The Six Day War was a war between Israel and her neighboring countries - Egypt, Syria and Jordan - which was conducted from June 5th until June 10th 1967

Six Day War

The Six Day War was a war between Israel and her neighboring countries - Egypt, Syria and Jordan - which was conducted from June 5th until June 10th 1967. The tensions between Israel and the Arab countries intensified from the mid 1960's due to multiple terrorist attacks and infiltrations of Palestinian terrorists from Syria, Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula into Israeli territory. These actions were motivated by the support of the Arab countries. The tensions were increased by Syrian shelling of Israeli settlements in the Hulah Valley, as well as Israeli and Syrian planning of projects for the diversion of water sources. 

On April 6th 1967, an aerial incident between Israel and Syria took place, in which 6 Syrian MiGs were intercepted. Syria filed a complaint to its ally Egypt for not fulfilling its military agreement signed in November 1966 and coming to Syria's assistance. Egypt notified that it will not tolerate an Israeli action against Syria and its army's state of alert was raised. Vast amounts of tanks and infantry units were stationed along the Egyptian-Israeli border. Their Soviet allies encouraged these actions, while statements made by Israeli leaders in May were interpreted by the Russians and Arabs as threats made towards Syria. Egypt demanded that the United Nations' Emergency Force abandon its stations across the border, from the Straits of Tiran, and from all Egyptian territories. The United Nations met their demands. 

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran on May 21st and 22nd to all shipping from and to Eilat; the area was open to Israeli ships under UN supervision since 1957, and Israel repeatedly stated that such a blockade will be considered as casus belli (justification for acts of war). The United States and several other countries declared that the Straits of Tiran are an international passage and they must remain clear for a safe passage of all ships. No actual steps were taken on these remarks, and Egypt proclaimed that any attempt to break their blockade on the Straits would be considered an act of war. 

Nasser, in an intentional provocation, asked Israel to open in war, declared that Egypt is strong enough to be victorious, and threatened to destroy Israel. Other Arab leaders made similar aggressive speeches as well and military pacts were signed between Egypt and Jordan (on May 30th) and between Egypt and Iraq (on June 4th). The supply of Soviet weaponry to Arab states was also increased. 

In the early morning of June 5th 1967, the war broke out. Israel made a preemptive strike on the Egyptian Air Force: The Air Force attacked all military airports in Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, destroying hundreds of aircrafts and neutralizing the Egyptian Air Force. The same day, Jordanian forces began bombing and attacking from the air from across the borders agreed in the Ceasefire Agreements (of 1949). Israel warned King Hussein to refrain from fighting but he relented and the Jordanian military conquered the UN Headquarters (formerly the residence of the British High Commissioner). The Israeli Air Force also acted against the Jordanian Air Force. Throughout these hours, Syria continued to shell Israeli settlements; Syrian airports were attacked and most of the Syrian aircrafts were destroyed. On the first day of fighting, Israel obtained absolute aerial control; however, this information remained almost completely unknown to the public at the time. 

Simultaneously, IDF forces progressed within the Sinai Peninsula towards Rafah and el-Arish in the north, Abu Ageila and Bir Gafgafa in the center, and el-Qusseima in the south. After running into difficulties in the Abu Ageila region, the area was conquered by a combined force of the Paratroopers Brigade and the infantry corps, armored forces and a combat engineering force, assisted by the Air Force. Bitter fighting took place on the outskirts of Gaza on the night between June 5th and 6th. The Israeli Armored Forces stormed forward, accompanied by aerial support. The Egyptian withdrawal turned on the eve of June 6th to an actual defeat: Sharm el- Sheikh, from which the Egyptian army operated the blockade on the Straits of Tiran, was conquered from the sea. 

In addition to the attacks on the Jordanian Air Forces, Israel sent military reinforcement to Jerusalem, retrieving on June 5th the control over the UN Headquarters and succeeding to connect with Mount Scopus at the north of the city, which was an Israeli enclave within Jordan since 1949. Specific orders were given in order to minimize the physical damage that might be caused to the holy places in the Old City. Ultimately, after 36 hours of combat, Israel succeeded to take control over the roads leading to the Old City and East Jerusalem. The conquest of the Old City was completed on June 7th, and IDF forces were able to reach the Western Wall and raise the Israeli flag on its premises. Heavy fighting took place in Jenin, Northern Samaria and Qalqilyah and its surroundings, from which long-range artillery was fired at Tel Aviv. 

By the end of the third day of fighting, Israeli forces completed the conquest of the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal and most of the West Bank. At this time, following several days of bargaining, the UN's Security Council called for a ceasefire, to which Israel was the first to agree. On June 8th, Lebanon had officially joined the war, but did not take an active part other than sending in a couple of planes. Syria continued its shelling on Israeli settlements and made a failed attempt to conquer Kibbutz Dan. Following the Syrian dismissal of a ceasefire, the IDF concentrated forces to storm Syrian posts en-route the Golan Heights. A wide strip of the Golan Heights, including Mount Hermona and the city of Quneitra, was conquered after 20 hours of fierce fighting near Kibbutz Dan. A ceasefire on the Syrian border was established on June 10th. 

The war ended with an evident Israeli victory. Over 4,000 Arab aircrafts were destroyed, 60 intercepted while airborne; over 500 tanks were destroyed or looted; some 70% of the heavy machinery used by Egypt, Syria and Jordan – at a total worth of over one billion dollars, were put out of use. More than 15,000 Egyptians were killed during the war and 5,600 were taken as prisoners. Jordan, according to King Hussein, had 6,000 casualties (other sources give various smaller numbers). Syria suffered some 1,000 losses. Israel had more than 700 casualties and 2,500 injured. 

Israel was tripled in its size after the war and gained sovereignty over an Arab population of approximately one million citizens (in addition to 300,000 Israeli Arabs living in Israel at the time). The public was in great spirits and had a sense of power, caused by the swift victory and the capturing of the Old City. This was in great contrast to the anxiety and confusion felt during the weeks prior to the war.

Immediate Drift

In the spring of 1967, tensions between Syria and Israel ran high, with flashpoints including terrorist raids against Israel originating from Syria and the Syrian diversion of water from the Jordan River. Following an attack on the water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be hit, and then fire back. The plan went into effect accordingly and resulted in a large-scale dogfight on April 7 over Syrian skies, in which the Israeli Air Force shot down several Syrian planes. In the next month, Fatah, the Palestinian terrorist organization, launched more than a dozen attacks on Israel and planted mines and explosives on Israel's borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. On May 5, violence escalated as Palestinian fighters shelled Kibbutz Manara. All the while, Israel continued with its forays into the demilitarized zones and Israel launched a diplomatic campaign to set the groundwork for retaliation.

An Israeli appeal to United Nations Secretary General U Thant led to unprecedented UN censure of the Arabs. On May 11, U Thant condemned the Arab attacks; but a proposed Security Council debate on the matter was derailed by Soviet obstructionism. The United States, meanwhile, refused Israel's request for tanks and jets and suggested that its naval fleet in the region would remain neutral in case of war. Israeli statements about answering Syrian aggression were reported in the international press and goaded additional Syrian backing of Fatah operations.

Soviet Meddling
In mid-May, Soviet meddling severely escalated the brewing conflict. On May 15, Israel Independence Day, plans for a parade involving large numbers of Israeli troops in western Jerusalem drew outrage in Arab countries. Wishing to defuse the situation, Eshkol forbade bringing heavy weapons into the capital. This decision was used by the Soviets to stoke tensions; on May 15, Anwar al-Sadat, then speaker of the National Assembly, visited Moscow, where he was warned (falsely) by the Soviets that Israel was planning to invade Syria sometime between the dates of May 16 and May 22. The Soviets cited the absence of weapons in the Jerusalem parade as proof that the Israelis were preparing for war and falsely claimed that Israel was massing brigades along its norther border with Syria. Syria also quickly passed the disinformation to Egypt's President Nasser, who on May 14 declared a state of emergency and made a show of parading his troops through Cairo on their way to Sinai. During this period, Arab leaders and the media spoke daily of eliminating Israel. (See here for examples.)

Claims of Israeli Troop Buildup Debunked, But Evidence Ignored
On May 14, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of the general staff, visited Damascus and toured the Syrian border with Israel, where he saw no Israeli troop buildup. Fawzi's findings, which were confirmed by the chief of Egypt's military intelligence, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and the CIA, were shared with Nasser, who nevertheless decided to proceed in his menacing troop buildups.

In response to the Egyptian troop buildup, Eshkol put the army on a first-level alert and authorized the placement of several tank companies in the south. Reluctant to send a message that Israel was eager for war, he did not call up the reservists. Israeli diplomats went into service on all fronts — inviting UN Observer Odd Bull to the north to confirm troops were not gathered there, seeking to relay to Egypt that Israel was not interested in war, and sending international warnings about the gravity of Egypt's actions.

Between the nights of May 15 and 16, the Egyptian and Palestinian troop presence in the Sinai tripled. On May 17, Egyptian planes entered Israeli airspace to carry out an unprecedented reconnaissance of Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona, prompting the Israelis to heighten the alert of their army and airforce. Syria announced that its forces were deployed in the Golan Heights. Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin called up 18,000 troops and ordered the laying of mines along parts of the Egyptian border. General Murtagi, the Egyptian Commander of forces in the Sinai, declared an Order of the Day, which was broadcasted on Cairo Radio May 18: "The Egyptian forces have taken up positions in accordance with our predetermined plans. The morale of our armed forces is very high, for this is the day they have so long been waiting for, for this holy war."

Egypt Evicts UN Forces
In the evening of May 16, Egypt presented the United Nations Emergency Force, which had been deployed in the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip to discourage hostilities between Egypt and Israel, with a demand to withdraw from key locations. Without consulting with the General Assembly, as required by a commitment made in the UN in 1957, UN Secretary General U Thant decided to withdraw all of the UN forces. By May 19, UNEF officers relinquished their posts to the Egyptians and the Palestine Liberation Army.

The Americans again rebuffed Israeli diplomatic appeals, refusing to approve any preemptive actions, provide assurances regarding Israeli security or transfer tanks and jets Israel had requested. Efforts to obtain from France and the United Kingdom expressions of support for Israel's security similarly failed. By May 20, Israel had called up 80,000 reservists.

Straits of Tiran Closed
On May 22, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping for the first time since the 1956 war, an act of war under international law. (Israel had long made clear that blocking the Israeli port of Eilat was cause for war.) Nasser's decision to close the strait set off activity across the Arab world. Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all activated their militaries. Iraqi troops reportedly approached the Syrian and Jordanian borders while Jordan moved tanks towards the West Bank.

U.S. Rejects Israeli Appeals
Up north, the Syrians blocked UN observers from reaching a critical road and began pouring troops into Golan Heights. At that point, the Israelis received a message from President Lyndon Johnson stating that they should not initiate fire or take any action without first consulting with the United States. Eshkol therefore argued against entering into war at that time, and on May 23 the government agreed to accept an American proposal in which the U.S. would weigh the possibility a multinational escort of Israeli ships through Tiran. (In the wake of the 1956 war, the United States had committed itself to guaranteeing Israel's access to the Straits of Tiran.) That night, Chief of Staff Rabin, suffering from anxiety, pressure, exhaustion, depression and perhaps nicotine poisoning, secretly withdrew from his duties for a two day period. His operations chief, Ezer Weizman, filled in for him and expanded upon Rabin's limited war plan with a more aggressive plan called Operation Axe.

However, Eshkol did not approve the operation, as foreign minister Abba Eban was in the middle of what proved to be an unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in France, Britain and the United States, where he asked for an American commitment that any attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the U.S. Although Johnson had condemned the blocking of Tiran as "illegal" and "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace," and sent word to Egypt that its aggression would meet "gravest international consequences," he nevertheless held firm in his opposition to unilateral Israeli action. The French and Soviets also warned Israel against starting a war.

Operation Dawn
Egyptian Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, a one-time close confidant of Nasser whose growing power eventually came to threaten the president, was largely able to wrest control of the country's armed forces from the Supreme Headquarters. He developed a war plan, called "Dawn," whose goal — capturing the whole Negev desert — far exceeded the more limited plan to isolate Eilat and bomb specified targets. Nasser didn't intervene with Amer's orders, despite the fact that they wrought chaos among the poorly-equipped troops pouring into Sinai, and contradicted Egypt's longstanding three-pronged defense strategy, dubbed "Conqueror."

In a tense meeting of Israeli leadership, Eshkol agreed to call up the remaining reservists, though he and Rabin again decided against going to war in favor of waiting for positive results to Eban's ongoing diplomacy trip. In France, Eban received a stern warning from Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to refrain from attacking Egypt. Britain's response was less hostile and included promises to try to bring an end to the blockade.

The American Role
Starting on May 24, the U.S., for its part, attempted to sell the Israelis on the "Regatta" plan, which involved an international convoy affirming free passage through the Straits of Tiran. Within two days, international enthusiasm for the plan waned, but the Americans withheld this discouraging information from the Israelis.


A headline in the June 10, 1967 New York Times refers to pre-war delays to allow for diplomatic activity.
Furthermore, the plan to ensure free passage seemed irrelevant by May 25, when Eban, then in Washington, received a cable from Jerusalem emphasizing that Israel faced an existential danger. "An all-out Egyptian-Syrian attack is imminent and could occur at any moment," it read. Eban, however, at times downplayed the Egyptian threat in discussions with American statesmen, much to the consternation of his colleagues in Israel. Perhaps soothed by Eban, Washington initially stalled on providing any direct guarantees or commitments, and continued to promise progress regarding an international convoy. Johnson appears to have hoped that, by stringing the Israelis along, he could buy time to either solve the situation via the United Nations or possibly convince the Israelis to agree to the placement of UNEF on their territory, an unthinkable option to Israel. On May 26, Eban met with Johnson, who said the U.S. "will support a plan to use any or all measures to open the straits." At the same time, Johnson continued to warn against Israel taking preemptive action.

Eban returned to Israel and joined a strongly polarized Cabinet debate about whether or not to strike preemptively. During the meeting, communications from Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk reiterated the American commitment to opening the Straits as well as U.S. opposition to an Israeli attack. The Israelis decided to keep their army mobilized but to hold off on war so as to give the Americans an opportunity to work their diplomacy.

The strain on the Israeli leadership was tremendous. A May 28 radio address, in which an exhausted Eshkol bumbled through a speech about the choice to rely on American diplomacy, left the nation in a state of panic. The army had been biding time until Eban's return, developing various contingency plans, but keeping everything on hold, resulting in confused troop movements in the Negev desert. Concerned about the deteriorating situation, army commanders were furious at the government's decision to withhold from war. The public responded similarly, expressing impatience for formation of a national unity government and preparing itself for war.

The Soviet Position
In Moscow, the Egyptians sought to clarify the Soviet position in case of war, and like the Israelis vis-a-vis the United States, received an ambiguous response. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed Nasser about a cable sent from Washington containing a warning of an imminent Egyptian attack and urged Nasser not to strike. As a result, Operation Dawn was called off. Although some in the Soviet Union had urged caution, Shams Badran, the Egyptian defense minister, returned from Moscow with the message that the Soviets would stand by the Egyptians in battle.

The Defense Pact
Gilbert map
Arab troops mass on Israel's borders. (Click to enlarge. Source: Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict)
On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in which Egypt gained joint command of the Jordanian army. Iraq joined a military alliance with Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In the context of the pact, Jordan permitted the reopening of PLO offices in Amman and essentially relinquished control of its army to the Egyptians, who transferred two Egyptian battalions to Jordanian territory. By this point, Israel was surrounded by some 500,000 troops, more than 5,000 tanks, and almost 1,000 fighter planes.

Alarmed by this development and succumbing to public pressure, Eshkol stepped down as defense minister on June 1 and named popular war hero Moshe Dayan as a replacement, which buoyed public spirit. Eshkol also formed a national unity government, appointing Menachem Begin minister without portfolio.

In the first several of days of June, the Israeli government began to receive signals from the Americans that the U.S. no longer opposed a preemptive strike, and Dayan oversaw final preparations of Israel's war plan.

Arab Preparations
As for the Egyptians, their troops continued to pour into Sinai. Despite some disorganization, shortages and exhaustion among his forces, Nasser was sure of victory. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the control of Egyptian General 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad, were largely spread out across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more strategically important locales. Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem by attacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the fighting. As for Syria, it failed to coordinate with Egypt despite their defense pact. Like the Jordanians, the Syrians adopted ambitious war plans, opting for an offensive operation as opposed to a more limited plan to fend off Israeli attacks on the Golan Heights. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia all sent troops to the Sinai. With the Arab nations united like never before, Arab oil companies pledged to boycott any country that supported Israel and Nasser threatened to close the Suez Canal. The Soviets, too, lent a hand of support by way of 10 warships which arrived in the eastern Mediterranean.

Israel Decides 
In addition, Israel received word from France, the nation's major arms supplier, that De Gaulle had issued a complete ban on weapons sales and transfers to Israel. And in a June 4 meeting, the newly formed Cabinet, received a cable from President Johnson seeming to contradict the earlier American softening on the issue of preemption. It warned that "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone." Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in a 12-to-2 vote, opted for war, scheduled to begin early the next morning, Monday, June 5.


General References
Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, Dan Kurzman, 1998
Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael B. Oren, 2002
Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran, 1981


Arab Threats Against Israel

In the weeks leading up to the Six Day War, Arab leaders repeatedly threatened Israel with annihilation. Together with Egypt's ejection of United Nations forces, the closing of the Straits of Tiran, and the massing of troops on Israel's northern and southern borders, the fiery rhetoric created a state of existential fear in Israel.

Egypt 

"Our aim is the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim: the eradication of Israel." – President Nasser of Egypt, November 18, 1965 

"Brothers, it is our duty to prepare for the final battle in Palestine." – Nasser, Palestine Day, 1967 

"Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight . . . The mining of Sharm el Sheikh is a confrontation with Israel. Adopting this measure obligates us to be ready to embark on a general war with Israel." – Nasser, May 27, 1967 

"We will not accept any ... coexistence with Israel. ... Today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel .... The war with Israel is in effect since 1948." – Nasser, May 28, 1967 

"The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel . . . . to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations." – Nasser, May, 30, 1967 after signing a defense pact with Jordan's King Hussein 

"We are now ready to confront Israel .... The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, or the withdrawal of UNEF, but the ... aggression which took place in Palestine ... with the collaboration of Britain and the United States." – Nasser, June 2, 1967 

"Under terms of the military agreement signed with Jordan, Jordanian artillery co-ordinated with the forces of Egypt and Syria is in a position to cut Israel in two at Kalkilya, where Israeli territory between the Jordan armistice line and the Mediterranean Sea is only twelve kilometers wide ... ." – El Akhbar newspaper, Cairo, May 31, 1967 

Cairo Radio Statements:

May 19, 1967: "This is our chance Arabs, to deal Israel a mortal blow of annihilation, to blot out its entire presence in our holy land" 

May 22, 1967: "The Arab people is firmly resolved to wipe Israel off the map" 

May 25, 1967: "The Gulf of Aqaba, by the dictum of history and the protection of our soldiers, is Arab, Arab, Arab." 

May 25, 1967: "Millions of Arabs are ... preparing to blow up all of America's interests, all of America's installations, and your entire existence, America." 

May 27, 1967: "We challenge you, Eshkol, to try all your weapons. Put them to the test; they will spell Israel's death and annihilation." 

May 30, 1967: "With the closing of the Gulf of Akaba, Israel is faced with two alternatives either of which will destroy it; it will either be strangled to death by the Arab military and economic boycott, or it will perish by the fire of the Arab forces encompassing it from the South from the North and from the East." 

May 30, 1967: "The world will know that the Arabs are girded for battle as the fateful hour approaches." 

Jordan

"All of the Arab armies now surround Israel. The UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait. ... There is no difference between one Arab people and another, no difference between one Arab army and another." – King Hussein of Jordan, after signing the pact with Egypt May 30, 1967 

Iraq

"The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear – to wipe Israel off the map. We shall, God willing, meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa." – President Abdel Rahman Aref of Iraq, May 31, 1967 

Palestinians

"D-Day is approaching. The Arabs have waited 19 years for this and will not flinch from the war of liberation." – Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, May 27, 1967 

"This is a fight for the homeland – it is either us or the Israelis. There is no middle road. The Jews of Palestine will have to leave. We will facilitate their departure to their former homes. Any of the old Palestine Jewish population who survive may stay, but it is my impression that none of them will survive." – Shukairy, June 1, 1967 

"We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants and as for the survivors – if there are any – the boats are ready to deport them." –  Shukairy, June 1, 1967, speaking at a Friday sermon in Jerusalem 

Syria

Syria's forces are "ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united.... I as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." – Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad, May 20, 1967

"Our two brotherly countries have turned into one mobilized force. The withdrawal of the UN forces ... means 'make way, our forces are on their way to battle.'" – Foreign Minister Makhous on his return from Cairo

Others

"The freedom of the homeland will be completed by the destruction of the Zionist entity and the expulsion of the Americans and the British from the region." – Algerian Prime Minister Houari Boumedienne

"We want war. War is the only way to settle the problem of Israel. The Arabs are ready." – Yemeni Foreign Minister Salam

General References

1) Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Mitchell G. Bard, 2001
2) Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Martin Gilbert, 1993

3) Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael B. Oren, 2002