A Jewish Majority in the Land of Israel by Yakov Faitelson

The Resilient Jewish State
A Jewish Majority
in the Land of Israel
by Yakov Faitelson
Growth trends and population forecasts have played a significant role in the political
landscape of the Middle East, especially over the thorny question of Israel
and the disputed territories. The notion that the Jewish majority of Israel is in
danger of being swamped by Arab fertility has repeatedly been used as a political and
psychological weapon to extract territorial concessions from the Israeli government. In
September 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama referred to the so-called “hard realities
of demography” that threaten the survival of the Jewish state.1
Such a conclusion is wrong. Analysis of long-term demographic developments leads
to quite the opposite conclusion: In the long run, a strong Jewish majority, not only in the
state of Israel—as this author projected almost twenty-five years ago2 and the Israel Central
Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) recently reaffirmed3—but also in the Land of Israel,4 is
quite possible.
Yakov Faitelson is the author of Demographic
Trends in the Land of Israel, 1800-2007 (Israeli
Institute for Zionist Strategies, 2008).
MIDDLE EAST POPULATION
ANNUAL GROWTH
It is useful to analyze the processes among
world populations in general and in the Middle
East and the Arab world in particular. Such scrutiny
helps to determine whether demographic
trends within the Jewish and Arab population
groups living in the Land of Israel differ or resemble
the general tendencies observable within
the global population over the last sixty plus years,
the same general time frame as that of the state of
Israel.
Beginning in 1966, the annual population
growth in the Middle East rose consistently until
it peaked at 3.24 percent in 19805 when it began to
ebb—at a faster pace than in the developed
world.6 In the subsequent thirty-two years, the
Middle East population increase has gone down
1 NBC News, Sept. 23, 2010.
2 Dan Petreanu, “Demography: Men or Myth,” The Jerusalem
Post, Aug. 16, 1988, quoted in Yakov Faitelson, “‘Demography:
Men or Myth’ – 24 years later,” Apr. 4, 2012.
3 The Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2013.
4 The term “Land of Israel” is used here to denote the areas of
Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan River, namely, the territories
constituting the State of Israel as well as Judea and Samaria
(the “West Bank”) and the Gaza Strip.
5 “Annual Growth Rate Percent, Near East Countries, U.N.
Regions,” U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs, International
Data Base, accessed Mar. 12, 2013.
6 Dominique Tabutin and Bruno Schoumaker, “The Demography
of the Arab World and the Middle East from 1950 to the
2000s. A Survey of Changes and a Statistical Assessment,” Population,
2005/5-6, Institute de démographie, Université catholique
de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, pp. 505-615.
16 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
by more than a half to 1.45 percent in 2012 (see
Figure 1, this page).
During that same period, the annual growth
rate of the Jewish population in Israel was much
higher than in developed countries, largely due
to the ongoing repatriation of Jews from various
countries to Israel.7 For the same reason, the annual
increase of the Israeli Jewish population was,
for the most part, higher than the population in
less-developed countries. During the times of
mass immigration to Israel, the Jewish growth rate
was also significantly higher than the aggregated
growth rate of Middle Eastern countries.
Since 2003, the annual increase of Jewish Israelis
has grown steadily from 1.48 percent to 1.81
percent8 while the aggregated annual increase of
the Middle Eastern countries has decreased to
1.45 percent.
POPULATION CHANGES
AMONG ISRAELIS
After reaching its all-time peak of 2.89 percent
in 1951, the natural increase rate of Israeli
Jews began to decline, dropping to 1.07 percent
by 1995. This sharp decrease was due to the influx
of close to 600,000 Jews from the former Soviet
Union in 1990-95,9 which paradoxically lowered
the natural increase rate for the Jewish population
as it took approximately five years for the
new citizens to settle in properly and start families.
Thus, despite a lowered natural increase rate,
the Jewish population grew in total by 24 percent.
By 1995, the total fertility rate10 of these
new Israeli citizens increased, reaching 1.72 children
per woman (compared to 2.66 for native-born
Israelis), presumably due to their successful absorption
into the larger society as well as a con-
7 “Table 13: Jewish Population, by Sex and Age (1948, 1951,
1954, 1956),” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1956 (Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, [hereafter ICBS],
1956), p. 19; “Table B/13: Jewish Population, by Sex and Age
(1948-1965),” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1966 (ICBS, 1966),
p. 38.
8 “Table B/1: Population, by Population Group,” Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics, May 2013 (ICBS, June 6, 2013), p. 4.
Figure 1: Annual Increase of the World Population versus Israeli Jews, 1955-2012
9 Petra Nahmias, “Fertility behaviour of recent immigrants to
Israel: A comparative analysis of immigrants from Ethiopia and
the former Soviet Union,” Demographic Research, Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research, Mar. 17, 2004, pp. 83-120.
10 The average number of children that would be born alive to a
woman during her lifetime.
/ 17
tinued influx of others from the former Soviet
Union along with Ethiopian immigrants during the
1980s and 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the natural
increase rate of Israeli Jews has trended upward,
rising to 1.5 percent in 2010, increasing by 25.2
percent in one decade.11 The same natural increase
rate of Israeli Jews was also maintained in
2011 and 2012.12
At the same time, the trend for Israeli Arabs
has moved in the opposite direction. Having
reached a peak of 4.41 percent in 196413—a figure
significantly higher than that of the rest of the
Arab world (see Figure 2, this page)—the natural
increase rate of the Israeli Arabs declined by 37.2
percent from 1964 to 1987.14 Furthermore, while
the natural increase rate for Israeli Jews rose by
41.6 percent from 1995 to 2012, the Arab natural
increase rate declined during the same time by
30.6 percent, with the rate in 2012 at its lowest
level since 1955.
The main reason for such decline is the rapid
decrease in Arab birth rates from 36.4 births per
1,000 in 1998 to 24.7 births in 2012. While the Arab
mortality rate also dropped from 3.37 deaths per
1,000 in 1995 to 2.69 in 2010, it has risen to 2.78
deaths per 1,000 in 2012.
POPULATION AGE
STRUCTURE
These demographic developments have an
impact on the proportion of Israeli Jews versus
Israeli Arabs. As a result of declining fertility, significant
changes in the age structure of the Israeli
Arab population have taken place during the past
fifteen years. Figure 3 (see page 18) compares
Jewish Israelis to Arab Israelis by age group structure
and can help make better sense of both historical
and future trends.
For example, in 2000, the number of Israeli
Arabs born was 39,579 (including 34,667 Mus-
Figure 2: Natural Increase Arab World versus Israeli Arabs and Jews
11 Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2002 (ICBS, 2002), st3.02;
Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001 (ICBS, 2001), st3.01.
12 Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2012 (ICBS, 2012), st3.01;
“C. Vital Statistics,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics-February
2013 (ICBS, Mar. 7, 2013).
13 “Statistic Tables for Live and Death Rates by Population
Group,” Yearbook of Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1955-2010
(ICBS, 2010).
14 “World Development Indicators: Birth Rate, Crude,” World
Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed Mar. 7, 2013; “World Development
Indicators: Death Rate, Crude,” idem, accessed Mar. 7,
2013.
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
18 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
lims).15 By 2012, the number of Israeli Arab newborns
was 40,080 (35,730 Muslim).16 The number
of children born within the Jewish population rose
from 90,900 in 2000 to 125,492 in 2012 and in the
expanded Jewish population, which includes
Jews, any population not classified by religion,
and non-Arab Christians, from 94,327 to 130,460
in 2012. Thus the share of babies born to Jews
increased from 67.9 percent in 2000 to 73.6 percent
and of expanded Jewish population from 70.4
percent to 76.5 percent in 2012.
Taking a broader view, the number of Jewish
children in the 0-4 age cohort rose by 26.7 percent
while that of Arab children in this group rose by a
mere 1.9 percent.17 Thus, the share of Jewish toddlers
within the general population increased from
68.2 to 72.8 percent and of the expanded Jewish
population from 70.7 to 75.6 percent in 2012.
The shape of the age structure presented in
Figure 3 clearly shows that the younger the age,
the more the number of Jews increases while the
number of Arabs either decreases or remains
stable.
While in 2012 there were 81,600 21-year-old
Jews (86,300 expanded Jewish population), their
number steadily and continuously grew for the
younger ages: 125,492 Jewish babies (130,460 for
expanded Jewish population) born in 2012. By
contrast, there were 31,100 21-year-old Arabs and
40,080 newly born Arabs in 2012—a smaller relative
increase than their Jewish counterparts.
There were 98,100 Jews (or 2.38 per every
Arab) at the age of “9” when the Arab population
reached its peak for all ages—41,300 people. When
checking this proportion of each age group down
to age “0”, this ratio continuously increases, up to
3.13 Jews for every Arab at the “age 0” group.
The share of Jews among the “0” age group
reached 73.6 percent compared to the lowest
share of 67.4 percent at the age of “11.” The expanded
Jewish population among age group “0”
reached 76.5 percent (compared to the 70.4 percent
at the age of “11”), or 3.25 children for every
Arab child. Such developments started influencing
the Israeli education system because the share
of Hebrew education pupils among all pupils in
the first grade began increasing in the 2008-09
school year. Taking into account the numbers of
babies born in 2012, there will be at least 76.5
Figure 3: Israel Population Pyramid by Population Group, 2012
Source: ICBS Statistical Abstracts for Israel 2012, Table 2.19. Demographic Characteristics. Population by Population Group,
Religion, Sex and Age. ICBS Monthly Bulletin of Statistics - May 2013, C. Vital Statistics. Published 05/06/2013.
15 Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001, st2.18.
16 “C. Vital Statistics,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics-February
2013.
17 Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001, st02.20; Statistical
Abstracts of Israel, 2011 (ICBS, 2011), st02.21.
Jews
Muslims
Jews +
Arabs
/ 19
percent Hebrew-education first-grade pupils in
the 2018-19 school year. The addition of the children
of new immigrants (olim) will enhance this
proportion still further.
Another way to look at the population dynamics
of the two groups is to examine the other
end of the aging spectrum. Israel’s Jewish population
share of the 65+ age group was 88.5 percent
(91.8 percent for expanded Jewish population)
in 2012 versus 8.2 percent for the Arabs.
Taking into consideration that the 45-75 age group
of 2012 will belong to the 65+ age group of 2032,
the share of the Jews in this age group would
diminish to 81.7 percent (86.5 percent for expanded
Jewish population), while the share of Arabs
would increase to 13.5 percent, 64.8 percent larger
than it was in 2012. The share of the Israeli Muslims
at the 65+ age group will increase even more
drastically, by 75.5 percent, from 6 percent in 2012
to 10.5 percent in 2032. In other words, during the
last ten years, the share of Israeli Jews versus
Israeli Arabs within the overall young Israeli population
has increased, indicating that the Jewish
population has started to become younger while
the Israeli Arab population is getting older. With
existing life expectancies factored in, the natural
aging of Israeli Arab “baby boomers” will significantly
increase their mortality level over the next
two decades, causing an accelerating decline in
the overall Arab natural increase rate.
Continuation of current trends will result in a
convergence in 2025 of the natural increase rate
for Jews and Arabs in Israel. For the first time in
the modern history of the Land of Israel, the Arab
natural increase rate may not be higher but rather
equal to the natural increase rate of the Jews. Given
the possibility of continued Jewish immigration,
one can expect an intensification of the steadily
rising Jewish share of the total population of the
Land of Israel.
This trend becomes even more pronounced
when studying the population of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza, which until recently had been under
Israeli administration and is now either part of the
Palestinian Authority—dominated by the Palestine
Liberation Organization—or a quasi-independent
Hamas enclave.
Under the Israeli administration (1967-93), the
natural increase rate of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza Strip rose markedly from 2.52 percent in
1965 to peak at 4.21 percent in 1989.18 However,
Figure 4: Natural Increase Rate, Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza,
Israeli Arabs and Jews, 1960-2012
18 “Demographic Characteristics of the Arab Population in
Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, 1968-1993, #1025,” ICBS, July 1996,
p. 15.
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
Prepared by Yakov Faitelson. Source: World Bank Data Indicators, 2012; ICBS Statistical Abstracts for Israel.
20 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
over the next two decades, it declined noticeably
to 2.88 percent in 2012. (See Figure 2.)19 It appears
that the decline in the Palestinian natural
increase rate in Judea and Samaria is accelerating
even faster than among Israeli Arabs. (See Figure
4, page19.)
Combined with a massive emigration of Arab
youth from these territories, especially from Judea
and Samaria, the size of the younger age group will
be reduced and coincidentally, the elderly age cohort
of the population will increase, resulting in an
increased mortality rate in the near future. Following
these trends, the natural increase rate of Arabs
in Judea and Samaria will be decreasing even faster.
MIGRATION BALANCE
AND POPULATION
ANNUAL GROWTH
Any proper analysis of demographic developments
in the Land of Israel must take into account
the critical role of the migration balance.
Aliya—Jewish repatriation—has been a significant
factor in narrowing the difference between
Jewish and Arab natural increase rates. For example,
while in 1990, the natural increase rate for
Jews was equal to only 1.29 percent, their annual
growth, due to immigration, was 6.18 percent, more
than twice as high as the Arab natural increase
for that year. (See Figure 5, this page.)
From 2008 to 2011, Jewish immigration to Israel
rose 30 percent.20 An analysis of immigration
patterns reveals some surprising data about
the countries of origin of these émigrés and
points to future developments with important
consequences.
In 2010, Israel ranked 15 out of 169 on the
Human Development Index (HDI)—a comparative
measure used to rank countries by life expectancy,
education levels, and standard of living.
21 While about a million and a quarter Jews
Figure 5: Annual and Natural Increase of Population of State of Israel
by Population Group, 1952-2012
19 “World Development Indicators: Birth Rate, Crude,” World
Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed Mar. 7, 2013; “World Development
Indicators: Death Rate, Crude,” idem, accessed Mar. 7,
2013.
20 “Emigration and Tourism, Table E/2: Immigrants by Type of
Permit,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, ICBS, no. 11/2011, p.
143.
21 “Table 1: Human Development Index and Its Components,”
Human Development Report 2010, U.N. Development Programme,
New York, p. 143.
/ 21
live in twenty countries with an HDI lower than
Israel, another eight countries with significant
Jewish populations (about 6,500,000) have a
higher HDI than Israel.22
In 2000-10, 284,907 new immigrants moved
to Israel alongside 44,639 returning expatriates.23
Not surprisingly, about 87 percent of the newcomers
came from countries with an HDI lower
than Israel’s—59.4 percent of all repatriates came
from the former Soviet Union, 10.2 percent from
Ethiopia, and 4.1 percent from Argentina.24 Only
13.5 percent came from countries with a higher
HDI such as the United States or France. Yet in
the first ten months of 2011, the largest growth of
repatriation to Israel (compared to the previous
decade) came from countries with a higher HDI:
Their share of the total immigrant population more
than doubled. Twenty-nine percent of these immigrants
came from eight developed countries,
14.6 percent from the United States and 10.3 percent
from France.
It may very well be that a combination of
factors contributed to this change. The recent
world economic crisis may be one. According to
Reuters: “Employees of universities and researchers
are among the biggest sufferers of economic
slowdown in the United States … As a result,
universities are cutting their budgets and staff,
and many researchers are going home.”25
The other likely contributor is a rising wave
of anti-Semitism, especially in Western Europe.
According to Benjamin Jacobs, Holland’s chief
rabbi, “the future for Dutch Jewry is moving to
Israel.”26 Relentless harassment in the south
Swedish city of Malmö has driven most of its
Jewish population out of the city, or even the
country.27 Recent years also have seen increasing
numbers of Jews moving to Israel from France
and the United Kingdom. There have been reports
of Muslims assaulting Jews in Norway and
Denmark and stone-tossing Arabs driving Jewish
dancers from a stage in Germany.28 A recent
poll found that 38 percent of Muslim youth in
Austria agree that “Hitler had done a lot of good
for the people.”29
A spring 2008 survey by the Pew Research
Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project finds
46% of the Spanish rating
Jews unfavorably.
More than a third of
Russians (34%) and
Poles (36%) echo this
view. Somewhat fewer,
but still significant
numbers of the Germans
(25%) and French
(20%) interviewed also
express negative opinions
of Jews. These percentages
are all higher
than obtained in comparable
Pew surveys taken in recent years. In a
number of countries, the increase has been especially
notable between 2006 and 2008.30
This situation has brought increasing numbers
of Jews to Israel. According to data from
2012 published by the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant
Absorption, the majority of olim continued
to come from Europe (10,088, 49.4 percent of all
immigrants), and the numbers rose by 30 percent
in 2008-12.
The immigration from France with 1,923 individuals
(9.4 percent of all immigrants) in 2012 remained
steadily in third place from Europe after
Russia (3,566, 17.5 percent of all immigrants) and
Ukraine (2,100, 10.3 percent). Former USSR countries
accounted for 35.9 percent of all immigrants
to Israel in 2012. From 2008 through 2012, repa-
A rising wave of
anti-Semitism,
especially in
Western Europe,
has brought
increasing
numbers of
Jews to Israel.
22 Sergio DellaPergola, Jewish Demographic Policies: Population
Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora (Jerusalem:
The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2011), p. 61.
23 “Immigrants by Type of Visa,” Statistical Abstracts of
Israel, 2011, st04.03.
24 “Immigrants, by Period of Immigration, Country of Birth
and Last Country of Residence,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel,
2011, st04.04.
25 Ynet News (Tel Aviv), Jan. 22, 2012.
26 “Interview with Holland’s Chief Rabbi: Dutch Anti-
Semitism,” Arutz Sheva (Beit El and Petah Tikva), July 4, 2010.
27 YNet News, May 21, 2013.
28 Fox News, June 24, 2010.
29 David J. Rusin, “The Slow-Motion Exodus of European
Jews,” FrontPage Magazine (Sherman Oaks, Calif.), Jan. 7,
2011.
30 “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in
Europe,” PEW Research Center Project, Sept. 17, 2008.
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
22 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
triation from Russia rose by 32.4 percent and from
Ukraine even more, by 58.9 percent.
A significant number of immigrants came from
the United Kingdom (641, 3.1 percent). Repatriation
from Scandinavian countries rose by 65.8
percent and from Italy by 161.9 percent; the increase
from Holland was 22.2 percent and from
Belgium, 24.6 percent. However, the most impressive
growth of immigration
during these four
years came from Spain, by
232.1 percent.31
If these conditions
persist, Israel may experience
a substantial aliya
wave into the near future,
including an influx of
skilled professionals, a
welcome addition to
Israel’s fast developing
economy. The recent discoveries
of huge gas deposits
create an enormous momentum for the Israeli
economy that is bound to change the geopolitical
situation in the Middle East.
Many Israeli expatriates may also seriously
consider returning to the Jewish state. During the
years 2000-10, the number of returning Israelis
was 21.3 percent higher than the previous decade.
These developments would lead to a further
increase in the annual growth of the Jewish
population.
Of equal importance are emigration trends of
the Arab population that began long before the
1967 Six-Day War. Demographer Justin McCarthy
has estimated that about 200,000 Arabs emigrated
from Judea and Samaria between 1949 and 1967.
“After 1948, Palestinian high fertility and the limited
economic potential of the land led to outmigration.
The West Bank, in particular, had sizable
out-migration from 1948 to 1967… emigration
was now large-scale and directed mainly to
the Arab world.” Migration rates from Gaza were
much lower because until the 1960s, the Egyptian
government, which controlled the territory, restricted
emigration.32
According to Mustafa Khawaja, director of
the Jerusalem Statistical Department of the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS): “The
net balance of arrivals and departures for the West
Bank in the period 1967 to the present has been
consistently negative, with an average of about
10,000 leaving annually … The main reason for
migration by Palestinians relates to the economic
factors resulting from the political instability and
the infighting between the Palestinian parties.”33
This view is supported by journalist Khaled Abu
Toameh who wrote in August 2002:
Approximately 80,000 Palestinians have left
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the
beginning of the year (a rise of 50 percent compared
to last year), a senior Palestinian Authority
official said Monday. The official …
told The Jerusalem Post another 50,000 Palestinians
are now trying to leave through the
Jordan River bridges and the Rafah border
crossing [between Gaza and Egypt].34
Two years later, Egyptian journalist Bissan
Edwan stated that “according to Jordan[ian] statistics,
at least 150,000 Palestinians left the West
Bank during the intifada years from 2000 to 2002
and did not return,” concluding that the economic
situation in the Palestinian Authority territories
could lead to new waves of emigration. She also
dismissed the myth of a demographic time-bomb
by noting that net Jewish migration offset the
higher Palestinian natural increase and that better
access to birth control lowered Palestinian fertility
rates.35 The impact of out-migration was further
reinforced by a 2006 poll published by An-
Najah University in Nablus, which found that
Palestiniansupplied
growth
projections are
seriously flawed
with doublecounting,
inflated
birth numbers, and
deaths not counted.
31 “Statistics,” Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Tel Aviv,
accessed June 17, 2013.
32 Justin McCarthy, “Palestine’s Population during the Ottoman
and the British Mandate Periods: Migration,”
PalestineRemembered.com, Sept. 8, 2001.
33 Mustafa Khawaja, “Highly-skilled into, through and from the
southern and eastern Mediterranean and sub Saharan Africa. The
Case of Palestine,” Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies
and the European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole,
Italy, 2010, p. 8.
34 The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 26, 2002.
35 Bissan Edwan, “al-Qanbala ad-Dymoghrafiah fi Israil wa-
Khidaal-Nafs,” Apr. 16, 2004.
/ 23
“one in three Palestinians wanted
to emigrate. The 1,350 people surveyed
in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip cited dire economic conditions
as the first reason, followed
by lawlessness, political deadlock,
and fears of civil war.”36
Arab emigration from Judea
and Samaria increased even more
in 2007-09. During the first seven
months of 2008, the Jordanian-
Palestinian border crossing point
located near the Karame bridge
registered a negative migration
balance of 63,386 people while
in the first eight months of 2009,
there was reported a negative
migration balance of 44,000
people.37
World Bank figures also indicated
a decrease in the size of
the Palestinian population, by
0.45 percent in 2009 and by 0.37
percent in 2010.38 Thus, in 2009-10, the negative
migration balance was higher than the natural increase
of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria,
and the Gaza Strip.
POPULATION PROJECTIONS
FOR THE LAND OF ISRAEL
It is a well-documented fact that Palestinian
population figures as well as Palestinian-supplied
growth projections are seriously flawed, rife with
double-counting, presumed (and unsubstantiated)
mass immigration, inflated birth numbers,
and deaths not counted.39 Considering those issues
alongside the emigration trends should lead
policymakers in Israel and abroad to a more nuanced
view of demographic projections and decisions
based upon them.
Consider the PCBS’ 2001 annual Statistical
Abstract of Palestine.40 According to its projection,
the Arab population in the Palestinian-administered
territories would amount to 4,077,981
people in 2005, then increase to 5,027,580 in 2010,
to 5,354,988 in 2012, and finally to 6,632,439 in
2020. In fact, at the end of 2005, the actual PCBS
population estimate was lower by 315,976 persons
than the PCBS projection published just four
years earlier.41
In December 2006, the PCBS proclaimed that
the “Palestinian population and the Jewish population
[east of the Jordan river] will be equal in 2010
36 Reuters, Nov. 22, 2006.
37 Khawaja, “The Case of Palestine,” p. 3.
38 “Population Growth (annual %): West Bank and Gaza,”
World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed June 7, 2013.
39 Bennet Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise,
“The Million Person Gap. The Arab Population in the West
Bank and Gaza,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 65,
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University,
Ramat Gan, Feb. 2006.
These Ethiopian Jews now call Israel home. Doomsday
predictions about the demographics of Israeli Jews disregard
the hard facts: Jewish population rates are rising due to a
number of factors including immigration from the former Soviet
Union and from Ethiopia. Beginning in 1996, the natural
increase rate of Israeli Jews has trended upwards, increasing
by 25 percent in one decade.
40 “Palestinians in the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and
Gaza Strip): 3.2 Population,” Statistical Abstract of Palestine,
No. 2, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter, PCBS),
Ramallah; “Table 3.2.1: Projected Population in the Palestinian
Territory in the End Year by Region, 1997-2024,” PCBS, Nov.
2001, p. 470.
41 Annual Report for 2005, Population and Demography, Health
Status in Palestine 2005 (Ramallah: Ministry of Health-Palestinian
Health Information Center, Oct. 2006), p. 1.
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
24 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
… the Palestinian population will increase to 5.7
million in mid-2010.”42 The reality was different: At
the end of 2010, the PCBS issued a press release
claiming that there were actually 4,108,631 Arabs
in Palestinian-administered territories,43 918,949
less than it had projected in 2001. Similarly, a PCBS
press release on December 31, 2012, estimated the
Arab population at 4.4 million,44 a number smaller
by 955,000 than it had previously predicted.
The recent PCBS projection made at the end
of 2012 stated that “the number of Palestinians in
historical Palestine will total 7.2 million compared
to 6.9 million Jews by the end of 2020.”45 According
to the recent Israel Central
Bureau of Statistics
projection, there will be
about 1.9 million Israeli Arabs
in 2020. Reducing this
figure from the PCBS projection
for all Arab population
in historical Palestine
in 2020 gives 5.3 million Arabs
in Palestinian-administered
territories. This estimate
is 1,362,439 less than
projected by PCBS in 2001.
But projections from
Palestinian sources are not
the only forecasts that
need to be adjusted. In
October 2007, this author
prepared a demographic
projection of the Israeli
population based on observable
trends since the
founding of the Jewish
state.46 The resulting numbers,
12,805,000 persons in
2050, fell somewhere between
two U.N. population projections—
11,942,000 using the high forecast variant and
13,064,000 using the constant fertility rate
variant.47
The author’s projection was based on certain
assumptions: That just as in each of the last
42 “Palestinians at the End of Year 2006,” PCBS, Dec. 2006, p.
11.
43 “Palestinians at the End of 2010: Table 2: Estimated Number
of Palestinians in the Palestinian Territory by Status and Region,”
PCBS, Dec. 30, 2010, p. 34.
44 “Palestinians at the End of 2012,” PCBS, Dec. 2012, p. 1.
45 Ibid., p. 3.
46 Yakov Faitelson, “The Demographic Forecasts for the Population
of the Land of Israel and the Reality (1898-2005),” Proceedings
of the Fifteenth Annual International Conference on Jewish
Studies, Part 1: State of Israel, 60 Years of History (Moscow:
Moscow Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization
“Sefer,” Institute for Slavic Studies, 2008), p. 68; idem, “Demographic
Trends in the Land of Israel (1800-2007), accessed Mar. 7,
2013, p. 47-70; idem, Table 1: Comparison of Forecasts for
Citizens of the State of Israel up until 2050, “Demographic
Forecast Scenarios until 2050,” The Institute for Zionist Strategies,
Jerusalem, 2008.
47 High-fertility assumption: Under the high variant, fertility is
projected to remain .5 children above the fertility in the medium
variant over most of the projection period. That is, countries
reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children per woman in the medium
variant have a total fertility of 2.35 children per woman in
the high variant at the end of the projection period. Constantfertility
assumption: fertility remains constant at the level estimated
for 2000-05.
Oday Aboushi (center) is the first Palestinian-American player in
the National Football League. Palestinian Arabs have flocked to
the United States. A 2006 poll published by Nablus’ an-Najah
University found that “one in three Palestinians wanted to
emigrate,” and massive emigration of Arab youth from Judea and
Samaria has accelerated the decline in the natural increase rate of
Arabs within the Land of Israel.
/ 25
120 years, the annual growth of the Jewish
population would consist of natural
increase as well as immigration. Some
of the predictions, however, proved to
be far more conservative than what actually
transpired. For example, in 2003-
10, average annual growth was 14.7 percent
higher than originally estimated.48
The 2007 report had also predicted that
the natural increase rate of the Arab citizens
of Israel would continue diminishing
in the future. In fact, the natural increase
rate of Israeli Arabs was 2.2 percent
in 2012, 21.1 percent lower than assumed
in 2007. In sum, based on the new
data, the share of the Jewish population
in Israel is expected to decrease to
its lowest point of 79.2 percent in 2015,
but starting in 2024 may begin to rise up
to 81.8 percent of the total population
in 2050 and to 83.2 percent by 2059.
Further, it is reasonable to conclude
that an existing trend of growing natural
increase in the Jewish non-ultra-Orthodox population
will continue. This will likely be augmented
by a positive migration balance since the majority
of Jews living in the Diaspora are not ultra-
Orthodox (Haredim).49
There were apparently no Haredim among
the immigrants from the former Soviet Union and
just 4.5 percent of these declared themselves as
religious. There were only 7.2 percent of Haredim
and 14.8 percent of religious people among immigrants
from Europe and the United States. Just
3.1 percent of immigrants from Asia and Africa
declared themselves as Haredi and 26.4 percent
declared themselves as religious. All in all, the
Haredi share of 2012 immigrants could be estimated
at 3.6 percent and of religious people at
10.4 percent.
This would be accompanied by an accelerating
decline in the natural increase among the
Haredi population. According to ICBS, the total
fertility rate (TFR) of the Haredim has declined by
14.3 percent in just six years from 7.62 children
per woman in 2003 to 6.53 children per woman in
2009, back to the level that existed twenty-five
years before in the middle of the 1980s.50 At the
same time, the TFR of secular women rose by 8.9
percent from 1.90 children per woman in 2003 to
2.07 in 2009.
Likewise, from the beginning of the twentyfirst
century the TFR of Israeli Muslims decreased
considerably, from 4.7 in 2000 to 3.5 children
per woman in 2011.51 The TFR of all Arabs
decreased still further to 3.3 children per woman,
48 Faitelson, “Demographic Trends in the Land of Israel (1800-
2007),” accessed Mar. 7, 2013, p. 50-3.
49 According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the ICBS
in 2009, 8 percent of Israeli Jews defined themselves as Haredi, 12
percent as religious, 13 percent as traditional religious, 25 percent
as less traditional religious, 27 percent as not so religious, and 18
percent as nonreligious. See Seker hevrati 2009. Pirsum mispar
1433. B. mimtsaim ikariim. a. datiyut umeafienim demografiim
uhevratiim kalkaliim beisrael (bnei 20 umala), ICBS Social
Survey 2009, no. 1433, Jerusalem, Apr. 2011, p. 13.
50 Ahmad Hleihel, “Fertility among Jewish and Muslim Women
in Israel by Level of Religiosity, 1979-2009,” ICBS, Working
Paper Series, no. 60, June 2011, pp. 32-4.
51 Ibid., p. 15; “Fertility rates, Average Age of Mother and Sex
Ratio at Birth, by selected characteristics of the mother. Muslims.
2011,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, Table 3.14.
From 1995 to 2010, Israel’s Arab population’s natural
increase rate decreased by 26 percent. Its live birth
rate has simultaneously fallen, despite a concurrent
drop in the mortality rate. What this means is that the
Jewish population has started to become younger
while the Israeli Arab population will become older.
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
26 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2013
very close to the 3.09 for Jews born in Israel.52
In November 2011, a new comprehensive ICBS
projection was published in which the government
office admitted that in the past it had overestimated
Israeli Arab fertility and underestimated
Jewish fertility.53
An updated version of the author’s 2007
projections for the population of the State of
Israel (extended from 2050 to 2059) appears in
Figure 6. (See this page). The numbers are presented
side by side with the ICBS’s second and
third scenario projections.
According to the author’s forecast prepared
in 2007, the Arab population in Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza Strip would reach 2,496,000 in 2050.
Extending the forecast for nine more years, this
population could reach 2,761,500 people. Combined
with the estimated population of the State
of Israel, the total population of the Land of Israel
would comprise some 19,487,000 people in
2059.
Based on these estimates, the expanded
Jewish population share would be 83.19 percent
of the population of the State of Israel and 71.4
percent of the total population of the Land of
Israel in 2059.
CONCLUSIONS
Population growth for the Land of Israel at
the end of the second decade of the twenty-first
century will be influenced by the Arab and Jewish
natural increase rates reaching a convergence
point based on similar live birth and mortality rates.
It will also likely be influenced by continued Jewish
immigration, including a new, possibly strong
wave in the near future following the prolonged
world economic crisis and manifestations of rising
anti-Semitism around the globe. Repatriation
will also be encouraged if the Israeli economy
continues to be strong in the near future, an increased
likelihood based in part on the huge gas
and shale oil fields recently discovered in Israel.
The share of Jews in the total population of the
Land of Israel may also increase as a result of
continued Arab emigration that may include Israeli
Arabs as well. According to the results of the
first-ever survey on political-social attitudes of
Arab youth in Israel, conducted by the Baladna
Association for Arab Youth and the Mada al-
Carmel Arab Center for Applied Social Research,
both in Haifa, 25 percent of the Arab youth in
Israel want to emigrate.54
Every country has a natural and objective
carrying capacity limit for the population living
on its territory and, in this respect, Israel is no
different than any other. With that in mind,
52 “Fertility rates, Average Age of Mother and Sex Ratio at
Birth, by selected characteristics of the mother. Israeli born. 2011,”
Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, Table 3.14.
53 Ari Paltiel, Michell Spulker, Irene Kornilenko, and Martin
Maldonado, “Tahaziot Haukhlusiyah le-Yisrael Letvah Arokh:
2009-2059,” Demography and Census Dept., Jerusalem, Nov.
30, 2011. 54 Ynet News, Apr. 22, 2004.
g j
Population
Group
ICBS 2011 Projection for State of Israel Yakov Faitelson
2nd Scenario 3rd Scenario* 2011 Projection
People % of
Total People % of
Total People % of
Total
Jews,
expanded 14,283,000 83.63 15,964,800 85.10 13,913,723 83.19
Jews,
expanded,
excluding
Haredim
9,953,600 58.28 9,953,600 53.06 9,647,993 57.69
Haredim 4,329,400 25.35 6,011,200 32.04 4,265,730 25.50
Arabs 2,796,000 16.37 2,796,000 14.90 2,811,754 16.81
TOTAL: 17,079,000 100 18,760,800 100 16,725,477 100
* The third ICBS scenario is based on the high estimate for non-Haredi and Haredi populations and low estimate for the Arabs.
Figure 6: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and Faitelson Projections for 2059
/ 27
demographic projections can and should be used
as a tool for planning by the state as well as by
municipalities to avoid mistakes that can damage
vital infrastructure and public services, such as
health, education, and welfare systems. Ignoring
the impressive demographic changes of the last
twenty years in Israel has produced heavy burdens
on Israel’s health system due to a lack of
hospital beds and a scarcity of medical personnel.
55 Overpopulated classrooms and a lack of
qualified teachers is another such consequence.56
Faitelson: Israel’s Demographics
55 “The Physician Shortage in Israel,” Israeli Medical Association,
Tel Aviv, May 2011.
56 Karen L. Berman, “Israel Must Overhaul Education System,”
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Mar. 29, 2012.
Similarly, lower than necessary construction
starts in the residential sector is causing pain
for young couples.57
Developing proper demographic policies
can be important tools for planning national security
needs to assure internal order and the
security of the state’s borders. Jerusalem must
bear in mind that without developing such a professional,
comprehensive, and long-term demographic
policy, it will be very difficult to reach
the vital goals of assuring a stable and secure
future for generations to come.
No Mixed-sex Shopping for Saudis
Authorities in Saudi Arabia have ordered shops that employ both men and women to build
separation walls to enforce segregation, local media reported on Monday.
The order was issued by Labor Minister Adel Faqih and was verified by Abdullatif al-
Sheikh, the head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,
commonly known as “Mutawa” or religious police.
The new rule states that a separation barrier, no shorter than 1.6 meters, should be
erected to divide men and women in the workplace.
Authorities have been focused on promoting the kingdom’s conservative rules in the
country’s shopping malls.
On June 2011, Saudi Arabia required lingerie shops to replace their salesmen, mostly of
Asian origin, with Saudi saleswomen. This directive was later extended to cosmetic outlets.
Women complained that they feel uncomfortable buying personal items from males, predicating
the initiative.
The labor ministry said the decision to employ women in lingerie shops should create
some 44,000 jobs for Saudi women. The unemployment rate among women stands at 30
percent according to official figures.
In December, the head of the religious police accused the labor ministry of failing to
promote a safe work environment for women in the country as many have complained of
harassment.