’s seat when it came to building "structures of permanent peace." Nevertheless, at this point the magazine clearly laid the blame for the conflict on Arab leaders. For example, in its July 26, 1967 issue devoted to the aftermath of the 1967 War,  the magazine published an editorial noting that normally vocal pro-Arab sources had been strangely silent after the magazine's post-war expression of support for Israel: A few letters, a few articles, but beyond that – silence. Perhaps this silence is an acknowledgement that in the present crisis the Arab world – Egypt and Nasser in particular – was guilty of fomenting and initiating the war in which it went down to humiliating defeat before Israel’s lightening strokes. … What can the Arab sympathizers say about this snip of history except to confess that their party planned and attempted to execute a ruthless war of extermination against Israel? On Aug. 2, 1967, Christian Century continued to scrutinize Arab attitudes toward Israel. In an editorial titled "King Hussein’s New Offensive," the magazine lauded King Hussein of Jordan for calling on the Arab world to accept Israel as a fact of life, but then criticized him for refusing to talk peace with Israel directly and for stating that the Arab world had no problem with Jews, just Zionists. The magazine forthrightly stated "His distinctions between Jews and Zionists may make some sense to American Jews, but it makes no sense at all to most Israeli Jews." In reference to Hussein’s call for peace without direct talks, the magazine stated "Israel will decide what Arab proposals are realistic, and it will not be those made by King Hussein." To be sure, there were other voices in the magazine that offered a different interpretation. For example, Cecil Northcott, an editor-at-large for Christian Century, emphasized Israel’s obligation to make peace with its attackers: Israel by her swift and skillful war, which to many seemed little short of aggressive action, won an advantage over her Arab neighbors and exposed their weakness and division. She is now faced with the task of living, for the time being, with the people she has defeated, and of establishing a new way of life in the Middle East. (Christian Century, August 23, 1967) Nevertheless, the magazine’s willingness to tolerate and even affirm the use of force in defense of Jewish sovereignty against a "ruthless war of extermination" stood as a marked counterpoint to the magazine’s previous attitude of indifference, and in some instances, hostility toward the Jewish people. As documented in Hertzel Fishman's American Protestantism and a Jewish State, the Christian Century had long exhibited a troubling enmity toward Jews. It had condemned Jewish efforts to maintain a distinctive identity, opposed Jewish efforts to obtain a sovereign state, and expressed contempt for Jewish support for America’s entry into World War II. Robert W. Ross, author of So It Was True, The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews, documents how Christian Century, even after acknowledging the Holocaust's atrocities, cast doubt on the reality of the gas chambers used to kill Jews. On May 30, 1945, for example, Christian Century published an article by James Morgan Read suggesting the gas chambers may have been intended to delouse prisoners, not kill them: Many of these camps were obviously fighting typhus epidemics and using fumigation chambers to delouse the prisoners as a preventive measure. The question is, "How many of these chambers represented genuine efforts to kill lice, and how many of them were flimsy excuses or even undisguised efforts to killpeople?" Court trials could establish such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. (Qtd. in Ross) It is noteworthy, then, that 22 years later the same magazine took Arab threats to destroy Israel seriously, and affirmed the use of force by the Jewish State to protect itself. Christianity and Crisis, a magazine founded by Reinhold Nieburh in 1941 in response to the isolationism espoused by Christian Century before America’s entrance into World War II, published two articles on the subject on June 26, 1967. The first, written by Nieburh himself, laid heavy emphasis on Arab rejectionism and portrayed the Six Day War as a conflict between the Israeli "David," with 2.5 million inhabitants, and "Goliath," represented, in Nieburh's words, by "the Arab world under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership, number a population of 20 to 40 million" which "never accepted Israel’s existence as a nation or granted it the right of survival." The second editorial, signed by John C. Bennett, chairman of the magazine’s editorial board, stated that while Israel "was threatened with extermination" before the war, Israel now has the obligation to end the conflict by working to solve the refugee problem. Now that Israel has the power and the initiative in the Middle East we hope that she will put her great gifts into creating something new in her relation with the Arabs. If this victory means increasing the number of Arab refugees by scores of thousands, she will lose much moral support. Any moves toward reconciliation will be difficult because hatred of Israel has for so long been fomented by Arab leaders. But it will not be enough to say of the old refugees or the new ones that they did not have to leave Israel or that they are used as an instrument of propaganda by the Arabs. Israel must assure many Arabs that they are welcome in Israel and offer compensation to others while she has the initiative while the situation is fluid. Refugees In the fall of 1967, the United Church Herald, a magazine published by the United Church of Christ, weighed in on the issue of refugees. The publication, had made no mention of Arab rejectionism in the months before the Six Day War but in an August 1967 editorial condemned Israel for its unwillingness to allow UN troops on its soil after the war, devoted six pages to the plight of Palestinian refugees in Jordan in its October issue. The author, A.C. Forrest, laid some blame for the suffering of the refugees on "unstable governments" and leaders in "Cairo and Jerusalem, Damascus and Amman who let these things happen year after year," and not just on Israel. Nevertheless, Forrest portrays Israel’s hardened attitude toward the refugees as the motivator for a future war. At one point, Forrest quotes without irony a nurse employed by the United Nations Work and Relief Agency, who says that "the Israelis are very good at frightening people they want to leave." This was written while the memory of incessant Arab threats against Israel and its citizens were still fresh in the minds of Israelis and the international community alike.   America and Christian Century also addressed the issue of refugees. In it's July 15, 1967 issue,America stated that the reasons behind the flight of refugees was "not the important question," and focused instead on their resolving their plight: The immediate and terrible fact is, however, that there are more refugees in the Middle East. Today, they are desperately in need of food, clothing and lodging. Tomorrow, they will become the core of a new and desperate political problem. No one could have watched and listened to the parade of speakers at the special session of the UN General Assembly in recent weeks and not realized that the plight of the Middle East’s million refugees is at the heart of the problem in the area. The Aug. 2, 1967 issue of Christian Century included an editorial stating that, "[b]y and large, the sympathies of Christian people have been with Israel in this conflict, and properly so. But we know now better way for Christians as individuals to aid Israel than by helping rescue the victims of the Middle East crisis." Jerusalem Christianity Today, a publication that served the evangelical community in the United States interpreted Israel’s capture of Jerusalem as an affirmation of biblical prophecies, and asked whether a Third Temple would be built on the Temple Mount. One piece, titled "War Sweeps the Bible Lands" and published on June 23, 1967, stated: For two thousand years, the Jews wandered on the face of the earth without a homeland because they had disobeyed God. … But in 1948 the new state of Israel came into being, and since then it has flourished. As Christ foretold, Jerusalem has been "trodden down by the Gentiles." While Christianity Today rejoiced over the return of Jerusalem to the Jews, it interpreted it largely in terms of Christian eschatology: The prophetic clock of God is ticking while history moves inexorably toward the final climax. And as that clock ticks, the Christian believer lifts his head high, for he knows that a glorious redemption draws near. Commentators and representatives from the Roman Catholic Church did not traffic in prophecy, but instead view Jerusalem with an eye toward its importance to the historical church. According to Banki, an article in L’Osservatore Romano, the Vatican Daily, argued that Israelis’ military victory had in no way reduced the importance of placing Jerusalem under international control. This was widely publicized in the world press and broadcast repeatedly, in several languages over Vatican Radio. On June 14, Msgr. Alberto Giovannetti, permanent observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, circulated a note on "Jerusalem and the Holy Places" to all 122 member delegations. Internationalization of "that city and its vicinity," the memorandum declared, was "the only solution" which offered sufficien protection of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Banki reports that the "Vatican appeal found some echo in the American Catholic press." For example, The Criterion, a Catholic newspaper published in Indianapolis stated on June 23 that "Jerusalem does not belong to the Israelis or to the Jordanians. It belongs to the world." The Jesuit-own America appeared somewhat tolerant to the idea of Israeli control of Jerusalem, publishing an editorial on July 8, 1967 stating that "If free access is the issue, then we cannot help wondering if the case for the internationalization of Jerusalem is as urgent today as it appeared to be in 1947." Christian Century addressed the issue in an editorial published on July 12, 1967 that called for Israel and Jordan to "devise a system by which a united city could be mutually administered and other nations were excluded from all control of Jerusalem." We understand Israel’s unwillingness to surrender any of the Arab lands it has captured until the Arab states acknowledge Israel’s existence, its legitimacy and its integrity as a state. … But we also believe that Israel’s unilateral annexation of Old Jerusalem plants depth charges that will be exploding for the next hundred years. A New Template Emerges As quotes from Arab leaders calling for Israel’s annihilation faded from memory, the coverage and commentary began to shift away from Arab rejectionism and Israeli vulnerability to Zionist culpability and Arab benifience. This shift was particularly evident in the Christian Century, which in 1968 began a process of whitewashing Arab enmity toward Israel and subjected Israel and Zionism to intense scrutiny. Emblematic of this process was an article that appeared the magazine’s April 3, 1968 issue. The article titled "The Arab Experience," was authored by Mounir R. Sa’adah. After affirming the virtues of Arab nationalism, Sa’adah stated that Arabs viewed Israel as … a maddened and dangerous fugitive who has taken refuge in the midst of Arabs against their will. Like any desperate creature, she strikes at friend and foe, lashes out against anyone who comes near because she is so sorely hurt. Israel is an anomaly: a materialist-collectivist society, a theocracy resting upon racism and triggered by arrogant nationalism. Hers are not new or original experiments in social organization. They have been tried in many times and lands and found tragically wanting. History makes no exceptions. Israel’s own inner contradictions might destroy her as a political community. Time is on the Arab side. They will seal up Israel in her frontiers, even if their seal must be an international police force supplied by the United Nations. Should their fears prove wrong, should Israel turn out after all to be a force for humanity, no harm will have been done to the Arab ring that surrounds it. Meanwhile, the Arabs will act as Islam bids them to: openly and vigorously. This benign interpretation of Arab nationalism in the pages of Christian Century was followed by a powerful expression of suspicion toward Jewish nationalism. On Sept. 18, 1968, the Christian Century published a piece by Alan R. Taylor, an associate professor at American University. Taylor portrayed Zionism as a malevolent force that destroyed the humanistic impulses of the Jewish people. A cutline beneath the title stated Taylor’s thesis thusly: "The Zionists’ elevation of the material over the spiritual deprives our age of a needed witness." In the piece, Taylor portrayed Theodor Herzl as a puppet master intent on manipulating the Jewish people. To buttress his case, Taylor cited a passage in Herzl’s journal in which he wrote: "I conduct the affairs of the Jews without their mandate." Taylor wrote: … Herzl constructed a hierarchical organization. The upper echelon, the "family council," was to be aware of the entire plan from the outset. A second echelon, established in Jewish centers throughout the world, would also be briefed on the general scheme after being sworn to secrecy. It would then be instructed to select a third echelon to which the plan of organized emigration would be revealed without, at first, any mention of a state. The Jewish masses were to manipulated by this elite organization and, once they had arrived in the territory of the projected state, they would be recruited into labor battalions along military lines, their training involving a nationalist indoctrination buttressed by patriotic songs and heroic plays. According to Taylor, the Zionist experiment (Israel) has "in general has risked putting up before the Jewish world an idealized image of the de-Judaized Jew." Later, Taylor wrote It would be indeed tragic if in our own time, when our vision of man in history so greatly needs strengthening and broadening, we were to witness the decline of humanism among a people who in past ages have made such notable contributions to that tradition. The piece prompted numerous critical letters to the editor, which appeared in the Oct. 23, 1968 issue of the magazine. One stated that "The Christian Century has lent itself to the proposition that most Jews do not understand the essential character of their own religious faith, and that it therefore falls on Christians like Alan Taylor to rescue the Jewish faith from the inimical influence of Zionist ideology. … In his lonely crusade to save Judaism from the Jews, Taylor is joined only by the Arabs, whose opposition to Zionism is now motivated by their determination to safeguard the humanist tradition of Jewish faith." The author of this letter then went onto characterize Taylor’s description of Zionism as inspired by the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." … what we have here is a piece of vile, unadulterated anti-Semitic slander. Anyone even remotely familiar with the history of Zionism knows that the Zionist congresses in Basel were held in the full and brutal glare of public attention. Indeed, Herzl insisted that the sessions be open to the press, because of his conviction that ultimately a Jewish state could come about only if it is "publicly secured" through legally valid international covenants … In response to the criticism the editors published in the same issue an editorial titled "To Zionists with Love." It reminded readers that "the editorial stance of the Century is not necessarily to be identified with the articles we publish" while at the same time asserting that charges of anti-Semitism were overblown and counter-productive. If it will serve any purpose, the Century is quite prepared once more to state its editorial support for the existence and national integrity of Israel, for the securing of Israel’s maritime rights, and for the rights of access to holy places. We also believe, however, that Israel’s retaliatory raids on Jordanian towns in late 1966 undermined the possibilities of peace accommodation with a relatively moderate King Hussein and played a part in igniting the June war of last year. The shift from support to suspicion toward Israel began to manifest itself in the pages of Americaas well. For example, in a review of The Six Day War by Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, commentator Peter J. Henriot said any book on the situation in the Middle East needs to ask just how militaristic is the present state of Israel? Admittedly, this seems and unfair, loaded question. But it is a query inevitably raised by the impact of TV interviews of Defense Minister Dayan, of boyish paratroopers, of ordinary Tel Aviv citizens. Prepared over nearly two decades for a life-death struggle for the homeland, stirred by glorious and tragic memories of the 1948 and 1956 campaigns, and flushed now with stunning victories, the Israeli leaders and people today are more military oriented than Jews have historically been since biblical times. Understandable as this may be, it nevertheless must be taken into account of any realistic appraisal of recent events. Unfortunately, the authors do not seriously examine this theme. The cycle was put in motion. In the coming years, Christian witness about the Arab-Israeli conflict would focus on Israel, not on the Arab enmity that fueled the conflict.     General References America: "Commitment to Israel," June 3, 1967; "The Six Day War," Peter J. Henriot, February 3, 1968; "Jerusalem's Holy Places," July 8, 1967. Christian Century: "Israel Annexes Old Jerusalem," July 12, 1967; "Israel's Finest Future," Cecil Northcott, August 23, 1967; "Israel's New Burden," June 21, 1967; "King Hussein's New Offensive," August 2, 1967; "The Arab Experience," Mounir R. Sa'adah, April 3, 1968; Letter to the Editor, Henry Siegman, October 23, 1968; "The Priority of Human Need in the Middle East," August 2, 1967; "Thunder Over Sinai," May 31, 1967; "To Zionists, with Love," October 9, 1968; "Wise Men in the Middle East," July 26, 1967; "Zionism and Jewish Humanism," Alan R. Taylor, September 18, 1968; "Nasser's Bluster Threatens World Peace," The Christian Century, June, 7, 1967. Christianity and Crisis, "Further Thoughts on the Middle East," John C. Bennett, June 26, 1967; "David and Goliath," Reinhold Niebuhr, June 26, 1967. "War Sweeps the Bible Lands," Christianity Today, June 23, 1967. "She Helped Change a Church's View of Jews," New York Times, Chris Hedges, July 29, 2004. United Church Herald: "A Tangled Tragedy," August 1967; "Homeless Over Jordan," A.C. Forrest, October 1967. Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis: New Agenda for Interreligious Dialogue, Judith Hershcopf Banki, American Jewish Committee, 1968. American Protestantism and a Jewish State, Hertzel Fishman,1973. The Arabists: The Romance of An American Elite, Robert D. Kaplan, 1993. So It was True, The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews, Robert W. Ross, 1980. "Statement on the Middle East," World Council of Churches Central Committee, adopted at Heraklion, Crete, Greece, at August 15-26, 1967 meeting.     Documents & Statements List of documents and statements:   Egyptian President Gamal Nasser announces blockade on Straits of Tiran Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol responds to Egyptian blockade United States President Lyndon B. Johnson response to Egyptian provocations Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan speaks after Israel liberates the Western Wall Levi Eshkol addresses Israeli control over Jerusalem Exchange of Letters Concerning Assistance to Refugees Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) Khartoum Resolutions — September 1, 1967     President Nasser announces blockade of Straits of Tiran Excerpt from a speech delivered by President Nasser to his troops in Sinai on May 23, 1967, announcing the new blockade: ... Yesterday the armed forces [of Egypt] occupied Sharm el-Sheikh. What does this mean? It is an affirmation of our rights, of our sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, which constitutes Egyptian territorial waters. Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jews threaten war. We say that they are welcome to war, we are ready for war, our armed forces, our people, all of us are ready for war, but under no circumstances shall we abandon our rights. These are our waters ... Prime Minister Eshkol Responds to blockade Excerpt from a speech delivered by Prime Minister Eshkol to the Knesset on May 23, 1967 after Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits of Tiran: This morning a statement by the Egyptian President was published declaring his intention to block the international waterway which passes through the Straits of Tiran and joins the Gulf of Eilat with the Red Sea to the passage of Israeli flagships and ships of other flags whose cargoes are of a strategic character. Members of the Knesset: Any inference with freedom of passage in the Gulf and the Straits constitutes a gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of other nations and an act of aggression against Israel. As the Knesset is aware, a number of Governments, including the major maritime Powers, have publicly stated, since 1957, their intention of exercising their rights to free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Eilat. During the past few days, the Government of Israel has been in close touch with the Governments that have proclaimed and exercised the principle of free passage in these waters since 1957. After these exchanges, I can say that international support for these rights is serious and widespread.   President Johnson Responds to Mideast tensions and Egyptian blockade   Excerpt from a speech delivered by President Johnson on May 23, 1967 after Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits of Tiran:   The danger, and it is a very grave danger, lies in some miscalculation arising from a misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of others. The Government of the United States is deeply concerned, in particular, with three potentially explosive aspects of the present confrontation. First, we regret that the General Armistice Agreements have failed to prevent warlike acts from the territory of one against another government or against civilians or territory under control of another government. Second, we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance. We intend to support its continuance with all possible vigor. Third, we deplore the recent build-up of military forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensitive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the Security Council, such as the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly important aspect of the situation. In this connection I want to add that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought a new and very grave dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free and innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community. Defense Minister Dayan speaks after Israel liberates the Western Wall  On June 7, 1967, the Israel Defence Forces liberated the Old City of Jerusalem and nineteen years of Jordanian rule came to an end. The Defence Minister, accompanied by the Chief of Staff and senior officers, arrived at the Western Wall at noon on that day. The Minister made the following statement: This morning, the Israel Defence Forces liberated Jerusalem. We have united Jerusalem, the divided capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our Holy Places, never to part from it again. To our Arab neighbours we extend, also at this hour - and with added emphasis at this hour - our hand in peace. And to our Christian and Muslim fellow citizens, we solemnly promise full religious freedom and rights. We did not come to Jerusalem for the sake of other peoples' Holy Places, and not to interfere with the adherents of other faiths, but in order to safeguard its entirety, and to live there together with others, in unity.     Prime Minister Eshkol's Address to the Spiritual Leaders of all communities in Jerusalem, June 7, 1967: Before proceeding to the Western Wall, the Prime Minister invited the Chief Rabbis and spiritual leaders of other communities to his office and read the following declaration: Honourable Chief Rabbis, Honourable Community Leaders: I have taken the liberty to call you to this meeting in order to enable you to share with me the news of the events taking place these last few days in Jerusalem, the Holy and Eternal City. On the Monday of this week, after the Egyptian aggression against Israel began, I announced in a radio broadcast that Israel would take no military action against any State that did not attack it. Despite this statement, the Government of Jordan - under Egyptian command - declared war upon the State of Israel and its forces and embarked upon hostile action by land and in the air. Our forces were compelled to take the necessary military steps in order to put an end to this aggression and to protect human lives. By its actions, the Government of Jordan, with the agreement of Egypt and following upon pressure from Cairo, violated international law, the United Nations Charter, and the neighbourly relations between our two countries. In its aggression Jordan made no distinction between civilians and soldiers. Crime was piled upon crime by Jordan when it carried war into Jerusalem, thus desecrating the eternal peace of this city, which has always been a source of hallowed inspiration to mankind. As a result of Jordanian aggression, dozens of people were killed and many hundreds were wounded. Blood was shed in the streets of Jerusalem and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dwellings were hit. There was shelling specifically directed at hospitals, synagogues, Yeshivoth, the President's residence, the Hebrew University, the Israel Museum and Government buildings. Likewise a large number of schools in the city were hit. The shelling continued uninterruptedly from Monday until today, Wednesday. Out of consideration for the sanctity of the city, and in accordance with our policy of avoiding casualties among the civilian population, we have abstained from any answering action inside the city, despite the casualties incurred by our soldiers and citizens. The criminal actions of Jordan's Government shall stand before the court of international opinion and before the judgement of history. Peace has now returned with our forces in control of all the city and its environs. You may rest assured that no harm whatsoever shall come to the places sacred to all religions. I have requested the Minister of Religious Affairs to get in touch with the religious leaders in the Old City in order to ensure regular contact between them and our forces, so as to make certain that the former may continue their spiritual activities unhindered. Following upon my request, the Minister of Religious Affairs has issued the following instructions: a) arrangements in connection with the Western Wall shall be determined by the Chief Rabbis of Israel; b) arrangements in connection with the Moslem Holy Places shall be made by a council of Moslem clerics; c) arrangements connected with the Christian Holy Places shall be made by a council of Christian clergy.With the aid of the Rock and Salvation of Israel, from Jerusalem, a symbol of peace for countless generations, from this Holy City now returned to its peace, I would like to have you join me in this call for peace among all the people of this area and of the whole world.   Exchange of letters consituting a provisional agreement1 between the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and Israel concerning assistance to Palestinian refugees. Jerusalem, June 14, 1967 1 Came into force on 14 June 1967 by the exchange of the said letters. MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS JERUSALEM, ISRAEL 14 June 1967 Dear Commissioner-General, I wish to refer to the conversations I have had with you and your colleagues within the last two days, and to confirm our agreement that, at the request of the Israel Government, UNRWA would continue its assistance to the Palestine refugees, with the full co-operation of the Israel authorities, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. For its part, the Israel Government will facilitate the task of UNRWA to the best of its ability, subject only to regulations or arrangements which may be necessitated by considerations of military security. On this understanding, we are prepared to agree in principle: (a) To ensure the protection and security of the personnel, installations and property of UNRWA; (b) To permit the free movement of UNRWA vehicles into, within and out of Israel and the areas in question; (c) To permit the international staff of the Agency to move in, out and within Israel and the areas in question; they will be provided with identity documents and any other passes which might be required; (d) To permit the local staff of the Agency to move within the areas in question under arrangements made or to be made with the military authorities; (e) To provide radio, telecommunications and landing facilities; (f) Pending a further supplementary agreement, to maintain the previously existing financial arrangements with the governmental authorities then responsible for the areas in question, concerning: (i) Exemptions from customs duties, taxes and charges on importation of supplies, goods and equipment; (ii) provision free of charge of warehousing, labour for offloading and handling, and transport by rail or road in the areas under our control; (iii) such other costs to the Agency as were previously met by the governmental authorities concerned. (g) To recognize that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946,1 to which Israel is a party, shall govern the relations between the Government and UNRWA in all that concerns UNRWA’s functions. The present letter and your acceptance in writing will be considered by the Government of Israel and by UNRWA as a provisional agreement which will remain in force until replaced or cancelled. I have the honour to be, Michael COMAY Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister and Ambassador-at-Large Dr. Lawrence Michelmore Commissioner-General United Nations Relief and Works Agency 1 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1, p. 15, and Vol. 90, p.327 (corrigendum to Vol. 1, p. 18). No. 8955 II UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST 14 June 1967 Your Excellency, I refer to your letter of to-day’s date, and wish to confirm that UNRWA is willing to continue its assistance to the Palestine refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas on the basis proposed in your letter. This will be subject to such further supplementary agreements as may be required, and to detailed arrangements which UNRWA representatives will make with the authorities in the two areas concerned. Naturally, this co-operation implies no commitment or position by UNRWA with regard to the status of any of the areas in question or of any instrument relating to them, but is concerned solely with the continuation of its humanitarian task. As I explained in our conversation, the facilities enumerated in paras. (a) to (g) of your letter are essential if the Agency is to operate effectively. For this reason I expect that such restrictions as may for the time being be placed on the full use of those facilities will be removed as soon as considerations of military security permit this. I agree that your letter and this reply constitute a provisional agreement between UNRWA and the Government of Israel, to remain in force until replaced or can celled. UNRWA’s agreement is subject to any relevant instructions or resolutions emanating from the United Nations. I have the honour to be, Yours faithfully, Lawrence MICHELMORE Commissioner-General His Excellency Michael Comay Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister of Israel and Ambassador-at-Large   Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSM-373-67) After the war, US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the relationship of land that had come under Israeli control to that country's security. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle G. Wheeler, replied on June 29, 1967: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense 1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 19 June 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without regard to political factors, on the minimum territory, in addition to that held on 4 June 1967, Israel might be justified in retaining in order to permit a more effective defense against possible conventional Arab attack and terrorist raids. 2. From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders. Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients, and provision of defense in-depth for important facilities and installations. More detailed discussions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto. In summary, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding these areas are as follows: a. The Jordanian West Bank. Control of the high ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan generally east of the main north-south highway along the axis Jenin-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then southeast to a junction with the Dead Sea at the Wadi el Daraja would provide Israel with a militarily defensible border. The envisioned defensive line would run just east of Jerusalem; however, provision could be made for internationalization of the city without significant detriment to Israel's defensive posture. b. Syrian Territory Contiguous to Israel. Israel is particularly sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Qnaitra about 15 miles inside the Syrian border, would give Israel contral of the terrain which Syria has used effectively in harassing the border area. c. The Jerusalem-Latrun Area. See subparagraph 2a, above. d. The Gaza Strip. By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel's military advantage. e. The Negev-Sinai Border. Except for retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja and some territory for the protection of the port of Eilat, discussed below, continued occupation of the Sinai would present Israel with problems outweighing any military gains. f. The Negev-Jordan-Aqaba-Strait of Tiran Area. Israel's objectives here would be innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of its port of Eilat. Israel could occupy Sharm ash-Shaykh with considerable inconvenience but could rely on some form of internationalization to secure free access to the gulf. Failing this, Israel would require key terrain in the Sinai to protect its use of the Strait of Tiran. Eilat, situated at the apex of Israel's narrow southern tip, is vulnerable to direct ground action from Egyptian territory. Israel would lessen the threat by retention of a portion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of the Wadi el Gerafi then east to an intersection with the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 29°20' north latitude. 3. It is emphasized that the above conclusions, in accordance with your terms of reference, are based solely on military considerations from the Israeli point of view. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Signed Earle G. Wheeler Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Appendix Discussion of Key Israeli Border Areas   1. The Jordanian West Bank a. Threat. The Jordan-Israeli border is 330 miles in length extending from the Gulf of Aqaba northward to the Dead Sea, thence following the armistice demarcation lines and the Jordan River northward to the Yarmuk River, thence along the Yarmuk River to the Syrian frontier. This border area has traditionally been lightly held by military forces and defenses consisted mainly of small, widely separated outposts and patrols and, therefore, afforded an area where launching of saboteurs and terrorists into Israel was relatively easy. During the period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 53 incidents of sabotage and mining activity took place along this border. These activities resulted in three killed, 35 wounded, and damage to houses, roads, bridges, railroads, and water and electric power installations in Israel. Instances of exchange of small arms fire occurred quite frequently. The majority of these events took place from the Mount Hebron and Aravah areas where the Jordanian authorities did not take sufficient measures to protect against line crosses and saboteurs. The high ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan overlooks Israel's narrow midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts. b. Requirement. A boundary along the commanding terrain overlooking the Jordan River from the west could provide a shorter defense line. However, as a minimum, lsrael would need a defense line generally along the axis Bardala-Tubas-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then to the northern part of the Dead Sea. This line would widen the narrow portion of Israel and provide additional terrain for the defense of Tel Aviv. It would provide additional buffer for the air base at Beersheba. In addition, this line would give a portion of the foothills to Israel and avoid inter- diction by artillery in the Israeli villages in the lowlands. This line would also provide a shorter defense line than the border of 4 June 1967 and would reduce the Jordanian salient into Israel. It also provides adequate lines of communications for lateral movement. 2. Syrian Territory Contiguous to lsrael a. Threat. The border between Syria and Israel extends approximately 43 miles. It extends from a point on the Lebanese-Syrian border east to the vicinity of Baniyas, south to Lake Tiberias, then south along the eastern shore of the lake to the Syrian-Jordanian border. During the period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 28 sabotage and terrorist acts occurred along this border. In addition, there were numerous shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking the area southeast of Lake Tiberias. Casualties were seven killed and 18 wounded. Control of the dominant terrain affords Syria a military route of approach into northern Israel; however, the greatest threat in this sector is from terrorism and sabotage. b. Requirement. Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the boundary of 4 June 1967 which overlooks the Galilee area. To provide a defense in-depth, lsrael would need a strip about 15 miles wide extending from the border of Lebanon to the border of Jordan. This line would provide protection for the Israeli villages on the east bank of Lake Tiberias but would make defending forces east of the lake vulnerable to a severing thrust from Jordan to the southern tip of the lake. The Israelis would probably decide to accept this risk. As a side effect, this line would give the Israelis control of approximately 25 miles of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. 3. The Jerusalem-Latrun Area a. Threat. These areas have been the scene of intermittent trouble over the years as both Jordanians and Israelis have been illegally cultivating lands in the areas between the lines. Only one serious incident occurred in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. b. Requirement. To defend the Jerusalem area would require that the boundary of Israel be positioned to the east of the city to provide for the organization of an adequate defensive position. On the other hand, if Jerusalem were to be internationalized under the United Nations, a boundary established west of the city could be defended in accordance with the concept in paragraph 1, above. 4. The Gaza Strip a. Threat. During the period 1949-1956, prior to the Suez war, numerous infiltrations and terrorist raids were mounted by Egypt from the Gaza Strip. However, with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957, based in the Gaza Strip and along the Sinai border, the situation has been quiet. Only three events of sabotage occurred in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. The Strip, under Egyptian control, provides a salient into Israel a little less than 30 miles long and from four to eight miles wide. It has served as a training area for the Palestine Liberation Army and, despite the few incidents arising in this area of late, it is significant to note that one of the first actions by the Israelis in the recent conflict was to seal off the area from the Sinai. b. Requirement. Occupation of the Strip by Israel would reduce the hostile border by a factor of five and eliminate a source for raids and training of the Palestine Liberation Army. 5. The Negev-Sinai Border a. Threat. This area has not presented any border problems since establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957. The demilitarized zone around Al Awja, containing the main north-south, east-west road junction in eastern Sinai and the major water source in the area, is the principal feature providing military advantage. b. Requirement. Except for an adjustment of a portion of the boundary tied to the defense of Eilat, discussed below, and retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja, no need is seen for Israeli retention of occupied territory in the Sinai. 6. The Negev-Jordan-Aqaba-Strait of Tiran Area a. Threat. There were only five incidents of sabotage in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. Israel's chief concern in this area is free access through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of Eilat, Israel's chief oil port and trade link with the West African countries. Eilat, being at the apex of Israel's southern tip, is vulnerable to interdiction from Egyptian territory. b. Requirement. To provide Israel with sufficient depth to protect the port, the boundary should be established approximately 20 miles to the west along the Wadi el-Gerafi, south to its headwaters, then east to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 39°20' north latitude. In the event an international guarantee for free passage of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba is not provided, Israel would feel compelled to occupy key terrain in order to control the entrance to the Strait. 7. See map on following page.   The Khartoum Resolutions September 1, 1967Eight Arab heads of state attended an Arab summit conference in Khartoum during August 29 - September 1, 1967. It formulated the Arab consensus that underlay the policies of most Arab states participating in the conflict until the early 1970's. The resolution adopted called for the continued struggle against Israel, the creation of a fund to assist the economics of Egypt and Jordan, the lifting of an Arab oil boycott against the West and a new agreement to end the war in Yemen. By adopting the dictum of no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel, the Arab states appeared to have slammed the door on any progress towards peace. TEXT: The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country. The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure. The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil. The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities. The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.    Suggested Reading Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran, Harvard University Press Hussein of Jordan: My War With Israel, King Hussein, Peter Owen Limited Warrior: An Autobiography, Ariel Sharon, Simon and Shuster The Arab-Israeli Wars, Chaim Herzog, Random House Arab-Israeli Wars, A.J. Barker, Hippocrene Books Chariots of the Desert, David Eshel, Brassey’s Six Days of War, Michael Oren, Oxford University Press Personal Witness, Abba Eban, Putnam Six Days in June, Eric Hammel, Scribner’s The Tanks of Tammuz, Shabtai Teveth, Viking Press The Illustrated Map of Jerusalem, Dan Bahat, 1989. Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Martin Gilbert, 1993. Freedom of Religion in Jerusalem, ed. Ruth Lapidot and Ora Ahimeir, 1999. Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974, Ed. Meron Medzini, 1976. Whose Jerusalem?, Terence Prittie, 1981. Jerusalem: An Archaeological Biography, Hershel Shanks, 1995.  Lightening Out of Israel, Associated Press, 1967 Transnational Broadcasting Studies, "Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs, and 'Sawt al-Arab' Radio," Laura M. James "The Making of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, David A. Korn, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 1948 – 1983, Clinton Bailey, Westview Press, 1984    Links U.S. Department of State: foreign relations documents relating to the Six-Day War   Jerusalem Post Six-Day War Supplement, 1997   "No Pyrrhic Victory," Bret Stephens, The Wall Street Journal "Prelude to the Six Days," Charles Krauthammer, May 18, 2007 "Did Israel Want the Six-Day War?," Michael B. Oren, May 15, 2007 (See Azure, Spring 1999 for a more detailed version of this article.)   "Q & A with Michael Oren," Jerusalem Post, June 5, 2007 "A Nation Under Siege," Time, June 9, 1967  Israel's Story in Maps — a collection of useful maps showing the changing boundaries of the Jewish state. "Error-Filled Advocacy Journalism Replaces Balanced Reporting on Settlements," CAMERA — an example of how some news stories stray from factual and objective reporting when discussing Israeli settlements.   Myths and Facts: Jerusalem, Eli Hertz   Forty Years of 'Occupation' Myths," Gerald Steinberg, June 1, 2007   Sixdaywar.co.uk "Arab armies planned to destroy Israel," Steve Linde, Jerusalem Post "The Six Day War: Exodus II," Brenda Gazzar, Jerusalem Post, June 6, 2007 — about the imprisonment and expulsion of Egyptian Jews in 1967.    Photos Click thumbnails for larger photos. Jerusalem Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Jerusalem Commander Uzinarkis enter through Lion’s gate into the Old City. -GPO 06/07/1967 Israeli paratroopers stand in front of the Western Wall in Jerusalem. -GPO 06/07/1967 Group of young Israelis dancing the Hora in front of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem after the unification of the Jerusalem . -GPO 07/02/1967 One of the paratroopers who took part in the battle for the Old City in Jerusalem celebrating his wedding in front of the Western Wall.  -GPO 06/09/1967 Israeli soldier near the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. -GPO 06/26/1967 Six Day War. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Jerusalem Commander Narkis underneath the street sign pointing to the Western Wall in Jerusalem. -GPO 06/07/1967 Chief of Staff Rabin and Aluf Ezer Weizman talking to soldiers in Jerusalem. -GPO 06/03/1967 Aerial view of Jerusalem in 1967.  -GPO 06/09/1967 Six Day War. IDF soldiers advancing over high ground in the Old City of Jerusalem. -GPO 06/05/1967 Six Day War. IDF soldier aiming his rifle at an Arab legion sniper position in Jerusalem. -GPO 06/05/1967 Six Day War. Israeli paratrooper unit advances through a deserted lane in the Old City of Jerusalem. -GPO 06/07/1967 Six Day War. Israeli paratroopers putting up the Israeli flag above the Western Wall in Jerusalem.  -GPO 06/07/1967 Northern Front One of the Syrian tanks in its fortified position at "Tawfik", dominating Kibbutz Tel Katzir and the settlements on the Sea of Galilee . -GPO 08/05/1967 Syrian tank in fortified position at "Hirbet Batin" above Ha'on on the Sea of Galilee. -GPO 08/05/1967 The Syrian "Amrat Az Adin" fortified position overlooking Kibbutz Ha'on on the Sea of Galilee. -GPO 08/05/1967 View of Kibbutz Daphna and Dan (in background) seen from the "Tel Azaziat" fortifications on the Syrian Heights.  -GPO 08/01/1967 View of Kibbutz Daphna and Moshav Shear Yashuv seen from the "Tel Azaziat" position on the Syrian Heights . -GPO 08/03/1967 View of the fish ponds of Kibbutz Daphna seen from the "Tel Azaziat" position on the Syrian Heights. -GPO 08/03/1967 House at Kibbutz Gadot damaged by Syrian shell fire.  -GPO 04/01/1967 Six Day War. A child’s stroller among the debris of a house at Kibbutz Tel Katzir demolished by Syrian shelling. -GPO 06/11/1967 A family in the living room of their house in Rosh Pina village damaged by Syrian shell fire. -GPO 6/5/67 Toddlers with their nurses outside the entrance to underground shelter at Kibbutz Nahal Oz. -GPO 5/29/1967 Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the kibbutz. -GPO 4/1/1967 One of the children in the shelter at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the kibbutz. -GPO 4/1/1967 Toddlers taking shelter during shelling of Kibbutz Tel Katzir from Syrian positions in Tawafiq. -GPO 1/1/67 Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the Kibbutz. -GPO 4/1/1967 Concrete wall facing direction of Syrian border protecting dining hall of Kibbutz Shamir  -GPO 1/1/1967 Israeli tanks climbing up a steep hill on the Golan Heights. -GPO 6/10/1967 Israeli tanks in the Golan Heights . 1967 Israeli army detachment stopping by the water pool at Banias Village on the Golan Heights. -GPO 06/11/1967 P.M. Levy Eshkol (Center) with senior staff officers during a visit to northern command headquarter.  -GPO 6/10/1967 Richard Nixon (Center) visiting Kibbutz Gadot which was under Syrian shell fire until the outbreak of the Six Day War. -GPO 6/24/1967