Israel - Recognition as a Jewish State

IN ORDER TO appreciate the essence of the claim

for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, it is helpful

to first dispel several myths that surround it. Three

propositions in particular tend to muddy the debate

and should be quickly dismissed as they detract from

more substantial and legitimate objections: (1) that

the claim seeks to affirm the objective of establishing

a Jewish theocracy, (2) that it is new or invented, and

(3) that it necessarily constitutes a repudiation of corresponding

Palestinian national rights.

Self-Determination, Not Theocracy

First, the term “Jewish state” is sometimes misunderstood

in the context of recognition claims as implying

an aspiration for a Jewish theocracy.8 This interpretation,

though sometimes raised by opponents of recognition,

is clearly not the meaning intended by its supporters.

9 As discussed in more detail below, the term

“Jewish” refers here to the national aspirations of the

Jewish people, not to Judaism in its religious sense.

Properly understood, the claim seeks no more and

no less than public recognition of the right of the Jewish

people to self-determination in a state of their own.

It may be preferable to adopt this kind of terminology

so as to avoid the potential for misunderstanding and

mischief when the shorter term, “Jewish state,” is used.

Even though the term “Jewish state” has no religious

connotation in this context, it denotes more

than a mere description of the state as having a Jewish

majority.10 It seeks to affirm the state both as an expression,

and as the legal and political guardian, of the collective

rights of the Jewish people. As such, the term

implies—in the spirit of national self-determination—

a public space in which the majority can give expression

to its collective identity, for example, by marking

Jewish holidays and cultural events and by giving preference

to Jewish immigration.11 It is in this sense that

the overwhelming majority of advocates for recognition

have employed the term.

In this respect, the demand for recognition is not

essentially different from the claims for collective rights advanced by many other peoples. The claim

itself is derived from the Jewish nation’s peoplehood

and their corresponding right to self-determination,

which they have realized in a nation-state of their

own. From an international perspective, its justification

is thus less associated with any unique Jewish biblical,

religious, or historical claims than with universal

moral and legal norms.

As a matter of international law, this assertion is

hardly controversial. Once the status of a group as a

“people” is accepted, their right to self-determination

is legally protected. The scope and content of this right

in any given situation, and the manner in which it is

balanced against competing rights, are often subject

to controversy.12 Yet the right itself as a legal principle

under both customary and treaty law is today overwhelmingly

accepted.13 Most significantly, the right is

enshrined in the first article of the two leading human

rights covenants—the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights14 and the International Covenant

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights15—both of

which affirm that “all peoples have the right to selfdetermination”

and to which the vast majority of states

are party.

It is generally accepted that the definition of “people”

for the purpose of self-determination of an ethnic

or national group requires the fulfillment of both subjective

and objective criteria.16 Subjectively, the group

must perceive itself to be a people. Objectively, it must

possess a combination of common characteristics such

as history, language, religion, and culture.

That the Jewish people meet these criteria is overwhelmingly

accepted,17 despite the somewhat exceptional

relationship between Jewish religion and Jewish

peoplehood.18 The vast majority of Jews certainly

conceive of themselves as a people and, as shall be discussed

shortly, this status constituted a key rationale

for international support for Israel’s establishment.

It follows that while objections may be raised to the

manner in which Jewish self-determination is exercised

or to the manner in which it is balanced against 

competing claims and rights, neither of these arguments

undermines the essential legitimacy of the right

to Jewish self-determination itself.

A New Claim?

Though the demand for recognition of Israel’s Jewish

character is sometimes portrayed as a new ploy to

complicate negotiations,19 the claim is at least as old

as Zionism itself. Indeed, one could well argue that it

predates Zionism by many centuries, given the historical

longing of the Jewish people to reconstitute a sovereign

entity in their ancient homeland.20

Admittedly, calls for explicit recognition of Israel

as a Jewish state were less common historically. But

this is largely because they were viewed as less necessary,

not less important. Support for Zionism was

essentially synonymous with support for Jewish selfdetermination,

thus obviating the perceived need for

recognition in the specific form now sought by Israel.

Recognition of Israel, especially in the years following

the Holocaust and the 1947 UN partition resolution21

(which expressly called for the establishment of two

states—one Jewish and one Arab), was generally considered

identical to recognizing the right of the Jewish

people to self-determination in a sovereign state.

Still, even from the earliest days of the Zionist

enterprise, leaders of the Zionist movement called for

international recognition of Israel’s Jewish character.

Some salient examples merit attention.

Naturally, the Zionist movement itself was founded

on the pursuit of international support and recognition

for a Jewish homeland. The Zionist program,

adopted at the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897,

specified that the “aim of Zionism is to create for the

Jewish people a home in Palestine, secured by public

law.” To attain that objective, it was necessary, inter

alia, to adopt “preparatory steps for the procuring of

such government assents as are necessary.”22

In the decades that followed, Zionist leaders

labored assiduously, against the objections of both

Arab representatives and some Jewish activists, to

attain recognition not merely for the establishment of

a state in Palestine to which Jews could immigrate, but

for international acknowledgment of its character as

a Jewish homeland.23 As shall be discussed in the following

passages, specific recognition of the legitimacy

of a Jewish national homeland in documents such as

the Balfour Declaration (1917), the League of Nations

Mandate for Palestine (1922), the Peel Commission

Report (1937), and, of course, the General Assembly

partition resolution (1947) is, at least in part, the product

of these efforts.

The success of the Zionist project was thus grounded

not just in the realization of Jewish self-determination

in practice, but in acquiring legitimacy for it internationally,

if not from neighboring Arab states then at

least from the broader international community. The

Zionists attained recognition for the idea that the Jewish

people, exiled and persecuted for generations, were

entitled like other peoples to collective national rights,

and it is this recognition that paved the way for Israel’s

subsequent international acceptance.

With the establishment of Israel, its expectation

for recognition was regarded as flowing from—in the

words of its Declaration of Independence—“the right

of the Jewish people to establish their independent

State.” There was never any question in the minds of

the founders of Israel that they were establishing a Jewish

state and would seek recognition for it as such. The

Declaration of Independence itself proclaimed the

establishment of the “Jewish State of Palestine, to be

called Israel” and appealed to the United Nations to

“assist the Jewish people in the building of its State and

to admit Israel into the family of nations.”24 The name

“Israel,” taken itself from the Hebrew Bible,25 was simply

the title chosen for the Jewish state that the Zionist

movement had advocated and the international community

had endorsed.26

In seeking international recognition of its statehood,

the connection between recognizing Israel and

recognizing Jewish collective rights was thus never in

doubt. To mention but one example, in Israel’s formal

application for UN membership, Moshe Shertok (later

Sharett), acting as foreign minister of the provisional

government, drew the Security Council’s attention to

Israel’s establishment “by virtue of the natural and historic

right of the Jewish people to independence in its

own sovereign state” and argued that Israel’s admission

to the UN “would constitute an act of international

justice to the Jewish people.”27

The change in recent years, therefore, has not come

in Israel’s demand to be viewed as the national homeland

of the Jewish people, but in increasing criticism

of the legitimacy of such a claim. With the discernible

rise in efforts to delegitimize Israel as a Jewish nation state, recognition of Israeli sovereignty is no longer

necessarily seen as equivalent to recognition of the

Jewish right to self-determination. A peculiar alignment

of traditional Middle East rejectionist forces

(e.g., Hamas, Hizballah, Iran) and an assortment of

Western, pro-Palestinian groups, human rights activists,

and grassroots organizations has mounted a challenge

that is increasingly directed not just against some

of Israel’s policies, but against its right to exist as a Jewish

homeland.28

Indeed, even some who do not question Israel’s

rights as a sovereign state have shown a growing

unease about the internal character of the state and

increased sympathy for the proposition that it should

be a “state of all its citizens” rather than a “Jewish

state,” on the questionable assumption that the two

definitions cannot be reconciled.29 The more intractable

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems, and the

more elusive the realization of Palestinian national

rights, the greater the discomfort some feel in maintaining

their support for Jewish self-determination in

a separate sovereign state.

Such criticism is advanced with particular force by

those who advocate a “one-state solution” to the conflict.

30 Under this view, the very idea of the nation state—

certainly in the Israeli-Palestinian context—is

considered anachronistic and at odds with ensuring

equal human rights for all individuals, refugees, and

minority groups. These rights, the argument goes, will

be better realized through the establishment of a bi-national or “neutral” state between the Jordan River and

the Mediterranean Sea.

Against this intensified questioning of the legitimacy

of Israel’s Jewish character, the corresponding

Israeli demand for recognition as a Jewish state has

become both more noticeable and more strident. Israeli

leaders and the mainstream Israeli public perceive calls

for a bi-national state, criticism of Israel as a “racist” or

an “apartheid” entity, the demand for a right of return

for Palestinian refugees, and demographic trends as

a direct threat to the Zionist enterprise and to the

continued realization of Jewish self-determination.

The Israeli establishment has responded by seeking

renewed public recognition and international legitimacy

for Jewish statehood, if not in isolation, then at

least in the context of establishing a Palestinian state.

In the past decade, Israeli prime ministers Ariel

Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and now Binyamin Netanyahu

have come to see recognition of Israel as the homeland

of the Jewish people as a central objective of the

nation’s foreign policy and a key component of any

future Israeli-Palestinian agreement. In the words of

Ariel Sharon before the UN General Assembly, there

can be “no compromise on the right of the state of

Israel to exist as a Jewish state.”31 Similarly, in the lead up

to the 2007 Annapolis conference, Prime Minister

Olmert repeatedly insisted on the importance of recognizing

Israel as a Jewish state, stating outright, “I do

not intend to compromise in any way over the issue of

the Jewish state. This will be a condition for our recognition

of a Palestinian state.”32

This is not a new demand. It is a reaction to the

sense that what was once largely self-evident is now

under threat. Israel’s leaders increasingly view the erosion

of Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish nation-state as a

challenge not just to national identity, but to national

security. In the eyes of recognition advocates, the physical

threat posed by Israel’s regional enemies has been

compounded by an assault on its raison d’être as a Jewish

homeland, potentially narrowing Israel’s capacity

to defend itself.33 In this context, bolstering support

for the continuing moral, legal, and political validity

of the Jewish people’s right to self-determination has

acquired significance within Israel not merely as an

aspiration, but as a component of the national defense.

ISRAEL Historical Overview

BEFORE EXAMINING potential objections to the recognition claim and the ways in which they might be addressed, it is important to review its often neglected diplomatic and negotiation history. Opponents

of recognition tend to portray this claim as bereft of international support or precedent. But it is not only inaccurate to view this claim as “new,” it is also misleading to ignore the fact that historically, despite largely consistent Arab and Palestinian opposition,

the claim has enjoyed relatively widespread

international acceptance.

Establishing the Jewish Nation-State

Even before political Zionism emerged in the late

nineteenth century, the idea of the Jewish people

regaining sovereignty in their historic homeland

attracted prominent international support.37 The concept

flourished in England, for example, long before

the birth of modern Zionism, particularly among

English Christian and political figures such as Oliver

Cromwell, Lord Shaftesbury, and Lord Palmerston.38

In 1799, as Napoleon’s army camped outside Acre on

the Mediterranean coast, he issued a proclamation

calling upon the Jewish people, as the “rightful heirs

of Palestine,” to establish an autonomous homeland

under French protection.39

Similarly, the idea of restoring Jewish sovereignty

was popular among a broad cross-section of early

Americans.40 America’s second president, John Adams,

spoke of his wish that Jews would reestablish “in Judea

an independent nation,”41 while Abraham Lincoln

expressed the view that “restoring the Jews to their

national home in Palestine…is a noble dream and one

shared by many Americans.”42

With the adoption of a political program at the

First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, the drive to

reconstitute Jewish national independence became

a central Zionist objective and enjoyed a remarkably

positive response from the community of nations.

Naturally, political interests played a strong role in this

response, especially in the turmoil of World War I, but

international actors regularly justified their support on

moral grounds.

Britain’s Balfour Declaration of October 31,

1917, is well known as the first political recognition

of Zionist aims by a Great Power. It was endorsed

publicly by France and Italy in 1918, followed by the

U.S. Congress in 1922, quite apart from the document’s

incorporation into the League of Nations

Mandate for Palestine.43 In the declaration, Foreign

Secretary Lord Balfour informed Baron Rothschild,

a leading figure in Britain’s Jewish community,

of the cabinet’s “declaration of sympathy with

Jewish Zionist aspirations,” according to which,

His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment

in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish

people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate

the achievement of this object, it being clearly

understood that nothing shall be done which would

prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-

Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and

political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.44

Considerable debate has ensued as to whether

the words “national home for the Jewish people”

can be viewed as equivalent to an expression of

support for Jewish statehood.45 While many in

Britain and beyond certainly understood the term

in this sense,46 the evidence is mixed.47 What is

clear is that the Balfour Declaration provided both

the opportunity and the legitimacy for increased

Jewish immigration to Palestine in the years following

the First World War. Together with subsequent

developments, the declaration thus paved

the way for the establishment of a Jewish majority

in Palestine, which in turn sought—and ultimately

acquired—international recognition for Jewish

self-determination in a sovereign state.48

Whatever the ambiguities surrounding the Balfour

Declaration, its incorporation into the League

of Nations Mandate for Palestine gave far-reaching

political and legal support to the Zionist objective

of Jewish self-determination. Official endorsement

of the Balfour Declaration by the Allied Powers

of World War I was first attained at the San Remo

Conference of April 1920, which was convened to

determine the future of the territories of the defeated

Ottoman Empire under the League of Nations mandate

system. In the San Remo Resolution, the parties

agreed to entrust a mandatory power in Palestine with

the responsibility of “putting into effect” the terms of

the Balfour Declaration.49

This position was formally adopted in the terms

of the British Mandate for Palestine confirmed by

the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922.50

In a number of ways, the Palestine Mandate actually

enhanced the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The

Mandate not only called on Britain, as mandatory

power, to place Palestine under such “political, administrative

and economic conditions as will secure the

establishment of the Jewish national home,” but its preamble

also stated explicitly that

recognition has thereby been given to the historical

connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the

grounds for reconstituting their national home in that

country [emphasis added].51

To enable the implementation of the Mandate, and

without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of

all inhabitants, the mandatory power was required to

take several steps, including facilitating Jewish immigration

and encouraging “close settlement by Jews on

the land”; enacting a nationality law so that Jews with

permanent residence in Palestine could acquire Palestinian

citizenship; and establishing Hebrew as one of

the official languages of Palestine.52

The result of the Palestine Mandate was thus not

only to give enhanced international recognition to the

Jewish claim for statehood, and not only to create conditions

for it to be realized, but to transform the goal

of establishing a Jewish homeland from a policy preference

into an international legal obligation.

This international commitment to the Zionist

cause, as expressed in the Mandate, was sorely tested

by vocal and violent Arab opposition. With few notable

exceptions,53 Arab leaders rejected the very idea of

Jewish self-determination in Palestine and denied the

legality of the Mandate. The ensuing violence between

Arab and Jewish residents of Mandate Palestine and

changing geopolitical considerations prompted moves

to reconsider or repudiate the commitment to Jewish

statehood, as exemplified by the British White Paper

of 193954 and the recommendations of the Anglo-

American Committee of Inquiry of 1946.55

Nevertheless, the international community’s ultimate

response to Arab opposition was not to abandon

the goal of Jewish sovereignty, but rather to endorse

the concept of partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and

an Arab state. This position would eventually find its

form in two central documents—the Peel Commission

Report of 1937 and, even more significant, the

UN General Assembly Partition Resolution of 1947.

Both of these documents affirmed the historic legitimacy

of reconstituting a Jewish state while embracing

the proposal to establish an Arab state alongside it.56

Indeed, these early partition documents—which

expressly endorse the idea of a Jewish state—represent

the precursor to today’s two-state solution framework.

When viewed in this historical context, the current

controversy surrounding the idea of Jewish statehood

as part of the two-state solution seems peculiar. After

all, the historical and conceptual basis for the two-state

model is grounded in the need to give expression to

competing Jewish and Arab national claims. It should

follow that embracing the two-state vision means

endorsing separate Jewish and Palestinian claims to

self-determination, in respective sovereign states.

Background on the two reports is instructive. The

Peel Commission was established by Great Britain

in 1936 following an outbreak of Arab riots and violence

against Jewish residents of Palestine. The commission

members, after hearing a wide range of views,

concluded that any solution to the Palestine conflict

other than partition was either unfeasible or contrary

to British moral and political obligations. In defending

the concept of partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and

an Arab state, the commission argued as follows:

Partition enables the Jews in the fullest sense to call

their National Home their own; for it converts it

into a Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to admit

many Jews into it as they themselves believe can

be absorbed. They will attain the primary objective

of Zionism—a Jewish nation, planted in Palestine,

giving its nationals the same status in the world as

other nations give theirs. They will cease at last to

live a minority life.… To both Arabs and Jews Partition

offers a prospect—and there is none in any other

policy—of obtaining the inestimable boon of peace.57

These sentiments were given powerful international

support when Britain announced its desire to

terminate the Mandate and placed the “Question of

Palestine” before the United Nations. In response to a

British request, the UN General Assembly first established

a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)

in May 1947. UNSCOP, with representatives from

eleven nations, was called upon to investigate the

cause of the conflict in Palestine and, if possible, devise

a solution.58 Against the background of the Holocaust

and echoing the Peel Commission, the UNSCOP

report concluded:

By providing, as one of the main obligations of the

mandatory Power the facilitation of Jewish immigration,

it [the League of Nations Mandate] conferred

upon the Jews an opportunity, through large-scale

immigration, to create eventually a Jewish State with

a Jewish majority. Both the Balfour Declaration and

the Mandate involved international commitments to

the Jewish people as a whole.… It would appear that

the clear implication of the Jewish contention that the

National Home can be safeguarded from Arab domination

only when it can stand by itself is that an independent

Jewish State in all or part of Palestine is the

only means of securing the promise of the Mandate

for a Jewish National Home.59

However, the UNSCOP report recognized that

these commitments had to take account of the difficult

realities on the ground and be weighed against

commitments made to, and rights claimed by, the Arab

population of Palestine.60 The committee rejected the

idea of a unitary Jewish or Arab state, a binational

state, or a cantonal state. Instead, the majority report

endorsed the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and

an Arab state, with economic union and with respect

for democratic principles and minority rights. It

argued that

the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both

possessing validity, are irreconcilable, and…among

all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide

the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is

the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting

in part the claims and national aspirations of both

parties.61

It was the UNSCOP report that laid the groundwork

for the adoption by the UN General Assembly of Partition

Resolution 181. Adopted on November 29, 1947, by

a vote of thirty-three to thirteen (with ten abstentions),

the resolution formally recommended the termination

of the British Mandate and the partition of Palestine

into a Jewish and an Arab state. The resolution—which

mentions the term “Jewish state” no fewer than thirty

times—largely followed UNSCOP’s recommendations

regarding the practical and legal parameters for partition

and, most notably, gave formal UN legitimacy to

the very concept of a Jewish state.

While the Arab states’ violent rejection of the resolution

prevented it from being realized, the resolution

itself provides unassailable evidence of the extent

of international support for Jewish sovereignty in the

context of partition. From a legal perspective, Israel’s

subsequent establishment in May 1948, and its admission

to the United Nations in the following year, was

not formally based on Resolution 181, which remained

unimplemented. Nevertheless, it is clear from the

political context in which these events took place that

those states that recognized the new state and supported

its admission into the family of nations did so,

at least in part, because they viewed the status of the

Jews as a people as unquestionable and the establishment

of a Jewish national home in Palestine as necessary

and legitimate.62

As discussed earlier, with the establishment of

Israel and its acceptance into the United Nations, the

urgency of pursuing additional recognition for Jewish

statehood diminished. Recognition of Israel was seen

at the time as synonymous with acceptance of Jewish

self-determination. While Arab opposition to the Jewish

state remained widespread, Israel’s representatives

could be satisfied that a major component of the Zionist

program had been achieved and that the Jewish state

had earned a place in the family of nations, though not

yet in the region of which it was part.

Negotiation History

It is noteworthy that in the history of the peace process,

Palestinian negotiators have not always resisted

acknowledgment of Israel’s Jewish character. Despite

asserting the right of return for Palestinian refugees

(while showing a willingness to negotiate the manner

of its implementation) and defending minority rights

for Israel’s Palestinian Arab citizens, Palestinian negotiators—

beginning with Yasser Arafat himself—did

not seem to view the recognition claim to be quite as

problematic as they do today.

This is not to say that Palestinian representatives

recognized the historic legitimacy of Jewish selfdetermination

or the Zionist narrative. Little evidence

exists for that. But, in the context of peace process

negotiations, some measure of acceptance for Jewish

national claims, side by side with Palestinian claims,

was tolerated by Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) leaders and negotiators.

In the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (of

November 15, 1988, in Algiers), for example, General

Assembly Resolution 181 was recognized as partitioning

Palestine into “two states, one Arab, one Jewish”

and as the source of “international legitimacy that

ensure[s] the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to

sovereignty.”63

In his speech before the UN General Assembly one

month after the Algiers Declaration, Arafat reiterated

the PLO’s position that despite “the historic wrong

done to our people,” the partition resolution calling for

the establishment of “two states in Palestine, one Palestinian

Arab and one Jewish…continues to meet the

requirements of international legitimacy.”64

These sentiments were later echoed by the Palestinian

delegation at the 1991 Madrid peace conference,

which asserted that the 1988 declaration signified

the acceptance by the Palestinian people of the

two-state solution based on Resolution 181—the

same resolution that had been roundly rejected some

forty years before precisely because it endorsed Jewish

sovereignty.65

Even if these statements do not indicate official

Palestinian acceptance of any claimed historic Jewish

right in Palestine, they do suggest a willingness

to come to terms with the considerable international

support behind the idea of a Jewish nation-state. Most

important, by embracing Resolution 181 as the source

of “international legitimacy,” Palestinian representatives

tied the justification for Palestinian sovereignty to

the recognition of parallel Jewish sovereignty.66 When

compared with the PLO covenant of 1968—which

asserts that “the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the

establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal”

and that “Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent

nationality”—the significance of the 1988 declaration

cannot be overlooked.67

While this issue was not a prominent feature of

the 1990s interim agreements between Israel and the

PLO, it emerged again in the context of permanentstatus

negotiations conducted both under Israeli prime

minister Ehud Barak with Chairman Arafat and in the

Annapolis peace process negotiations of 2007–2008.

Under the interim agreements, the PLO formally

accepted Israel’s right to exist in peace and security,

as expressed most notably in the exchange of letters

between Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

that immediately preceded the Declaration of Principles

of September 13, 1993, and took steps to alter

the PLO covenant accordingly.68 Yet perhaps because

only interim issues rather than a permanent settlement

or Palestinian statehood were being negotiated at the

time, the issue of Jewish national rights did not emerge

in any detailed way.

During the final-status negotiations between Prime

Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat, however, the

issue of Jewish statehood arose on numerous occasions,

particularly in the context of negotiating the refugee

issue. Then, as now, Israeli negotiators viewed the Palestinian

claim of a right of return for refugees to sovereign

Israeli territory as a threat to Israel’s status as a

Jewish state, and sought to resolve refugee claims in a

manner that was consistent with this basic interest.

The recognition issue received direct attention in

the framework of the so-called Clinton Parameters of

December 2000—a last-ditch effort by President Bill

Clinton to outline the terms of a possible agreement

before he left office. In describing the issue of refugee

return, President Clinton noted that Israel could not

accept a right to immigrate that would “threaten the

Jewish character of the state.” As such, he asserted:

Any solution will…have to be consistent with the

two-state approach that both sides have accepted as a

way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A new state

of Palestine is about to be created as the homeland of

the Palestinian people, just as Israel was established as

the homeland for the Jewish people.69

What is striking is that in the extensive and detailed

reservations issued by the PLO to the Clinton Parameters

in early 2001, no challenge was raised to the

basic principle advocated by President Clinton that

the refugee issue should be resolved in a manner consistent

with the concept of two homelands for two

peoples—one Palestinian and one Jewish. While the

PLO took issue with Clinton’s practical proposals, it

not only failed to question his conceptual framework

but explicitly noted that the Palestinians were willing

to think “flexibly and creatively” about implementing

refugee return in order, among other things, “to

accommodate Israeli concerns.”70

One probably should not read too much into this

Palestinian omission, but it is noteworthy that Chairman

Arafat subsequently echoed it on record. Writing

in the New York Times in February 2002, Arafat

explained, “We understand Israel’s demographic concerns

and understand that the right of return of Palestinian

refugees, a right guaranteed under international

law and United Nations Resolution 194, must be

implemented in a way that takes into account such concerns.”

71 In a subsequent June 2004 interview with the

Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Arafat was asked explicitly

whether he understood that “Israel has to keep being

a Jewish state.” He responded, “Definitely, definitely, I

told them we had accepted [this] openly and officially

in 1988.”72 These sentiments, though arguably expressed

only for public consumption, nevertheless indicate a

readiness on Arafat’s part to publicly acknowledge the

legitimacy of Israel’s desire to maintain its Jewish character

in a way that the current Palestinian leadership has

not, as yet, been willing to contemplate.

The issue of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state only

returned to the negotiating table with the launch of

permanent-status talks under the Annapolis process. In

the years of terrorism and violence that separated the

breakdown of earlier permanent-status talks and their

renewal at Annapolis in 2007, the issue took on new

and weightier dimensions for both sides. For Israeli

leaders, the process of delegitimization of the Jewish

state in the region and beyond made the issue of recognition

paramount. For Palestinian leaders, the demand

for recognition served as further evidence that Israel

was keen to protect its own interests but not ready to

accommodate Palestinian ones.

In the context of the Annapolis negotiations, both

Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni

sought Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish

homeland, but their Palestinian interlocutors were wary

of Israeli intentions and reluctant to concede. 

As discussed

in the text that follows, Israeli diplomats enjoyed

some success during this period in enlisting renewed recognition

for Israel as a Jewish state from several important

international figures, but Palestinian representatives

were patently unwilling to entertain the notion.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore

in detail the reasons for this stance during the Annapolis

negotiations, several possible explanations—beyond

principled opposition to the claim—can briefly be

offered. Even among those Palestinian negotiators

who may have been willing privately to contemplate

recognition for Jewish collective rights in some form,

the timing of the Israeli demand—at the outset of the

Annapolis process—made it unacceptable from their

perspective for a number of reasons.

First, Palestinian negotiators perceived the

demand as an attempt to predetermine the resolution

of the refugee issue and thus refused to even consider

possible formulations outside the context of an agreement

that addressed and resolved this question. Second,

from a tactical perspective, the force with which

the Israeli side pursued this demand indicated to

their Palestinian interlocutors its value as a negotiating

card, and as a result, the Palestinians were reluctant

to contemplate acceding to it without significant

returns. Finally, representatives of Israel’s Palestinian

Arab minority as well as Hamas figures had emerged

in a way not visible a decade earlier in order to warn

the Palestinian leadership against officially accepting

any legitimacy for Jewish statehood. A weakened

Palestinian leadership, deeply concerned about criticism

and accusations of betrayal for controversial

concessions, simply lacked the inclination to entertain

such a demand, at least in the absence of a farreaching

agreement.

Since the Annapolis negotiations were suspended at

the close of 2008, Israel has continued to insist on the

importance of recognition of Jewish statehood in the

context of a peace agreement. Across Israel’s political

spectrum, relatively broad support exists for advancing

this claim. However, the Palestinian side thus far

has shown little sign of flexibility on the issue, and

Palestinian and Arab figures expressed fresh opposition

after the renewal of direct negotiations in September

2010.73

For his part, though he has studiously avoided any

recognition of Jewish self-determination rights, President

Mahmoud Abbas has recently been willing to

publicly acknowledge the history of Jewish presence in

Palestine74 and has not always been averse to using the

term “two states for two peoples.”75 Indeed, contrary to

comments by Netanyahu,76 U.S. special envoy George

Mitchell has asserted in repeated briefings that both

leaders have at least agreed that the goal of the negotiations

should be the establishment of “two states for

two peoples,” rather than just “two states.”77

As will be argued in the following sections, it is possible

that some Palestinian opposition to this claim

centers more on the context in which the demand is

raised and the manner in which it is formulated than

on the concept itself. The idea of mutual recognition

of Jewish and Palestinian national rights may at the

appropriate time, and in the right context and format,

become acceptable to those committed to the twostate

framework and to a conflict-ending agreement.

But to test this proposition, we must first grapple with

the substantive objections raised against the claim,

and contend with the inflated and misleading dimensions

this issue has acquired in Israeli and Palestinian

public discourse.

Recent Examples of Recognition

Before turning to the arguments raised by opponents

of recognition, brief attention should be given to

more recent international expressions of support for

this claim. As efforts to delegitimize Israel’s Jewish

character have intensified, Israeli leaders have increasingly

sought renewed international recognition of

Israel as a Jewish nation-state. During the tenure of

prime ministers Sharon and Olmert in particular,

a concerted diplomatic effort was undertaken to

attract international support for this claim, alongside

continuing demands for recognition from the Palestinian

leadership.

In this context, the United States under both

Presidents Bush and Obama has given clear and consistent

support to the notion of a Jewish state. As

early as November 2001, then secretary of state Colin

Powell asserted:

Both sides will need to face up to some plain truths

about where this process is heading as they turn to

the challenges of negotiating permanent status issues.

Palestinians must eliminate any doubt, once and for

all, that they accept the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish

state. They must make clear that their objective is a

Palestinian state alongside Israel, not in place of Israel,

and which takes full account of Israel’s security needs

[emphasis added].78

Similar statements were issued repeatedly by numerous

senior U.S. officials throughout the Bush administration.

79 Most significant, President Bush himself frequently

went on record declaring the U.S. commitment

to “Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for the Jewish

people.”80 Such expressions included his April 2004

letter to Prime Minister Sharon in which he affirmed

that “the United States is strongly committed to Israel’s

security and well-being as a Jewish state.”81

This general approach has continued under the

Obama administration, which from the outset

declared its intent to pursue a policy of “working with

Israelis and Palestinians to achieve the goal of two

states: a Jewish state in Israel and a Palestinian state

living side by side in peace and security.”82 Secretary

of State Hillary Clinton and Special Envoy George

Mitchell have regularly repeated this message, and

President Obama has consistently referred to Israel as

a Jewish state or as the homeland of the Jewish people,

including in his latest address to the UN General

Assembly.83 Most recently, U.S. State Department

spokesperson Philip Crowley responded to questions

about Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand for recognition

in the following terms:

We have recognized the special nature of the Israeli

state. It is a state for the Jewish people. It is a state for

other citizens of other faiths as well.… We understand

this aspiration, and the prime minister was talking

yesterday about the fact that just as they aspire to a

state for the Jewish people in the Middle East, they

understand the aspirations of the Palestinian people

for a state of their own.84

Similar expressions of recognition have come from

several European and international figures, though

many others have preferred to adhere to the language

of “two states” without recourse to terminology they

know to be controversial from a Palestinian and Arab

perspective. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France,85

Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany,86 Italian prime

minister Silvio Berlusconi,87 former Spanish prime

minister José María Aznar, and former Peruvian president

Alejandro Toledo88 are among those who have

recently given public support to Israel’s status as a Jewish

state.

Within the European Union, the concept of “two

national states” was endorsed by consensus at the 2007

EuroMed Conference in Lisbon,89 with the participation

of Palestinian and Arab representatives. Similarly,

the EU’s Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia

(now the European Agency for Fundamental

Rights) has defined denying the right of the Jewish

people to self-determination as a form of anti-Semitism 90—

a formulation subsequently adopted by the

U.S. State Department and relevant units of the Organization

for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Finally, mention can be made of former UN secretary general

Kofi Annan, who in his parting address on the

Middle East to the Security Council called for a resolution

“that respects the rights of Palestinian refugees

and is consistent with the two-state solution and with

the character of the states in the region.”91

Such expressions of recognition, despite Palestinian

and Arab opposition, indicate a continuing commitment—

by at least some in the international community—

to the underlying rationale of two national

homelands, the same rationale that dictated the logic

of partition in the first place. As will be in subsequent

chapters, international actors may have a greater role to

play in facilitating resolution of this issue by developing

a formulation that addresses legitimate Palestinian concerns

while responding adequately to core Israeli needs.

Palestinian, Arab, and Other Objections

EVEN IF THE claim to Jewish self-determination,

side by side with corresponding Palestinian rights,

enjoys considerable historical and international support,

its recognition remains deeply problematic for

Palestinian and Arab leaders. Indeed, Palestinian

and Arab representatives have opposed such recognition

with overwhelming consistency, on numerous

grounds, and generally with the same degree

of conviction as that demonstrated by the claim’s

Israeli proponents.

Given the increasing weight attributed to this

issue in the context of negotiations, its resolution has

assumed major importance in advancing the cause of

Israeli-Palestinian peace. What has been lacking is

a serious attempt to examine the merits of the claim,

along with serious consideration of the substantive

objections raised by the Palestinian side and the way

they might be addressed in practice.

For those who reject the two-state model, or who

believe that the very idea of the nation-state should

be abandoned, the case for recognition of Jewish and

Palestinian national rights will likely fall on deaf ears.

More worthy of attention, however, are objections to

the claim for recognition raised by those who ostensibly

endorse a two-state solution. These voices openly

embrace partition as the only feasible model for resolving

the conflict, and yet they are unwilling to support

an agreement that publicly affirms both Jewish and

Palestinian rights to self-determination.

For those who claim that the refusal to recognize

Israel as a Jewish state conceals a deep-seated rejection

of the two-state solution itself (regardless of the rhetoric

to the contrary), it is important to show that any

legitimate, ancillary concerns regarding recognition

can be overcome. By the same token, opponents of recognition

who claim to nevertheless support the two state

vision have an interest in demonstrating that their

objections do not stem from any fundamental problem

with the idea of Jewish and Palestinian coexistence in

two sovereign states. The next section seeks to explore

these challenges in further detail.

An Unnecessary Demand

Perhaps the most straightforward objection to the

claim for recognition is that it is simply unnecessary.

Even if theoretically legitimate, it is seen by some as

complicating negotiations that are already exceedingly

difficult.

To begin with, it is important to distinguish

between the legitimacy of the Jewish people’s right to

self-determination and the insistence that this right be

expressly recognized as part of a political agreement.

Those who argue that recognition of Israel’s status as a

Jewish state is unnecessary need not consider the status

itself to be illegitimate. Many peace agreements sidestep

or obfuscate issues that, while legitimate and even

agreed upon, are considered too politically charged for

one party or another to publicly acclaim.

Unsurprisingly, Palestinian representatives harbor

deep skepticism about the actual need for such formal

recognition. They are quick to point out that recognition

of Israel as a Jewish state was neither demanded

nor attained in Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and

Jordan. Indeed, the issue of recognition does not feature

in the agreements between Israel and the PLO as

a permanent-status issue to be resolved in negotiations.

Palestinian representatives also argue that the corollary

to recognition of a Palestinian state is not recognition

of Jewish rights but of the state of Israel—something

that was already realized in the 1993 exchange of letters

between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin,

in which the PLO affirmed “the right of the State of

Israel to exist in peace and security.” And they contend,

as President Abbas has repeatedly argued, that Israel is

entitled to define its own internal character but should

not and need not seek public Palestinian recognition

for this definition.92

Palestinian and Arab representatives are not alone

in questioning the necessity of recognition. They are

joined by some prominent Israelis, a significant number

of whom are known to be strong advocates of

Israel’s Jewish character but oppose seeking Palestinian

recognition for it.93